Essay Question: ‘In the post-war period, the desire to control Middle Eastern oil

has driven US politics in the region’. Discuss.

Instructions are to write a 2500 word essay for Politics of World Economy Module.

MLA format bibliography and in-text citation.

Attached to this request is my friends past essay on the same question, use it as inspiration but don’t copy, hope it helps out.

Politics of the World Economy – 153400083-A18/19 AS2

‘In the post-war period, the desire to control Middle Eastern oil

has driven US politics in the region’. Discuss.

Wordcount: 2338

Petroleum is an essential resource for the productivity of economies, from everyday life to industries, oil has been central since it became a commodity during the 20th century. What has made it so crucial and shaped the geopolitics of the 20th century concerns its geographical limitations as not every country possess their own oil reserves. I will argue that to an extent United States (U.S.) politics in the Middle East has been driven for the securitisation of fossil fuels. The U.S. desire to contain the spread of communism within this region can be also be linked to the securitisation of oil within this region. However, within the Middle Eastern region, the U.S. did go against its interest in oil due to structural power within its domestic politics. I will delimit my post-war era from 1945 to 1989, as well as, the analysis won’t be studied chronologically. Firstly, I will present the theoretical background of modern mercantilism and realism. Secondly, I will briefly present the US geopolitical background in the Middle East before the post-war era. Thirdly, I will analysis three main U.S. policies (Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine and Carter Doctrine). Fourthly, I will counterargue through neo-classical realism that the irrational U.S. backing of Israel alienated to an extent its vital interest in the Middle East. Lastly, I will conclude that the shaping of U.S foreign policies in the Middle East is the correlation of its desire and necessity for Middle Eastern oil, but also, the need to block communist expansion within this region. However, structural power has affected U.S. politics within the Middle East and strayed away from its vital interest in oil.

According to Robert Gilpin (1975), economic nationalism represents the modern mercantilist model, where states use the economy in order to boost their interest. Such interest can be internal affairs or foreign policies. He argues that “the essence of mercantilism … is the priority of national economic and political objectives over considerations of global economic efficiency” (Gilpin, 1975; cited in Cohen, 2005, p. 45-46; Pryke,2012). Moreover, he argues that economic policies are therefore a mean for power in the chaotic world of international politics (Gilpin, 2001, p.14; cited in Pryke, 2012, p.283). This view is emphasised by O’Brien and Williams (2017) by portraying economic nationalism in the international political economy as the twin of realism in international relations (O’Brien and Williams, 2017; cited in Pryke, 2012, p. 283).

In addition, according to Hans Morgenthau (1948), realism regards states as the principal rational actor in the anarchical world as there is no higher governing body than states themselves. States are primarily concerned with their national security. So, the making of foreign policy targets the reinforcement of one’s national security, but also, its vital interests (Morgenthau, 1948).

I believe that such theoretical depiction reinforces the case that I will make regarding U.S. policies towards the Middle-East; states are central to the analysis of foreign policies as through the latter they seek to maximise their power for their own interest and security. But also, it leads my analysis towards the realist theory which will portray the U.S. containment policy towards the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern region.

The geopolitics of oil took a turn when the US government realised its own petroleum reserves might deplete due to its over extraction for the wartime effort during WWII. As a result, Franklin, D. Roosevelt decided to explore the possibilities of importing oil to the U.S. and securing the U.S. reserves for a future war (Klare, 2012, p. 32). The non-affiliation of Saudi Arabia with any western country led to the first diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and the US government. Such a relationship can be termed as a ‘lethal embrace’, termed by Michael Klare (Klare, 2004, p.26). From this point onward, Saudi Arabia’s oil has been regarded as a national interest and the U.S. sought to defend its security and strategy no matter the cost which is reflected in 1945 Roosevelt-Ibn Saud Agreement. Consequently, the U.S. major owned Saudi oil for the absolute political and military protection of the Saudi Crown (Klare, 2012, p.32). This agreement is the bedrock of U.S. involvement in the Middle East to secure its shipping routes and to access petroleum in the region.

Compared to the U.S. production of a barrel, Middle-Eastern petroleum was a bargain; the production and importation of a barrel to the U.S. was $0.75p in exchange for $2.40 in the U.S, therefore $1.65 of profit before rent was subtracted (Erenow, n.d.). As a consequence, the U.S. became rapidly dependent on Middle Eastern oil which drove and boosted the U.S. economy in the post-war era and helped to position itself as a superpower. However, until the 1970s, the U.S. was not fully involved in the region due to the British presence. Such stance changed with the withdrawal of Britain from the Suez Canal in 1971 (Klare, 2012, p.33).

The post-war era corresponds, also, to the Cold War period due to the rising tensions between Washington and Moscow. Thus, to block the spread of communism worldwide, containment policies were enacted. Yet, when analysing U.S. containment policies, we must correlate them with U.S. national interest and strategic importance of oil within the Middle East. Moreover, the underlying politics of oil is not yet explicit within its politics of the Middle East as the U.S. is a new external actor; thus, its policies were being shaped and defined within this particular context, but also, due to the presence of U.S. allies within the region so it did not need to fully engage itself.

To start, the first U.S. containment policy in the Middle East was shaped due to a conflict over the Northern region of Iran, proclaimed the Republic of Azerbaijan under Soviet’s influence in 1946. Therefore, in 1947, the Truman Doctrine was implemented in order to contain Soviet aspirations in the Middle East; especially in Iran, but also in Eastern Mediterranean ports (Klare, 2004, p.39). We can connote an underlying assumption through the realist theory that such U.S. foreign policy in regard to the Soviet Union expansion in Eurasia targeted the protection and securitisation of U.S. national interests in Saudi Arabia as its oil importations and shipping routes could have been compromised or blocked (Klare, 2004, p.40).

Furthermore, the rise of nationalism in Iran resulted in the nationalisation of its oil reserves, which was followed by an embargo on exported Iranian oil by the oil majors. Accordingly, it affected severally the Iranian economy, which urged the U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower to back a coup against the Prime Minister Mossadegh to put in place the previous pro-western regime in order to contain the possibility of Soviet’s embrace with Iran “Given the economic consequences of the embargo, Iran was ripe for a communist takeover” (Sampson, 1975, p.121; cited in Halabi, 2009, p. 34). Consequently, Iran was seen as the door for the spread of communism in the Middle East, as well as, having the ability to easily destabilise the whole region which would have jeopardised U.S. interest. We can correlate such thinking to the development of the domino theory as a U.S. policy in the 1950s which stressed the need to contain at any cost the spread of communism. This theory emphasised that a loss of a state to communism will ultimately lead to the fall of neighbouring states towards the Soviet’s sphere of influence.

Additionally, the following U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East was signed by the U.S. Congress in 1957 – the Eisenhower doctrine was produced following the Suez Crisis of 1956. The politics behind such doctrine was again the containment of the Soviet Union within the region; however, its particularity lays within the economic assistance or military aid given by the U.S. to Middle Eastern countries in order to strengthen U.S. allies’ regimes in the region. Such doctrine was enacted as a result of an earlier Soviet intrusion in Egypt.

These two past doctrines show us that during the 1950s and 1960s, they help the U.S. government to shape and define its interest within the Middle East due to no previous diplomatic relations before WWII and a need to culturally understand the region. Therefore, it highlights the subtle foreign policies that are not ‘supposedly’ concerned with the securitisation of oil in the region; but, implicitly through the containment policies. The securitisation of oil will become explicit in 1980 through the Carter Doctrine by showing an aggressive political and military stance to anyone meddling in its interests.

“Let out position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including force” (Carter, 1980; cited in Klare, 2012, p.33). Such policy laid the contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitics of oil due to the reinforced military presence in the region by appointing U.S military bases and a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) (Klare, 2012, p.33). The vital interests portrayed by President Carter regards the geostrategic location of the Straits of Hormuz as it is the most used oil shipping routes in the world, therefore an aggression by rival actors would have led to the disruption of oil supply to the U.S. By being military present in the region, the U.S. had the advantage to repress any disorder quickly; hence it would not impact its economy and its importation. The implementation of such doctrine occurred due to the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the fall of the U.S. backed regime in Iran and the impossibility of Saudi Arabia to ensure Middle Eastern security due to its weak military forces (Halabi, 2009, p.62).

Even though U.S. politics in the Middle East in regard to oil were subtle before 1980 – the Cold War context helped to cover the U.S. aims, the need to control and to stabilise such region for its oil importation which resulted from its vital need of fossil fuel to feed its economy as it would have not strived without it. Hence, such geopolitical context brought the U.S. to take a stronger stance in regard to the Middle East due to its desire for oil. But also, due to a change of power relations between the Arab states and the U.S., exerted by the nationalisation of oil. The consequences of the Carter Doctrine are still being felt in the U.S. politics in the Middle East nowadays as the fall of the Soviet Union did not bring an end to U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East; thus, U.S. containment policies helped cover the geopolitics of oil from the post-war period.

The realist paradigm sees states as rational actors that are seeking to maximise their material power and protect their national interests. Contrarily, the sub-discipline of neo-classical realism emphasises the domestic politics that shape foreign politics with an emphasis on structural power (Zakaria, 1992, p.198). Such structural power can be traced back to U.S. domestic politics in foreign policies in the Middle East as there is a blurring of the U.S. national interest in this region as it cannot differentiate its vital and peripheral interest when it comes to Israel (Halabi, 2009, p.43-44).

U.S. support for Israel is irrational and go against U.S. vital interest within this region because it should be considered as a peripheral interest. However, many times U.S. relations with Arab producer states were put in danger due to its affiliation with powerful Jewish lobbyist that advanced their agenda in U.S. domestic politics, which impacted the U.S. position in the Middle East. Such stance can be traced back to the post-war era, under Truman (Truman got elected to office through the support of powerful Zionist lobbyist, asking for in return the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (Halabi, 2009, p.42). Even though at the beginning the U.S. viewed Israel as a ‘strategic liability’, Israel expansionism in neighbouring countries was also seen as a threat to the U.S. as it was alienating Arab states and handed them over to Soviet’s influence (Halabi, 2009, p. 46). Many policies were enacted in order for the U.S. to be impartial within the Arab/Israeli conflict and it limited its sales of arm within the region. However, the power held by the U.S. pro-Israeli lobbyists in government weakened U.S. position and power over Israel. One example that can depict the damage of U.S. vital interest due to U.S. backing of Israel is the Oil Embargo of 1973 that lasted until 1974. Oil, as seen previously, is classified as a national interest and security. The oil embargo against the U.S. led by Arab states (through OPEC) occurred as a result of the U.S. military support for Israel in the October War of 1973. Therefore, Arab oil-producing states retaliated through a decrease in oil production by 5%. Consequently, the embargo created an oil price shock which undermined the U.S. but also the global economy through recession and high inflation (Halabi, 2009, p.63-64). The retaliation by the Arab states is showing us the extent to which the U.S. domestic politics undermined the securitisation of oil as it should have stayed impartial within the conflict. So, it was an irrational actor due to the influence exerted by structural power within its domestic politics. Briefly, the oil embargo also shows us the change of power within the international political economy of oil during that period, which will be reclaimed by the U.S. by taking a different stance on the Middle East through the Carter doctrine and post-cold war era.

I conclude that to an extent the U.S politics in the Middle did, definitely, target its essential need to acquire fossil fuel in the post-war period. And, it is linked to the Cold War era, so, therefore had to contain Soviet expansionism in the region in order to protect its interest. However, within U.S. domestic politics, structural power by pro-Israeli lobbyist undermined its vital interests by bringing instability in the region and challenges to U.S. interests.

Bibliography:

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Gilpin, R. (2001). Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Halabi, Y. (2009). US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From Crises to Change. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1976). ‘International Relations and Domestic structures: Foreign economic policies of Advanced Industrial States’, International organization, 30, pp. 1-45; in Cohen, B. J. (2005). International Political Economy. Hants: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

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Klare, M. T. (2012). ‘The Changing Geopolitics of Oil’, in Looney, R. E. (2012). Handbook of Oil Politics. London: Routledge, p. 30-33.

Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics Among Nations. New York: A. A. Knopf.

Pryke, S. (2012). ‘Economic Nationalism: Theory, History and Prospects’, Global Policy, 3(September 2012): 281-291.