– analyze the factors that influence free trade.
– Do countries have the right to act in their own strategic interests? What about their security interests?
• Who are legitimate advocates for free trade – governments, companies, and/or NGOs?
• Who determines what is free trade? Do governments have the right? Do citizens have a right to have a say in this debate?
• What are the rules for state-run companies? Are they different from public companies run for the benefit of their shareholders?
MBA 200: Who is U.S.?
Drake University Online Programs 1
Assignment: Who’s Afraid of China Inc.? Paper
Assignment Objective
In this assignment, you will analyze the factors that influence free trade.
Overview
For this assignment, you will write a 5-page paper. Answer the following questions. Support your answers with sources from this week’s readings and other research performed on your own.
• Do countries have the right to act in their own strategic interests? What about their security interests?
• Who are legitimate advocates for free trade – governments, companies, and/or NGOs?
• Who determines what is free trade? Do governments have the right? Do citizens have a right to have a say in this debate?
• What are the rules for state-run companies? Are they different from public companies run for the benefit of their shareholders?
Requirements
Ensure your paper meets the following requirements.
• Is 5 pages in length, not including title page and references. • Follows current APA style and format guidelines.
o Feel free to use the attached template, which includes APA style reminders. o Refer to Other Resources, accessible from course menu in Blackboard, for APA
Resources. • Includes at least 3 references.
9/8/2020 Who’s Afraid of China Inc.? – The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/24/business/yourmoney/whos-afraid-of-china-inc.html 1/5
By Steve Lohr
July 24, 2005
WILLIAM A. REINSCH, an avowed free trader, welcomes China’s rising stature in the international economy. After all, he is the president of the National Foreign Trade Council, an organization founded in 1914 to promote an “open world trading system.” Indeed, when he was a senior trade official in the Clinton administration, Mr. Reinsch was chided by some security analysts who said he was being soft on China by placing matters of commerce ahead of national security.
But even Mr. Reinsch is uneasy about China’s attempt to buy Unocal, a midsize American oil company. The outcome of the takeover contest for Unocal is uncertain, and last week its board embraced an improved offer from Chevron. Yet Cnooc, a government-backed Chinese oil company, still has the higher offer — and it could up the ante.
If the Chinese bid proceeds, Mr. Reinsch wants to see a thorough national security review of the deal, one that goes beyond the usual focus on weapons technology to include energy security. “Our Army, Navy and Air Force run on oil,” he explained.
Oil is the ultimate geopolitical commodity — it is “The Prize,” as Daniel Yergin titled his epic history of petroleum and international politics. And even if Cnooc fails to grab Unocal, the pursuit has pushed the two sides of the Chinese challenge together and into the spotlight of public debate. For China is both an engine of economic globalization and an emerging military power. In symbolic shorthand, it is Wal-Mart with an army.
The two sides aren’t neatly divided. But those who focus on economics tend to see partnership, cooperation and reasons for optimism despite tensions, while security experts are more pessimistic and anticipate strategic conflict as the likely future for two political systems that are so different.
In China, there are also two camps — the security hawks and the economic modernists, according to China analysts. The modernists see China joining the United States as the second great economic power of the 21st century, and the two nations sharing the gains from increased trade ties and global growth. The hawks regard that view as naïve, and fret that American policy is to remain the world’s only superpower and to curb China’s rise. So China’s response, the hawks say, is to try to erode United States hegemony and reduce America’s power to hold China down.
Who’s Afraid of China Inc.?
9/8/2020 Who’s Afraid of China Inc.? – The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/24/business/yourmoney/whos-afraid-of-china-inc.html 2/5
Both faces of China have been evident recently. Two weeks ago, a senior Chinese military official, Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu, said China should use nuclear weapons against the United States if the American military intervenes in any conflict over Taiwan. Then, bowing to pressure from the United States and other trading partners, China announced last Thursday that it would no longer peg its currency tightly to the dollar. It is a measured step, and it will not do much to moderate China’s huge trade surplus with the United States anytime soon. But the move is a sign of flexibility and accommodation.
“Do we see each other inevitably as antagonists, or do we see a world of globalization from which both sides benefit? That is the big issue,” said Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior official in the National Security Council during the Clinton administration.
“And that framework, one way or another,” added Mr. Lieberthal, a China analyst and a professor at the University of Michigan business school, “will drive an enormous number of policy decisions.”
So that is the China question: Is it an opportunity or a threat? If nothing else, the Cnooc bid for Unocal has shown how unsettled American thinking is on China and how deep the anxieties run, both in matters of national security and trade.
It is easy to dismiss Washington as a hot-air factory, but the scope of the outcry in Congress is significant. Resolutions and legislative proposals, all critical of Cnooc’s takeover bid, have piled up in the House and Senate, from Republicans and Democrats. A resolution presented last month by Representative Richard W. Pombo, a California Republican, declared that permitting the Chinese company to buy Unocal would “threaten to impair the national security of the United States.” It passed, 398 to 15.
Senator Byron Dorgan, a North Dakota Democrat, has drafted three pieces of anti-Cnooc legislation that range from calling for a six-month Congressional inquiry into the bid to a bill that would prohibit the deal. Mr. Dorgan objects to the Chinese move on fair-trade grounds. The Chinese government, he says, would not allow an American company to buy a Chinese oil company. “So why on earth should they be able to buy an American oil company?” Mr. Dorgan said.
Yet the Chinese takeover bid taps into a deeper concern about trade and globalization for Mr. Dorgan. He talks of manufacturing jobs lost to China, intellectual-property pirates in China illegally copying American movies and software, and a trade deficit with China that is rising astronomically with no end in sight. “Trade should be mutually beneficial, and it is certainly not with China,” Mr. Dorgan said.
9/8/2020 Who’s Afraid of China Inc.? – The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/24/business/yourmoney/whos-afraid-of-china-inc.html 3/5
The tempest in Congress has increased the political risks surrounding the Cnooc bid. At $18.5 billion, the bid remains higher than Chevron’s sweetened offer of $17 billion. But Wall Street analysts say Cnooc will have to go higher to have a chance to win, offering a sizable premium over the Chevron bid to compensate for delays of a government review of the Chinese offer or even the possibility that Washington may block a Chinese deal.
It would be an extreme step, but Congress has the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations,” under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. “My sense is that Congress is not going to stand still for a Cnooc takeover being approved,” said C. Richard D’Amato, chairman of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, an advisory group to Congress. “That is the political reality.”
Cnooc and its advisers misread the political environment in Washington. Fu Chengyu, the Cnooc chairman who earned a graduate degree from the University of Southern California, has said he was surprised by the intensity of political criticism. Cnooc’s path would have been smoother if it had joined with an American oil company as a partner in its bid, an option that was considered briefly but rejected, according to a person close to the company.
The idea, the person said, would have been that the American company would acquire Unocal’s assets in the United States, while Cnooc took the main prize in the deal — Unocal’s offshore natural gas fields in Asia and its expertise in offshore exploration and production. The gas reserves and skill are considered strategic to China’s goal of moving away from coal and generating 20 percent of the nation’s electricity from natural gas by 2020. “It would have been better to have not made this big move a head-on attack, to have linked up with an American partner so the deal would have been less threatening and less a lightning rod for China politics in the United States,” the person said.
Perhaps, but many economists and trade specialists contend that the American angst over the Cnooc bid says more about the United States than it does about China or Cnooc’s tactics. “All this really points to the anxieties about globalization in our own society,” said Clyde V. Prestowitz, a trade official in the Reagan administration and president of the Economic Strategy Institute in Washington. “We are so economically interdependent with China now and we chose that path.”
Washington pushed for China’s integration into the international economy and its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. American companies have farmed out much of their manufacturing to Chinese factories. American consumers have been on a Chinese shopping spree for years, buying everything from clothes to computers made there. That is why the United States had a record $162 billion trade deficit with China last year. China sits on $700
9/8/2020 Who’s Afraid of China Inc.? – The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/24/business/yourmoney/whos-afraid-of-china-inc.html 4/5
billion in foreign exchange reserves, mostly in dollars. It recycles those funds in good part by investing in United States Treasury bonds; that keeps American interest rates low, fueling the real estate boom.
“We handed China the money they are using to try to buy Unocal,” said Mr. Prestowitz, author of a new book on the shift of wealth and power to Asia, “Three Billion New Capitalists” (Basic Books, 2005). “And now we’re telling the Chinese, please keep investing in our bonds but you can’t invest what amounts to a sliver of their surplus in an oil company. That’s really confused and hypocritical on our part.”
Where others see muddle, R. James Woolsey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Clinton administration, sees strategic clarity in challenging the Cnooc bid. Oil is a globally traded commodity, Mr. Woolsey concedes, but it is also a strategic resource in a market that is tightening because of rising demand from fast-growing nations like China and India. That, Mr. Woolsey says, is before one begins thinking of the possible impact of, say, an act of terrorist sabotage in a crucial Middle East oil field.
“China is realistically assuming there may be a shortage of oil,” said Mr. Woolsey, a vice president in the Booz Allen Hamilton consulting firm.
In China, Mr. Woolsey sees a nation with military ambitions to challenge the United States, and a political system with little regard for human rights and free speech. Cnooc, in Mr. Woolsey’s view, is the corporate vehicle of “a Communist dictatorship.”
The Cnooc move, according to Frank Gaffney Jr., a senior Defense Department official in the Reagan administration, is a step to ensure that China has the resources for its overarching national design. “China’s strategy is to supplant the United States as the premier economic power in the world and, should it become necessary, defeat us militarily,” said Mr. Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy.
The strategic concern was much narrower at William Blair & Company. Until recently, William Blair, the investment firm in Chicago, was the largest outside shareholder in Cnooc, which is majority-owned by the Chinese government. But William Blair sold off its stake, worth about $160 million, in recent weeks because of worries that Cnooc was behaving too much like a state-owned company and not enough like a capitalist enterprise trying to maximize returns to shareholders, explained David Merjan, a fund manager at the firm.
The pricey bid for Unocal, Mr. Merjan said, raised doubts about how independent Cnooc really was from the Chinese government. “If China is going to sell shares in a company like Cnooc to outside shareholders, it should not be run for the benefit of Chinese economic policy,” Mr. Merjan said.
9/8/2020 Who’s Afraid of China Inc.? – The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/24/business/yourmoney/whos-afraid-of-china-inc.html 5/5
CNOOC and its pursuit of Unocal, it seems, are part of China’s evolutionary path. Cnooc is playing its hand with plenty of government help, about $7 billion in loans on terms Western oil companies could not hope to get. Accordingly, Cnooc may be willing and able to overpay. Yes, China is hunting for oil and gas assets around the world as a national priority. Still, that is happening in a nation that is drifting steadily toward a market economy, though one with more central control than Americans view as a free-market economy.
The Chinese Communist Party, with 60 million members — more than the population of France — does guide the economy, if less and less over time. “But think of it as the Chinese bureaucratic capitalist party,” said Mr. Lieberthal of the University of Michigan. “It has nothing really to do with Communism.”
Mr. Lieberthal counts himself as among the optimists on China. Globalization, he says, and continued integration of the Chinese and American economies can work to mutual benefit. The spread of middle-class affluence and education across more of the Chinese population should eventually be a force for democratic liberalization, following the pattern of Taiwan and South Korea.
“Am I a hundred percent sure I’m right? No, but that’s the long-term bet I’d make,” Mr. Lieberthal said. “And if you let the pessimists — the people who believe that the U.S. and China will inevitably be enemies — drive policy, then the outcome will be the one they predict.”
The New Rules of Globalization As more countries rethink their priorities, multinationals must proceed with caution. by Ian Bremmer
The Globe
In the past few years, Pfizer has encoun-tered globalization’s new phase. As part of the Indian government’s efforts to make medicine accessible to as many people as possible, in February 2013 India’s Patent Office revoked Pfizer’s patent for the cancer drug Sutent and granted a domestic manufacturer, Cipla, the right to produce a cheaper generic version. India’s Intel- lectual Property Appellate Board has since set aside the decision and has directed the Patent Office to reassess the case. In China, meanwhile, the government has been slashing drug prices to reduce health care costs. Beijing established price ceil- ings on essential drugs in 2009 and low- ered the ceiling by around 30% in 2011, and
it has pledged to expand the list of essen- tial drugs to more than 500 medications by 2014. Such moves pose major risks for a multinational company like Pfizer: Lower prices create disincentives for quality con- trol, and China’s hospitals, which rely on drug sales for profits, are pushing inexpen- sive locally made products.
Until 2008 going global seemed to make sense for just about every company in the world. Western markets were extremely competitive, population expansion had slowed and incomes had flattened, and cor- porate operating costs were rising. Devel- oping nations, by contrast, boasted popu- lation growth, rising salaries, relatively low wages, and a welcoming climate for foreign Ph
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Coca-Cola lines a shelf at a supermarket in
shanghai in may 2009.
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investment. As distances shrank because of modern transportation and communica tion technologies, chasing growth globally became universally logical, and trade and capital flows surged.
In the aftermath of the recent global recession, we’ve entered a different phase, which I call guarded globalization. Govern ments of developing nations have become wary of opening more industries to multi national companies and are zealously pro tecting local interests. They choose the countries or regions with which they want to do business, pick the sectors in which they will allow capital investment, and select the local, often stateowned, compa nies they wish to promote. That’s a very dif ferent flavor of globalization: slowmoving, selective, and with a heavy dash of nation alism and regionalism.
Several factors have contributed to this trend. One, many governments find it risky to continue opening industries to foreign competition, because local com panies and consumers often attempt to block new entrants. Two, some countries have built large foreign exchange reserves and boosted exports, so they are no longer trying to attract large amounts of foreign investment. Three, governments are de fining national security more broadly. As financial instability, cyber espionage, and increases in food prices, for instance, be come global issues, the financial services, information technology, telecommuni cations, and food sectors have all been politicized.
Four, China, which will soon have the world’s largest economy, now establishes, rather than follows, international business rules and norms. Socialism with Chinese characteristics is casting a long shadow over globalization. Finally, and related, policy makers in developing countries are intervening to create uneven playing fields that give local players an advantage. The state perceives more and more sectors to be of strategic importance and deters foreign companies from entering them. Indeed, the rise of state capitalism in some of the world’s most important emerging markets
has shifted the tectonic plates, as I will de scribe. Globalization now comes with new costs and risks.
In globalization’s heyday, strategic sec tors—those in which governments take an active interest—and nonstrategic ones were easy to identify. Multinational com panies could enter some industries, such as soft drinks, all over the world; other sectors, such as aircraft manufacturing, were offlimits. That’s why CocaCola sells its products in more than 200 countries today, while Lockheed Martin generates 80% of its revenues from sales to the U.S. government and employs 95% of its work force in the United States. In the new era of guarded globalization, however, any sector could prove to be strategic, depending on a government’s attitudes and policies.
Indeed, between the extremes of a CocaCola and a Lockheed Martin, numer ous companies are drawing fresh levels of official scrutiny, and the state’s reach now extends well beyond traditionally key sec tors such as arms. Companies must realize that these changes will have an impact on their strategies, but responding to those changes will not be easy.
The Rise of State Capitalism in Emerging Markets State capitalism, which distorts the work ings of free markets and thus considerably alters globalization, has become popular in emerging markets other than China, such as Russia, India, and Brazil. Leaders in those countries know from experience that the market is crucial to growing the economy and improving living standards— and therefore helps autocratic or corrupt governments stay in power. But they also realize that if they allow the market to de cide which companies win, they risk losing political power, because they will no longer control job creation and their citizens’ liv ing standards. They may also inadvertently enrich those citizens who would challenge their power.
The objective of state capitalism is to control the wealth that markets gener ate by allowing the government to play a
dominant role through publicsector com panies and politically loyal corporations. Whereas the free market system’s motive of maximizing profits and growth is eco nomic, state capitalism’s goal is political: to control economic development and thereby maximize the incumbent regime’s chances of survival. It isn’t a coherent phi losophy but a set of techniques peculiar to each country.
The extent of state capitalism differs from country to country. In China, state run companies and their affiliates now ac count for more than half the country’s GDP and jobs, and of the 73 Chinese companies listed in the 2012 Fortune Global 500, 65 are stateowned. Similarly, Russia’s state owned enterprises account for over half the Moscow Exchange’s value, and more than 50% of Russians rely on the government for salaries or social benefits—nearly double the percentage in the United States. In the United Arab Emirates, national oil compa nies and sovereign wealth funds dominate the economy.
In other countries, the state’s economic reach is more modest. In Brazil, state owned firms such as Petrobras, the national oil company, account for just 38% of the
To identify their globalization options, Western multinationals must assess the strategic importance of their industries at home and in the countries they wish to enter. For example, Western retailers may face challenges in India, where the industry is considered relatively strategic, even though it is not strategically important at home.
Map Your Industry
STraTegIc To MNc’S hoMe goverNMeNT
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fast food (china)agricultural
equipment (Brazil)
social media (china)
retail (India)
renewable energy (eU)
104 harvard Business review January–February 2014
ThE GlobEThE GlobE
use its understanding of how the host and home governments may prescribe its op- portunities to develop the right approach. To avoid conflict, it could find ways to align its strategy with the prevailing policies. It could offer only products that are of little interest to the state. The company could also decide to stay home.
Strategies to Manage Guarded Globalization The multinational corporations likely to be affected most by the changes in globaliza- tion must pinpoint strategies for managing the risks.
Companies in industries that are strate- gically important to the home government can consider the following approaches:
Stay home. While the importance of keeping out of foreign countries is obvious for companies in the defense industry, the strategy is spreading to other sectors, such as retail, which has become politically sensitive in many emerging markets. If a company enters a strategic sector in a for- eign country, it should develop a playbook that maps the policy changes that would force it to leave and describes the possible exit options.
value of the BM&FBOVESPA, the largest exchange in Latin America. In South Africa, the state-run telecommunications com- pany, electric utility, airline, and railway system face plenty of competition from the private sector.
Western companies looking to do business in emerging markets must often compete with companies that have the fi- nancial and political support of their home governments. China’s national energy companies, for example, can afford to over- pay domestic suppliers for the oil and gas the country needs to power the economy. Although the system lends state-backed companies advantages that often deter foreign competitors, there’s a limit to how much the former can contribute to growth. Officials can’t allocate resources as well as the market can, so state capitalist econo- mies quickly become less innovative and less transparent.
But state capitalism is not necessarily just a developing-world phenomenon. For example, as controversy swells over the U.S. government’s spying on foreign gov- ernments and citizens, doubts about the nature of American capitalism will grow. Citizens of many countries, particularly those who suspect that the U.S. govern- ment has always used Google, Facebook, and Yahoo to read their e-mail, will per- ceive U.S. companies to be instruments of a peculiarly American form of state capitalism, which focuses on gathering data rather than making profits. American information technology, telecommunica- tions, and internet-based companies are bound to face greater scrutiny abroad as a result, and foreign governments will be in- clined to support local companies, further inhibiting globalization.
Mapping the Global Landscape CEOs of multinationals must understand the ways in which governments in devel- oping countries are redefining their inter- ests and drawing up new policies to further them. At one extreme, sticking close to home may ensure lower political risk, but
it could also mean ceding market share to global competitors. At the other extreme, pursuing a strategy without considering geopolitical dynamics could boost growth in the short term but heighten the risk that politics could fatally undermine business operations in the future.
To factor globalization’s new risks into strategy, executives must ask two ques- tions: Is our industry strategically impor- tant to the government of the country we wish to enter? Is our industry strategically important to our home government?
Visualizing the answers in a two-by-two matrix can help a company determine its position on the globalization landscape. Two “no” answers place a company in the upper-right quadrant, where a global- ization strategy generates little friction at home or abroad (à la Coke). Two “yes” answers land it in the lower-left quadrant, where national security concerns dominate its industry (Lockheed Martin’s reality).
Divergent answers to the two questions indicate that the company must make some nuanced decisions; managers are likely to be exposed to political constraints and geopolitical maneuvering from host governments or at home. The company can
It used to be easy to figure out which industries were of national strategic importance: The consumer products industry, for instance, wasn’t, and arms manufacturing was. In the new era of guarded globalization, however, any sector could prove to be strategic. Here’s how six industries will stack up in four emerging markets in 2014.
Which Industries Will Matter in 2014?
StrateGIc Not StrateGIc to the hoMe GoverNMeNt to the hoMe GoverNMeNt
Communications Technology
Energy/ Natural Resources
Financial Services
Infrastructure
Pharmaceuticals/ Health Care
Retail
Brazil
CHiNa
iNdia
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THIS ExHIbIT SHowS THE RElaTIvE STRaTEgIC ImPoRTaNCE oF SECToRS wITHIN a CouNTRy; IT IS NoT mEaNT To dEPICT CRoSS-CouNTRy ComPaRISoNS.
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Become more “strategic” at home. Some companies choose to boost their value to their home government instead of looking to create value abroad. They campaign for the state to view their sec- tor or products as strategic so that they can keep out foreign competition or boost profits by striking a closer relationship with the government. Ever since allega- tions surfaced last year that the U.S. Na- tional Security Agency has been spying on Europeans, some French and German telecommunications companies have started emphasizing their strategic value to local governments and consumers. Two of Germany’s internet giants announced a project in August 2013 called E-Mail Made in Germany, which automatically encrypts e-mail that goes through their servers. As Neelie Kroes, the vice president of the Eu- ropean Commission, explained recently,
“If European cloud customers cannot trust the U.S. government…maybe they won’t trust U.S. cloud providers either….there are multibillion-euro consequences [of spying] for American companies.”
Use the state to fight other states. Some companies may have the means to use government-to-government relations to sort out problems. BP, which has oper- ated in the United Arab Emirates since 1931, ran into trouble in 2012, when British politicians and officials publicly criticized the UAE for closing the offices of prode- mocracy groups and arresting political ac- tivists. The dispute undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the July 2012 decision by the UAE government to exclude BP from the 2014 licensing round of the largest onshore oil concession.
During a damage-control trip to the UAE in November 2012, Britain’s prime minister, David Cameron, offered to dispatch RAF fighters to a base in Abu Dhabi—a sign that his government understood the threats that Iran posed to the UAE’s security and that it was willing to ignore public criticism of this offer of help. A month later, Abu Dhabi quietly invited BP to bid for another onshore oil concession. Such strategies will become more important as politicians capitalize on public resentment in order to score points at the expense of foreign companies.
Companies in industries that are strate- gically important to host governments face a different set of challenges. Many of them have discovered that there’s no such thing as free market entry anymore. Choosing which carrot to offer the host government is what matters.
Strike alliances. Although joint ven- tures haven’t been popular for some years, many companies will need to partner—and share profits—with local players in return for safe passage. Partnerships can help in many industries. Consider movies. China has become too big a market for Western filmmakers to ignore, but the Chinese gov- ernment allows a limited number of foreign films into the country every year; in 2012 it increased the number of foreign-made
movies that could be shown on the main- land from 20 to 34.
A partnership with a Chinese film company can help shed the foreign label. Cloud Atlas, a German-made movie, was launched as a locally produced movie in China because 20% of the funding came from local investors. Of course, when the product involves intellectual and artistic content, the state pays close attention. In China, the government ensures that all scripts for radio, film, and television con- tain messages that are in harmony with state directives and don’t “tempt the peo- ple’s degeneration.” Local investors can also help Western producers navigate the corridors of power.
To overcome its many challenges in China, Pfizer is taking a three-pronged ap- proach to alliances. It has teamed up with a local company, Zhejiang Hisun, to tap into low-cost manufacturing capabilities and a generic drugs portfolio. It has also allied with China’s Jointown Pharmaceuti- cal Group to extend its reach to hospitals in the countryside. And Pfizer has invested $50 million in Shanghai Pharmaceutical Industry, which has vast R&D capabilities. This strategy has helped Pfizer become the largest multinational pharmaceutical com- pany in China.
Add value to the state. A single- product company must often find a new way to add value in the host country. Just a few years after entering China, IMAX vol- unteered to help China’s state-run media
Governments monitor and dictate prices in key indus- tries. The government of the United Arab Emirates, eager to assure people that the staples of everyday life will remain affordable, sets price ceilings for manufacturers and retailers. Several consumer goods manufacturers, such as Unilever and Kraft, reported that some vendors stopped supplying them when state- imposed prices rendered their businesses unviable.
Many emerging market governments, worried about the flow of information, keep tech companies under their thumb. Edward Snowden’s ac- cusation that U.S. intelligence officials use data gathered by tech companies to spy on users has helped the Chinese govern- ment justify efforts to protect consumers from American technology firms.
Telecommunications is seen as a highly strategic industry. In some Arab coun-
tries, technology providers must make available data that governments deem relevant for national security in return for market access. In 2010 the UAE and Saudi Arabia threat- ened Canadian firm Research in Motion (RIM) with a ban because they were unable to monitor messages sent on its BlackBerry Messenger system. Eventually, RIM negotiated an agreement with state- controlled telecom operators and government regulators.
Many countries rely on the domestic banking system to finance budget deficits, so they fear deregulation will have a destabilizing effect. In Indonesia, less than 30% of the country’s 240 million people have access to banks. Yet officials have pressured the central bank to restrict the activities of foreign banks, and new policies may require them to become locally incorpo- rated entities.
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achieve global production values. It’s hard to imagine that Beijing doesn’t remember that assistance when deciding which for- eign films can enter China and how many new theaters IMAX can open. Avatar, a movie in which IMAX was involved, was a huge success in the country. And IMAX has more than 150 theaters in China and another 400 in the works.
Become too diversified to fail. Many developing countries offer so many op- portunities that a multibusiness strategy can be compelling for multinationals. GE, for example, has dozens of investments in China, spanning different sectors and time horizons. In some instances, it is trading away its intellectual property; the company knows it can sell certain products in China only if it allows local partners to “adopt” its technologies. The company has no il- lusions: It makes new investments as old ones become less attractive. Even if alarm bells go off in one sector, or for a specific in- vestment, constant diversification ensures that China remains one of GE’s most lucra- tive markets.
Build it so that you can stay. Fast- expanding sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, which continually deal with traffic congestion, blackouts, and other infrastructure fail- ures, work hard to attract private invest- ment into infrastructure sectors. (Nigeria has almost as many citizens as Brazil but produces just 5% as much electricity.) Many African governments have launched
nology sector, the new policy stipulated, only if domestic state-owned companies were allowed to absorb their technologies. However, the policy’s success will help the Chinese government stay in power, so it’s unlikely that the state will forget the for- eign companies that invest—and those that don’t—in the industry.
AnticipAting risks in foreign markets and developing creative strategies to manage them will become increasingly important capabilities over the next decade. The pressures created by rapid social change and the failure of governments to keep pace with the demand for a more secure way of life and higher living standards help explain why protests over a commercial development in central Istanbul quickly became a national crisis in Turkey in 2013, and why a nine-cent bus fare hike in São Paulo sent a million angry Brazilians spill- ing into the streets across the country. Sure, multinational companies will continue to find opportunities for expansion and will face new obstacles to the sustainability of their investments. In this era of guarded globalization, however, both are likely to be moving targets that will require con- stant strategic adaptation.
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flagship projects with well-known foreign companies, which have aligned their op- erations to match government priorities.
Public-private infrastructure partner- ships usually adhere to the build-operate- transfer model, and so they generate prof- its for Western corporations only when projects require a level of technical exper- tise that local competitors can’t provide. Multinational companies would therefore do well to offer their best technologies in such partnerships.
Capitalize on state capitalism. An- other useful strategy to withstand new lev- els of scrutiny by host states is to commit to hiring local workers and using local ma- terials. In many emerging markets, that has already become a requirement. The Brazil- ian government expects large projects to source components from local producers as much as possible, and it favors domestic manufacturers in public procurement bids. In Africa, there are less stringent bench- marks for local jobs and sourcing, but countries across the continent want their citizens to share in the gains from foreign investment.
A government’s skewed priorities can create business opportunities. Fac- ing mounting social pressure to deal with China’s environmental crisis, Beijing an- nounced in July 2013 that the energy effi- ciency sector would receive greater fiscal and political support so that it could meet the country’s environmental goals. Foreign companies could enter China’s green tech-
ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, a global political risk research and
consulting firm based in New York. He is the author of Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World (Portfolio, 2012).
The New Risks Politicians may try to use
multinationals to promote personal agendas or to deflect public anger. Foreign participation in India’s retail sector is highly politicized because of the large number of people employed in mom- and-pop stores. The govern- ment announced in 2011 that it would allow foreign investment in multibrand retailing, but a backlash forced a policy rever- sal a month later. In Septem- ber 2012 the government did
another backflip and opened up the sector. Fierce political opposition will intensify in 2014, an election year.
Challenges to foreign companies can now come from state-backed investiga- tive journalists. A report filed in December 2012 by CCTV, China’s state-owned television network, claimed that chicken sold in China by Kentucky Fried Chicken was loaded with antibiotics. A public outcry reverberated through China’s
social media, and in January 2013 KFC’s month-on-month sales fell by more than 40%. Volkswagen, McDonald’s, and Carrefour have received the same treatment, as have Mead Johnson, Danone, and Nestlé for allegedly fixing the price of baby formula.
The developed world poses similar risks. Chinese compa- nies often complain about the hurdles they face overseas. Telecom giant Huawei’s bids to acquire U.S. companies 3Com
in 2008 and 3Leaf Systems in 2011 were turned down. And when Shuanghui International, a Chinese food company, made a bid (which ultimately suc- ceeded) for Smithfield Foods, U.S. politicians urged Con- gress’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to treat food supplies as “critical infrastructure” while evaluating the takeover.
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January–February 2014 Harvard business Review 107