C H

APTER 2

–

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic G onflict

f he theories and approaches discussed in chapter 1 inform

our understand- I

ing of incernarional relarions, and srare behavior specificall¡ and offer a m

eans for understancling erhnic conflicc. Yet, how can w

e caPture all the relevant piayers in intrastate ethnic conflict? The ievels of analysis fram

ew ork that has

been a m ainstay in international relations scholarshipl allow

s us to take into accollnt those im

portant players, or actors) that m atter for understanding ethnic

conflict, both its causes and possible solutions. The levels of analysis approacl’r usually considers three levels, or “im

ages”: incernational (balance of pow

er, anarchic international system ), dom

estic (fac- tors w

i¡hin states such as legislatures, bureaucracies, interest grouPs, m ilitar¡

political parties), and individual (elites/leaders). In this chapter w e exam

ine the three levels of anaiysis, w

hich are then applied to each of the case studies of erhnic conflicr ir-r chapters 3-7. As w

ill becom e quite clear, though the levels are

in rnany w ays distinct, they also overlap in actual cases of ethnic conflict. In

order for scholars and practitioners alike to discern the factors that m atter in

determ ining the causes of and solurions to ethnic conflict, how

ever, the levels of analysis fram

ew ork is useful as a m

eans to categoùze ancl idendfy relevant factors.

IN D

IVID U

AL LEVEL

Ar rhe end of the da¡ clecisions about poiicies, w hether dom

estic or inter- national, are m

ade by individuals, the eiites in the governm ent. Scholars have

focused on decision-m aking theories to account for the decisions of elites,

nam ely in che fields of social psychology and psycholo gy.z Aslerel R

osati argues’ “In realit¡ countries do not act; people act. States (and organizations) are m

ade up of inctividuals w

ho act on their behalf. U ltim

atel¡ hum an cognition m

at- ters-in politics, foreign polic¡ ancl w

orld politics.”3 Leaders m atler because they

are able to gec others ro follow , w

hether in term s of dom

estic or foreign policy, As M

ichael Brow n notes, the decision of w

hether disputes lead to w ar or Peace

rests w ith clom

estic elites.4

3l

32 Ethnic C onflict

Yet, there are also lim itations to the efficacy of action on rhe individual level.

The quesrion arises*as to how m

uch individuals really m atter given the structure

of the international system or dom

estic level factors. individual leaders are con- strained by dom

estic forces, such as interest groups) political parties, and politi cal institutions. \X/hether elites can get rhe m

asses to follow depends on their

ability to m obilize constituents (including ethnic constituents). Leaders are also

constrained by the structure of the system . For exam

ple, during the C old W

ar, U

.S. leaders w ere influenced by the bipolar strlrcture in w

hich the Soviet U nion

w as the other m

ajor pow er in the system

. The East-W est conflict dom

inated the relationship betw

een the tw o superpow

ers, affecting their foreign policy actions and decisions. U

.S. leaders m aintained a consistent containm

en[ policy tow ard

the Sovier U nion.

W hile these lim

itations are im portant to recognize, it is useful to look at the

role of political elites/leaders in exam ining intrastate and interstate behavior. W

e begin this secrion w

ith a brief discussion of the general theories and approaches to understanding individual elite behavior. The seconcl section acldresses the role elites play in ethnic conflict, particularly how

ethnic elites are able to m anipulare

identity ancl convince the m asses to follow

, as w ell as how

elites engage in ethnic outbidding in order ro obtain and m

aintain pow er.

Political Leadership In general, the study of political leadership concerns itself w

ith each leader’s indi- vidual style of decision rnaking and the effect that it has on his or her sociery.s The literature on political leadership abounds. It runs the gam

ut from personal biog-

raphies and autobiographies, each detailing an individual’s style, to classical political theories of leadership, to a m

ore general analysis of politicai leadership.6 C

lassifying leaders into different categories of sryle requires looking at rheir per- sonal characreristics, the instrum

ents that they use and have at their disposal, the obstacles that they face, the structure in w

hich rhey operate, ancl the choices that they m

ake given all of these other factors. The literature on successful and failecl political leadership offers three different explanations, according to Lew

is Edinger. Leadership is affected by conrextual factors (such as organizational structures and dom

estic socioeconom ic conditions), individual attributes (personal characteris-

tics ofleaders), and “qualities attributed to other persons involved” (such as “atti- tudinal dispositions and cognitions of others”).7

In the study ofpolitical leadership, scholars have utilized several approaches, including a focus on the “form

al-legai authority of individuals in key policym ak-

ing posirions,” w hich is the institutionalized executive authority w

ithin a coun- try. O

thers have utilized the rational actor approach, focusing on the rational calculation (cost-benefit) of selÊinrerested leaders.8

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 33

H ow

ever, the rational actor m odel em

braced by realism and liberalism

m ay

not be the best w ay to understand w

hat states do, or do not do, both internaliy and externally. Instead of a rational actor m

odel, w hich looks at an indiviclual’s

preferences and outcom es, som

e scholars have utilized cognitive approaches, focusing on the w

ays in w hich individuals’ beliefs, im

ages, ancl attitucles influ- ence their behavior.9 C

ognitive approaches can be used to help us unclerstand foreign policy behavior,lO

though these approaches can also be applied to elites and leaders’ behavior w

ithin states (including understanding ethnic conflict, as w

e w ill discuss later).

In brief scholars have found that individuals tend to seek consistency and avoid “cognitive dissonance.” W

hen new inform

ation does not corresPond w ith

rheir preexisting beließ, individuais w ill cliscounr that new

inform ation. In addi-

don, indivicluals are likely to use schem as-“ntental

constructs that represent clifferent clum

ps of know ledge (or com

prehension) about various facets of the environm

ent.” W ith an increasingly uncertain and com

plex environm ent, indi-

viduals w ill find them

selves utilizing schem as and other cognitive clevices that

are “shortcuts in inForm ation processing” so as to be able “to m

ake sense of the w

orld and the situation at hand.”11 For exam ple, President G

eorge W . Bush’s

January 2002 State of the U nion speecl-r labeled lran, Iraq, and N

orth Korea as the “Axis of Evil.” H

e asserted that “fsltates like tl-rese, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arm

ing to threaten the peace of the w orlcl. By seeking

w eapons of m

ass destruction, these regim es pose a grave and grow

ing danger. They could provide these arm

s to terrorists, giving thern the m eans to m

atch rheir hatred. They could attack our allies or attem

pt to blackm ail the U

nitecl States. In any ofthese cases, the price ofindifference w

ould be catastrophic.” In linking the Septem

ber LL,200l, terrorist attacks to stâte-sPonsored terrorism , he

clairnecl that “[o]r-rr w ar on terror is w

ell begun, but is only begun.”12 By catego- rizing perceived enem

ies as supporters of terrorism , his rhetoric of the Axis of

Evil served as a device to understand ancl sim plify a w

orld filled w ith com

plexity and uncertainry.

Im portantl¡ as R

osati observes, once such beliefs and im ages are obtained by

an individual, “the m ind tends to close; the closure is reinforced by the organiza-

tional, political, and social contexts in w hich the indivicluals operate.”i3 In this

w a¡ leaclers as w

ell as orher inclividuals are often constrained in their abiliry ro learn w

hen they obtain new inform

ation, and thus are often unable to “adjust to new

situations and changes in their environm ent.”14

In processing inform ation about the w

orlcl, individuals classify and categonze item

s. The classification and sorting can result in the em ergence of stereotypes.ls

Stereotyping others can lead to w hat are called m

irror im ages and enem

y im ages:

In a hostile relationship, individuals’ im age of them

selves is positive, but the

34 Ethnic C onflict

im age of others is negative (enem

y im age).16 In the stucly of foreign polic¡ schol-

ars, such as N oel Kgplow

itz, have nocecl that leaders’ “percepfions of [enem ies’]

character, intent, pð*”r, strengths, w eaknesses, trr-istw

orthiness, ancl that w hich

che [enem y] actor adm

ires ancl dislikes” m atter. These perceptions of the enem

y are the result of a leacler’s “experiences w

ith the enem y” as w

ell as “interpreta- tions of enem

y behavior,” am ong other factors. Kaplow

itz contends tl’rat though “self-im

ages ancl perceptions of enenties” can change (due to “lraum atic and

catastrophic events” or after long periocls of tim e have passed), they tencl to be

“relatively stal¡Ie.”17 Such consistent self-im ages and petceptions of the enem

y can lead ro m

isperceptions. For exam ple, w

hen leaders exaggerare their country’s srrengrh relarive to rheir enem

y, rhey rnay engage in aggressive behavior, incluct- ing w

ar.l8 In the end, because irnages and beliefs are difficuh to change, leaders are constrained in their ability to contend w

ith possible conflict.l9 This brief overview

of the research on political leaclership and cognitive approaches is m

eant to illustrate how ir-rdivicluals m

atter for ¡he understanding and evaluation of the policy decisiolls that elites rnake. Yet, even rhough cleci- sions are m

acle by elites, the irnplem entation of policy rests on the w

illingness and abiliry of others.to clo so. Such w

illingness ancl ability is an irnportant con- sideration in the case oFethnic conflict.

Elites and Ethnic C onflict

The overarching question in cases oF ethnic conflict is how the elires-

individuals-get the m asses to follow

to the extent ti-rat they can organize col- lectively and even go to w

ar. Are rhe follow ers being duped by the elites into

em bracing “false beliefs” and engaging in “actions that the follow

ers w oulcl nor

w ant to take if they unclerstoocl w

hat the leaders w ere up to”?20 O

r, as instru- m

entalist approaches to ethnic conflict w ould argLle, are elites using “institu-

tional rules and norm s,” including constitutional rules, to attain pow

er in the face of perceivecl security threats to che ethnic group?Zl Are elites able to ¡ake advantage ofthe everyday social interactions that proctuce and reproduce social identities- the social construction of t dentity?z2

Scholars, such as Stuart Kaufm an, have exam

ined the role that belligerenr elites play in encouraging and fostering m

ass hostilit¡ and form ing perceptions

about others as the enem y. Leaclers can stoke the hostility of the m

asses and rouse the security dilem

m a by virtue of the fact that leaders have access to gov-

ernm ent pow

er and the m edia. In this w

a¡ leaders’ behavior can lead to w ar.23

W hen elires can m

obilize grolrps by responding to their dem ancls ancl grievances,

such m obilization can leacl to collective action) including engaging in conflict.Z4

M arc H

ow ard R

oss m aintains that groups and leaders sttlize cultural m

etaphors for organtzation and m

obilization.2s Tlris is so because culture provides the link

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 35

becw een indivicluals and collective identit¡ ancl w

hen such idenrity is perceived ro be threatened, leaders can m

obilize grouPs inro action, even violent action.26 H

e further notes, “Pow erful m

etaphors flinked to how the enem

y engages in a particular behavior, for exam

ple] help groLlPS clefine the threats chey face.”Z7 R

elatecll¡ m ytl-rs about one’s ow

n ethnic group and other ethnic grouPs provide elires w

ith a m echanism

to enhance their ow n pow

er and can lead to conflict. Stephen Van Evera exam

ines three types of chauvinist m ythm

aking: self-glorifying m

yths, self-w hitew

ashing m yths, and other-rnaligning m

yths. Seif-glorifying m

yths are those that focus on a narion’s “special virtue and com –

petence, and false claim s of past beneficence tow

ard others.” Self-w hitew

ashing m

yrhs “incorporate false denial of past w rong-doing against others.” O

ther- m

aligning m yths “can incorporate clainis of others’ cultural inferiorit¡ false

blam e of others for past crim

es and tragedies, ancl false claim s that others now

harbor m align intentions against rhe nation.” All three types m

ostly com e from

political elites, as a m eans to enhance their ow

n pow er as w

ell as the pow er of

the group or nation, provide legitim acy for the elites and the regim

e, enable leaclers “to m

otivate sacrifice by their citizens and to justify cruelries againsr orhers,” ancl divert blam

e for dom estic econom

ic crisis to enem ies.2S A society

w ith a w

eak or nonexistent free press or lack of tradition of free speech, as w ell

as lack of free universities that can challenge the nationalist m ythm

akers, is a society in danger of chauvinist ancl m

isleading m ythm

aking.2e Jam

es Fearon and D avid Laitin fincl in their cases of ethnic violence that

political com perition betw

een tl’re ethnic m oclerates ancl extrem

ists w ithin the

ethnic group m otivates leaders “to ‘play rhe ethnic card.”‘ Playing the ethnic

card can occur in tw o w

ays. Extrem ist leaders or grouPs engage in violence as a

w ^y to com

pel m oclerate leaders ancl groups to strengthen their backing for

m ore extrem

e (and violent) positions. Alternativel¡ a m oclerate leader, fearing a

threat to his or her pow er base, Lltilizes violence as a m

eans of securing supporr from

the extrem ists or the m

asses at large.30 In this w ay, they argue, leaders are

able to construct group identities as m ore hostile and thr-rs trigger “a spiral of

vengeance.”31 As D avicl Lake ancl D

onald R othchild claim

, political entrepre- neurs, m

otivarect by pow er and political office rather than sLlPPorting the

extrem ists’ view

s, “m ay reflect the polarization of societies and, through their

actions, propel this process further.”32 M oclerates find them

selves in a vulnera- ble position, w

here tl.rey m usr m

ain¡ain or obtain pow er at the expense of

extrem ists. These political entrepreneurs assert that conflict w

ith other ethnic groups is possible. In doing so, they focus on the enem

y im ages of other ethnic

grolrps, underm ine healthy public debate, and persuacle m

em bers of their ow

n ethnic group to support them

. The quintessential exam ple is Slobodan M

ilosevic in Yugoslavia.33

36 Ethnic C onflrct

Ethnic outbidcling occurs w hen elites, vying for pow

er w ith other elites w

ithin tl-reir ethnic group\appeal to ethnic iclentity as the m

ost salient identity issue for the m

asses. D aniel’Bym

an distinguishes betw een tw

o rypes of elites, political and cultural. Polirical elites are those leaders w

ho are m ost concerned w

ith access to pow

er and decision m aking, and “m

ay or m ay not care about ethnic issues.” C

ul- turai elites are concerned w

ith ethnic issues. Bym an further notes that w

hile there are difFerences betw

een ti-re tw o types of elites, both seek to “enhance their

position against e¡hnic rivals” and tl-rus are concerned w ith advancing rhe

group’s status. Further, ethnic elites m ay be induced to encourage conflict, either

because they seek pow er over their rivals or they believe that their cause is just

ancl rigl-rt. D efending and enhancing the group’s iclendry provides legitim

acy to rhe ethnic elires.34 As nored in chapter 1, social constructivists argue that identi- ties are m

alieable. G iven that, elites attem

pt ro m ake certain idenri¡ies m

ore salient than others, focusing on the iclentities that w

ill invariably strengthen the political position of rhe leaders.3s Stuart Kaufm

an furtl-rer contributes to the cliscussion of ethnic ourbidding by noting tl-rat “[flor outbidding to be possible, elites require political space-i.e., the freedorn to engage in outbidding.” In order for outbidding to bc successful, the preconditions for m

ass hostility or the actual existence of m

ass hostility are needed for the m asses to respond to calls frorn

exrrem ists.36 Kaufm

an caLrtions rhat belligerent elites and ethnic outbidding are necessary btit r-rot sufficient conditions for m

obilization of the m asses and thus

for ethnic conflict to em erge: m

ass hostiiity ancl the security dilem m

a m ust also

be present.3T Such belligerent elites can com e from

the dorninant group or from the suborclinate grollp. \X/hen the belligerent elites com

e from the dom

inant group, they have the resources of the governm

ent at their disposal, creating “eth- nic hostility and a security dilem

m a.” W

‘hen the belligerent elites com e from

the suborclinate grolrp, they “create rival governm

ents aim ed at seceding from

or taking over the state,” tl-rereby also provoking ethnic hostility and the security dilem

m a. An exam

ple of this w ould be tl-re Serb leaders in C

roatia dem anding to

secede from C

roatia in the early 1990s.38 In the diversionary theor¡ or hypothesis, elites use dom

estic problem s to their

advantage-nanely by engaging in aggressive behavior against other states. By diverting attention from

troubles at hom e and tow

ard an external actor, elites can garner support. In their analyses of irredentist ethnic conflict, D

avid C ar-

m ent and Patrick Jam

es found that elires rnay seek to divert such dom estic clis-

cord tow arcl another state, thereby leading to conflict if the elites m

ake clairns on territory w

here the elites’ “in-group is perceived to be oppressed.”39 As they fur- ther contend, “nationalist identities, political sym

bols, and ideologies” becom e

crucial tools for elites to influence m ass feeling as they seek to achieve particular

foreign policy goais.a0 Lake and R othchild rem

ark that m obiiization frequently

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 37

inclucles an irredentist elem ent, w

ith ethnic elites calling for “the reunification of an often nrythical but nonetheless polidcally salient etLrnic hom

eland.”41 C

arm enr and Jarnes fincl rhat significant com

petition betw een elites w

ithin the dom

inant ethnic group can lead elites to Put forw ard new

issues as a m eans

ro underm ine their rivais and m

aintain Pow er. As noted earlieq elites also

a¡tem pt to influence m

ass sentim ent. M

ass sentim ent can act as a constraint on

elires in their efforts to seek policies that are cooperative.42 As a result of the em

ergence of new political Parties pushing for a foreign policy that is m

ore antagonistic (inclucling irredentist claim

s on other states), ethnic elites engage in ethnic outbidding, opting fbr aggressive policies as a m

eans of disdnguishing rhem

selves from other m

oclerate elites.43 As rhis section clernonstrates, w

heth’er through m anipulating ctem

ocratic freeclom

s,44 enclorsing and prom oting m

ythm aking, or engaging ir-r ethnic out-

bidcling, elites can ancl do initiare and supporr ethnic conflicr. At the sam e tim

e, elites can also foster cooperation and peace, and the resolution oferhnic conflict, w

hich w e exanrine in the next section.

Elites and R esolving Ethnic C

onflict

Eiites can play a role in m anaging and settling ethnic conflict. In the case oF

pow er-sharing political institutions (that is, consociationalisrn, federalism

), elites m

ust cooperate w ith elites from

other grouPs. In order to be successful at m anag-

ing ethnic tensions and conflicr (rather than m anipulating dem

ocratic freedom s),

such elites, according ro U lrich Schneckener, m

ust be able to incluce rheir follow –

ers to support peacefurl solutions, contain spoilers and extrem ists (including para-

rnilitaries), ancl put together “form al ancl inform

al coalitior-rs w ith m

oderate forces of the other side.” In acldition, elices m

ust abide by the term s of rhe status quo

agreem ent, as w

ell as gLrarantee that all the relevant groLtPS are able to Participate in the negotiations. M

anaging ethnic tensions so as to lead to an agreem ent can

also benefir everyone if elites can also look to “positive traditions of m utual under-

stancling from the pâst.”4s Schneckener provicles several exam

ples of successful elite cooperation that reducecl ethnic conflict, including N

orthern Ireland follow –

ing the 1998 G ood Friday Agreem

ent (in com parison to the failecl attem

pts at ending the conflict during the 1970s).a6 H

e also adds the im portance of elites on

both sides of a conflict being able “to present them selves vis-à-vis their follow

ers as’w

inners.’ . . . [T]he term s of the agreem

ent m ust help to tLtrn a zero-sum

gam e,

rypical for ethnic conflicts, into a positive-sum gam

e (w in-øin situøtion).”47

O ne strategy involving the role of elites in m

anaging ancl resolving conflict is the co-opcarion of elites by the state. If the leaders of disgruntled ethnic grouPs can be transform

ecl into supporters of the statLrs quo and peace, rather than a threat to the peace, ethnic conflict can be m

anaged. Through inducem ents

38 Ethnic C onflict

(bribes, jobs, status, pow er), governm

ents can satisfy ethnic elites anct buy them off in order to obtain their support. As Bym

an observes, “\X/hen co-optation is successful, g.i”rr.rrå., such as securit¡ status) or hegem

onic concerns m ay be

w idespread, but the group cannot m

obilize effectively because its leaders are co-opted.”48 In term

s of concerns abour inter-elite com petition w

ithin ethnic grolrps, co-optation serves to enhance tl’re sranding and Pow

er of the m oderates

at the expense of the extrem ists. M

oclerates are able to gain the support of their com

m unity, w

l-rile extrem ists becom

e m arginalized.4g There is a lim

it to co-optation as a strategy: if the grievances of the ethnic com

m unity are sig-

nificanr enough or the co-optecl elites lose their sratus, co-optation w ill not

succeed in ending the violence.s0 In attem

pcing to end ethnic conflict, how ever, there are alw

ays individuals w

ho m ay not be sarisfied w

ith a peaceful resolution of rhe conflict. StephenJohn Stedm

an exam ines ¡he role of “spoilers” in peace negotiations. Spoilers fear that

any peace “threatens their pow er, w

orlclvieq and interescs” ancl therefore pro- m

ote the continuecl use of violence in orcler to unclercut rl-re peace negotiations and possibility for an end ro the conflict.Sl Stedm

an’s w ork reveals the irnpor-

tance of recognizing the role that spoilers can play in preventing peace from being acl-rieved. H

e provides a typology of spoilers that includes the position of the spoiler (a spoiler “inside” signs an agreem

ent but cloes not com ply w

ith the m

ajor term s of the agreem

ent; an “outsicle” spoiier is not involvecl in the peace negotiations ancl em

ploys violence in orcler to dam age the peace process) as w

ell as the num

ber of spoiiers (the greater the num ber the m

ore clifficulty in achiev- ing the peace process).s2 C

onsequently, m anaging tl-re spoiiers, particularly by

international actors, is needed in orcler to oversee the im plem

entation of peace agreem

ents. Positive inclucem ents (sucl-r as providing the m

eans to deal w ith the

grievances claim ed by the spoilers), socialization about the acceptable norm

s of behavior for those parties com

m irtecl to peace and the peace process, and coer-

cion (threat or use of punishm ent to deter spoilers, such as w

ithdraw al of inter-

national involvem ent in the negotiations) are m

eans to m anage spoilers anci

prom ote the peace.s3

Thus for peace negotiations to go forw ard, both elites and m

asses (follow ers)

m ust bLry into the agreem

ent. As Frederic Pearson notes, “it w ould appear thât a

good balance of elite ancl com rnunal involvem

ent is likely to be necessary for peace Form

ulae to evolve into conflict resolution.”54

D O

M ESTIC

LEVEL

The fielcl of com parative politics (as w

ell as m any international relations scholars)

exarnines the facrors w ithin states thât can tell us m

uch about particular state

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 39

policies, both inrernal and external. There are form al institutions w

itirin a state, bur also other dom

estic factors such as political parties, incerest groLlPS, econom ic

sectors and factors, social m ovem

ents, political culture, and other com pering

forces w ithin a state that are useful to expiain stare behavior in general, but also

ethnic conflict w ithin and betw

een states. Thus, an exploration of the dom

estic level of analysis provides a useful tool for understanding ethnic conflict. There are m

any dom estic sources of ethnic

conflict. C onsequentlf, there are m

any dornestic actors and institutions that can am

eliora¡e or exacerbate ethnic conflict. In this section of the chapter w e address

d.om estic level theories to understand the interests, Pow

ers) and organization of clom

estic acrors rhrough a discussion of rational interesr/actor, institutionalist, andorganizational theories. W

e explore the com plexity of the state and rhe m

any political actors w

irhin it. \X/e then tLLrn to an exam ination of the underlying fac-

tors rhar can lead ro ethnic conflict (that can also diffuse or escalate it). Finally, w

e consider tw o types of states (hegem

onic and neurral) and the clom esric level

responses to ethnic conflict-the oPtions availabie to the state to resolve or at least m

inim ize ethnic conflict in the state, inch”rding coercive m

eciranism s and

national institutional resPonses, such as federalism and consociationalism

.

D om

estic Level Theorles: /nterests, Pow ers, and O

rganization

Ar rhe don-restic levei, tire range of possible actors from pow

erful indivicluals to nrass popular participation is quite staggering. For exam

ple, the term dom

estic

actors can inclucle politicians (elites at the individual level of analysis, discussed above), political parties, inceres¡ grouPs, or m

ass social m ovem

ents’ Theories about these actors take into account their diversity ir-r size and im

pact. Before tak- ing a look ar som

e very specific factors considerecl to be causes of ethnic conflict, w

e presenr the general theories developed by scholars about political actors in general.

Ir is essenrial to note chat theories of dom estic actors tend ro highlight three

very im portant aspects: their interesrs, their pow

ers, and their organization. Each actor iras a set of interests, com

m only referred to as his or her distribution of

preferences am ong alternatives. In other w

ords, w hen presentecl w

ith a choice betw

een tw o or m

ore separate alternatives (be they policies, candidates, actions, or w

hatever) actors have one that they prefer m ore than the otirers, one that they

like the leasr. All orher possible alternatives are ranked som ew

here betw een the

m ost preferred and rhe leasr preferrecl.ss D

ifferent actors m ay have very different

interests. As an exam ple, the Protestanf com

m unity in N

orthern Ireland gener- ally believes that rule by the British is preferable to rule by the R

epublic of Ire- land. The inreresrs of the C

arholic com m

unity have typtcally been opposite that of the Protestant com

m llnit¡ preferring to unite w

ith the R epublic of lreland.

40 Ethnic C onflict

Som etim

es actors have sim ilar or corlrlrron interesfs, as w

hen tw o or m

ore groups see benefits ir-r a single policy or action. This m

ay occur w hen nllm

erolls m

inority groLlps allseek the sarne change in how a governm

enr operates. A goocl exam

ple w ould be a num

ber of m inority groLÌps pressing for an expansion of civil

liberties to protect each of them from

the don-rinant group.s6 Each actor also has a set of pow

ers, or in other w ords, a clisrribution of

resources that he or she can use to achieve his or her goals. G roups vary grearly

in their ow nership of pow

ers. The clisrribution of pow ers is usually rhe proclucr

of broad social processes. These processes rnay be long-rerm societal cl-ranges (for

exam ple, m

odernization or inclustrialization of the econorny) or short-term upheavals (for exam

ple, a political revolurion). Pow ers are ofren not equally dis-

tributed am ong the actors, or even am

ong rhe clifferent aspecrs of the societ¡ w

ith som e actors having significanr econom

ic pow er but litrle m

ilitaryfviolent pow

er, political pow er, or alm

osr any possible com bina¡ion.sz An exam

ple w ould

be the chinese in M alaysia w

ho possess a great cleal of rhe econom ic w

ealth of rhe countr¡ w

hile the M alays rnain¡ain m

osr of rhe political conrrol ancl occupy the politicai offices.

The third factor is. organizarion. G roups organize in a w

ay rhat besr suits their interests ancl pow

ers. The com m

on organrzational expression of the ethnic group is the political party. Polirical parties exisr m

ainþ ro conresr elecrions, They do so by organizíng rhe opinions, values, ideologies, and policy desires of rhe cirizens inro a coherenr political organization.s8 Political parties are organizarions rhat provide candidates to serve in governm

ent. In the case of dernocracies, political parries pres- ent the electorate w

ith a list of candiclates w ith party plarform

s. Polirical parries also allow

for political pow er to alternate as leaders from

different polirical parries run for, and w

in, election. This m eans that political parties are crucial for dem

ocracies to w

ork. \xzhile political parries play a particularly im porranr role in dem

ocracies, political parties are also founcl in nondem

ocracies as w ell.s9

Im portantl¡ parties that represent ethnic com

m uni¡ies translate ethnic

dem ands into the electoral arena. Elecrions are a defining m

om enr in all societ-

ies: in a developed society they signal the conrinuation of au.thoriry or its rransfer from

one group to another; in a cleveloping society rirey can signal progress tow

ard greater dem ocracy or a srep backw

ards.60 Thus, the role of erhnic polirical parties is the key to undersranding rhe w

ay erhnic conflict is m anaged in a soci-

ery. Tim othy Sisk srares rhar w

hen elecroral instirurions prom ore cencrisr, coop-

erative politics am ong com

pering erhnic grolrps, the political parries w ill w

ork ro reduce conflict. H

e labels this “centriperalism ” because the iclea is ro ger parries

to find. a coûìm on center. Therefore, an interacrion exisrs betw

een polidcal par- ries, their actions, and electoral institutions.dl such interactions and cornplex relationships are exam

ined ar rhe dom esric level of analysis. \X/e acldress rhe role

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 41

of institutions ir-r shaping rhe actions of dornestic actors in m ore cletail later in

rhe chaPter. In essence, the organízation of a political party seeks to w

in elections ancl control governm

ent. H ow

ever, political Parties are not the only organizational expression for ethnic groLtps. Param

ilitary organizations (or guerilla arm ies) also

exist. These grolrps operate outsicle tl-re acceptable dernocratic or constitlltional fram

ew ork. Param

ilitaries pursue an arm ed resistance against the dom

inant efh- nic group andf or the state. They use violent m

eans (for exam ple, assassination,

terrorism , bom

bings) ro achieve their political goals. Exam ples of param

ilitary grorlps include rhe Irish R

epublican Arm y (IR

A) in N orrhern Ireland and the

Tam il Tigers in Sri Lanka.

Interest groups, “social or political groirps rhat represent the interests oftheir constituents,” can take part in the political Process and thereby influence the political and econom

ic arenas w ithin a state.62 Social m

ovem ents are form

ed w

hen people do not believe ¡hat the stare or other clom estic actors (nam

ely inter- esr grollps or political parties) have at¡encled to their interests satisfactorily and r,rnclerrake collective action.63 Exam

ples of social m ovem

enrs include labor m ove-

n-ìents, Peace m ovem

ents, w om

en’s m oventents, ancl, of course, ethnic grouPs

m obilized to prom

ote their interests. Interests) pow

ers, and organization of any clom estic actor are constrained by the

“rules of the gam e” in the relevant poliry. These rules are set by the constitution,

law s, contracts, treaties, andfor rhe courcs. The rules lim

it the range of possible actions and proscribe the punishm

ent for refusing to com ply. For exam

ple, the constitlltion of G

erm any forbicls anyone from

organizing a political party w ith a

fascist or com m

unist icleology. Thus, even if a clom es¡ic actor had an interest in

starting such a political parq\ ú1ey couid only do so by breaking rhe rules, and tl-ren w

ould be subject to punishm ent (w

hich in this instance is incarceration). \X/hat rheories can accoltnt for how

the interests) Pow ers, and organization of

dom estic actors behave? This section exam

ines three theories (rational inrerest/ actor, institutionai, and organization theories) of the behavior and actions of political actors in general.

R ationat C

hoice/lnterest fheories. R ational choice theories of political participa-

tion are based on an econom ic m

odel. Kenneth Arrow began the rational choice

school of political thought w ith his sem

inal w ork exam

ining decision m aking and

the rules usecl ro arrive at a collective clecision. H is econon-ric m

odel em phasizes

rhe ability of indiviclual decision-m akers to w

eigl-r the alternatives and select the option having m

a-xirnum urtility.6a Anthony D

ow ns goes one step further and

clevelops an econom ic m

odel to explain a citizen’s rationale for casting a vote in an election. In short, a cttizen w

oulcl becom e a voter if the value of casting a vote

42 Ethnrc C onflict

exceeded the costs involved. Tl-re value w as the difference be¡w

een the favored candidate ancl other candidates rnr”rltiplied by the likelihood of that voce m

aking a difference “, ,o *to w

ins.65 Borh of ihese founding w orks of the rarional choice

school have a m odel of a person as a rarional, selÊinterested calculator. In other

w ords, hum

ans pursue their best interests: they take actions that m axirrrize gains

and m inim

ize losses. M

ancur O lson builds on rational choice rheory ro exam

ine an em pirical para-

dox: coilective action. C ollective action is action by a group of m

an¡ w hich often

does not occur even though a clear rational interest exists for such action. \picaLIy this paradox occurs because the cost ofthe action is borne by each individual but the benefit of the action is shared collecrively. For exam

ple, supporrers of dem oc-

racy in an authoritarian state m ay w

ânt to change the system . But ro do so they

w ould have to m

arch, rall¡ ancl protesr w hile being observed and possibly rerali-

atecl against by the oppressive stare regim e. D

ernocracy is a collecrive good that they w

ould all share if it cam e to exisr, but none w

ould receive an individual, tan- gible benefit. H

ow ever, on the parr of those proresters w

ho are jalled, bearen, or killed, a very individual cost is paid. In orher w

orcls, “[r]hough all of rhe m em

bers of the group . . . havp a com

ûron interest in obtaining this collective benefir, they have no com

m on interest in paying the cost of providing thar collecrive good.”66

C ollecdve action lies at the hearr of ethnic conflicr. Erhnicities rypically orga-

nize into grollps ofvarious sizes anct functions in w hich a com

lnon identiry links to com

m on interests. \X/e also know

from l-ristory rhat ethnic groups do incleed

Press their dem ancts and take collective action. O

lson challenges rhe rarional interest rheories to explain how

this collective action w oulcl occur. H

e arglles that srnall groups can approxim

ate rhe rational actor rroclel because a sm all portion

of tire group can collect enough benefits ro provide rhe com m

on benefir for the w

hole group. A typical exam ple rnight be a sm

all erhnic polirical parry rhar cam –

paigns For the larger political interesrs. The leaders of the parry w ould obtain

benefits from holding office, such as building careers (as w

oulcl be seen ar the individr”ral level of analysis). Bur olson argues that large groups are less likely than sm

all grollps to act coherenrly in pursuing rheir interesrs.6T Thus, explaining m

ass erhnic group m obiltzation and acrion appears nor ro

be possible w ith just rational interest theories. “selective incentives” can “coerce”

inclividuals into w orking for the inreresrs of rhe group. In particular, olson high-

ligl-rts the role of social sancrions ancl social rew ards. w

irhin erhnic groups, social status ancl social acceptance are im

portanr qualities. H e states that “[i]t is in the

nature of social incentives thar they can distinguish am ong individuals: rhe recal-

citrant individual can be ostracized,” and those w ho cooperate can be rew

ard- ed.68 This occurs in m

any insrances of ethnic group”acrion, and it is very rypical of m

ass m obilization. For exam

ple, the erhnic m obilization in R

w anda and

Levels of Analysis and Fthnic C onflict 43

Burundi relied heavily on social acceptance. M em

bers of each ethnic com tnunity

joined the killing m obs, nor necessarily out of blooct lust, but m

ore so that they w

ould not be ostracizecl by their ow n ethnic com

m unity.

The m ain contribution of O

lson’s w ork is to show

the lim its of rational inter-

esr ancl actor theories. Im portantly for the study of ethnic conflicr, it points out

that rhe social context shapes the behavior of individuals and groups. Thus, it forces us to think about factors other than interest, pow

er, andorganízation and how

chese other facrors m ight influence individual and collective action.

The /Vew lnstitutional Schoo/. The N

ew Institutional School adds the concept of

institutions as actors to the rational interest theories. Jam es M

arch and Johan O

lsen argue that political institutions plây an autonom ous role ancl thus should

be the subject of acaclernic stucly: “Policical dem ocracy clepends nor only on eco-

nom ic ancl social conditions buc also on the design of political institr-ttions. . . .

They are political actors in their ow n righ¡.”69 Institutions interact w

ith hum an

acrions and social contexts. M arch and O

lsen assert that “fi]nstitutions seem to

be neither neutral reflections ofexogenous environm ental forces nor neutral are-

nas for the perform ances of inclividuais.”T0 Their argum

ent is that institutions orcler social and poiitical interaction: the “organization of political life m

akes a difference.”Tr

Institutions, as actors) have the ability to veto the actions ofothers, and thus m

aintain the status quo. G eorge Tsebelis develops the idea of the “Veto Players,”

or rhe “certain num ber of individual or collective actors [w

llo] have to agree to the proposed change.”72In other w

ords, these actors can check any possible agreem ent

or policy change. The irnpiication for ethnic conflict is that if one group secures all the veto player positions it can block any change to a m

ore open, dem ocratic

society. For exam ple, the ruling W

hite governm ent in South Africa during Apart-

heid controilecl all the governing institutions, including the executive, legislature, and judiciar¡ and thus colrld prevent the m

inoriry Black population from effect-

ing any change. Tl-ris concept of the veto player helps us understancl the frustration of n-rinority groups w

ho com plain that their calls for justice and equiry go

unheeded ancl that change is im possible. It also highlighrs how

control over insri- tutions can be tantam

ount to control over policy. C ontrol over policy leads to

control over ethnic conflict m anagem

ent/resolution andf or the lack of it.

O rganizational Theories. State institutions that form

ulare and execute policies include rhe execurive, legislative, and judicial institutions that exist in m

ost states. The executive m

ay be headed by a president or prim e m

inis¡er, or a m onarch. A

state m ay be a parliarnentary system

or presidential system . The legislature m

ay have separate bodies such as the H

ouse of R epresentatives and Senate in the U

.S.

44 Ethnic C onflict

C ongress, or the H

ouse oF Lorcls ancl H ouse oF C

om m

ons in Parliar-nenr in the U

nited Kingclom . States also have a courr sysrem

, or jucliciar¡ as w ell as an adm

in- istrative bureaucracj, ancl m

ilitary. Im portantþ given thar srare instirutions differ

in lrow they are organized, “these clifferences have a pow

erful irnpacr on polidcal and social lìfe.”73

O rganizational theories em

phasize the role of interacrion berw een the parrs

of a dom estic actor. In other w

orcls, these theories look at sucl-r things as how the

governm ental adm

inistration operates, the type of bureaucraric proceclures that are follow

ed, the w ay decisions are m

acle, and w ho parricipares in decisions.

O rganizational theories em

phasize that governm ental actors w

ill pursue their interests as best they can given their orgam

zational strengths and w eaknesses.

For exam ple, a dom

estic police unit typrcally is charged w irh dom

estic security. Its m

ain tool to accom plish tl-ris goal is violent force as legirim

ized by rhe srare, and it w

ill rely on its stanclard operaring procedr-rres and rradirional form s of

force to achieve its encls.Ta G

overnm ent agencies and organizations act in w

ays unlike other organizecl, dom

estic interests. This difference is clue ro the role of governm ent as m

anager of the state. G

overnm ent actors operate w

ithin a fram ew

ork of three cornpering interests: the interesrs of the inclividLlal actors w

ithin the organization, rhe inter- ests of the organization, and rhe interesrs of the state. \X/hen these interests coincide, governm

ental acrors can be surprisingly effective and efficient. H ow

– ever, w

hen these interests do not coincicle, governm ental actors m

ay not only be inefficient, but m

ay also w ork at cross-purposes from

other governrnental actors w

ho are supposediy attem pting to w

ork row arcl a com

m oll purpose.T.s

Such general theories of dom esric politics are useful in helping us ro under-

stand the role ancl im portance of dornestic level factors ro account for the behav-

ior and actions of actors w itl-rin the state. M

oreover, these theories provide valuable insights into the dom

escic level factors that conrribute ro rhe outbreak of conflict w

ithin states. It is to these factors thar w e now

turn.

D om

estic Level C auses of Ethnic C

onflict: W hy They Fight

As steven Lobell and Philip M auceri srare, “By rrearing rhe srare as a unirary acror

that pursues national interests and international relations as rhe interaction of sovereign states) m

any internationai relations theorists ignore the dom estic

political environm ents that characterize m

ost clividecl states.”76 D om

estic factors m

atter in understanding ethnic relations w ithin stares that can contribure to

conFlict. M ilton Esm

an notes that ethr-ric pluralism can leacl to ethnic confItct.TT

O nly w

hen tw o or m

ore ethnic groups occupy rhe “sam e political space” does the

potential for conflict arise.78 C onsequenrl¡ how

cloes one determ ine w

hy and w

hen e¡hnic groups w ill fight? Scirolars have encleavored to carego ríze the facrors,

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 45

,,ciassified as political, econom ic, ancl cultural,” rhat account for ethnic conflict.T9

\X/eak political institutions,sO polirical and econom

ic stratification leading to serious divisions w

ithin a society, deteriorating econom ic conditions,Sl as w

ell as frustration From

unm et expectations8z can lead ethnic groups and states to

eîgage in aggressive behavior both internally and externally as a m eans to im

prove econom

ic ancl political circum stances.s3

In an assessm ent of the literature on internal conflict, M

ichael E. Brow n sets

our four key caregories of factors that indicate the predisposition for violence: structural factors; political factors; econom

ic/social factors; and cultural fpetcep’ tual factors.”84 There are three structural factors that he notes scholars have addressecl: “w

eak states; intra-state security concerns [ethnic security dilem m

as]; and ethnic geography.”ss

‘

W eak state strLlctLrres often result from

governm ent corruption and inepti-

tude. W eakened state structures m

ake for a m ore perrnissive atm

osphere for conflict to em

erge betw een groups. Leaders m

ay be engaged in pow er struggles,

extensive hum an righrs abuses occur, fhere is less ability to control borders, ancl

ethnic groups begin to push for their dem ands and com

pete w ith each other for

fesoLlrces. C onsequentl¡ a w

eak state is r¡nable to respond effectively to rheir dem

ands, w ith conflict the likely resulr. O

ne can see this in the years follow ing

the Soviet w ithdraw

al from Afghanistan in 1985 and the ernergence of internal

conflict betw een com

peting groups. The w eak central governm

ent could not effectiveiy respond and end the fighting.s6

In rerrns of intrastate security concerns, as long as the in-group view s the out-

group in negative term s (enem

y im age) and perceives a threat to its ow

n identic¡ tirere w

ill be a lack of trust betw een the groups. M

istrust reinforces the negative perceptions each group has of the other, especially tl-re perception of hostile intentions, and thus each group m

ay be inclined to threaten the otheq leading to counterthreats and a spiral oF escalation of the conflict. This cycle of m

istrust and perception oF hostiie intentions results in the security dilem

m a, a concept

found in rhe inrernarional relations iiterature w ichin political science. In essence,

w hen states ¡ake action to increase their ow

n securit¡ other states feel less secure ancl then take actions to increase their security in turn. In the end, all are less secure.87 The security clilem

m a can also apply to ethnic and nationalist groups,

as noted in chapter 1. W hen one grollp threatens another, tl-re com

petition fuels the m

utual m istrust that further aggravates the already tense relationship (this

becom es even m

ore of an issue w hen the state is w

eak ancl unable to m ediate

betw een ethnic groups). R

ather ti-ran backing dow n in the face of threats, the

other group m ay react w

ith counterthreats, thereby producing a spiral of con- flict. For exam

ple, in the few short years leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia,

acrions by both Serbs and C roats reinForcecl the m

istrust both sides had of the

46 Ethnic C onflict

other and threats to each other’s identity. As noted by Barry Posen, policies undertaken by the C

roatian governm ent fueled the threats perceived by the Serbs

living in the republìc. For exam ple, the C

roatian governm ent askecl Serbs to take

an oath of loyalry, and replaced Serbian police w ith C

roats. The Serb m inority’s

perception of the likelihoocl of further threats in the future lecl them to consider

offensive actions againsr C roats.88

M oreover, the securiry dilem

m a and concom

itant m istrust can lead to group

conflict if one group is dom inant over another, as is the case in N

orthern Ireland, w

here the Protesrants are rhe m ajoriry ancl dom

inate in the areas of the police forces, professional services, governrnent services, nonm

anual labor, ancl overall em

ploym ent. The disproportional clom

inance of Protesrants in these various areas has lecl to long-term

inequality ancl tensions w ith C

atholics. The out-group, or m

inoriry (in this case, Irish C atl-rolics), m

ay perceive itself as having no recoLlrse to address its com

plaints, furrhering the conflict betw een the groups.89

Trying to overcom e the security clilem

m a is crucial to resolving conflicts,

including nationalist and ethnic ones. R eclucing the securicy dilem

m a involves

establishing rrust, credible com m

itm ents, and a cl-rangecl im

age of the enem y. If

groups m aintain m

iqtrust resulting fron-r the security dilem m

a, they are unlikely to be able to reach agreem

ent in orcler ro resolve their clifferences. C onversel¡

m utual trust rnakes it possible For groups and sta¡es to negotiate agreem

enrs ancl increase cooperation. O

nly over tim e can a group establisl-r a repuration for being

trustw or¡hy, particularly by fr-rlfilling its obligatior-rs.e0

The last structural factor no¡ecl by Brow n is ethnic geography. H

e asserrs that “states w

ith ethnic m inorities are m

ore prone to conflict than others, and certain kincls of erhnic dem

ographics are m ore problernatic rhan orhers.”91 Ethnic

m inoriry groLlps are either interm

inglecl w ith each other or live in their ow

n regions w

ithin a state. In both cases, confiict can erLlpt (secessionist dem ands for

those living in their ow n regions, for exam

ple). Schoiars repeatedly note the eth- nic conflicts that em

erged in the afterm ath of the colonial period in Africa.

W hen the arbitrary borders of the coionial entities w

ere establishecl, the new ly

independent states had to contend w ith the various ethnic clivisions w

ithin their territorial boundaries. Significant num

bers of ethnic groups live in the m ajority

of African states. The problem is that m

any of rhese groups are long-rim e ene-

m ies, fueling the possibility of conflict.e2 The political factors that Brow

n cleals w ith inclucle “cliscrim

inatory political institutions; exclusionary national icleologies; inter-group politics; and elite politics.”93 At the end of the da¡ political issues are about the control ancl starus of territory-and w

hich ethnic gror-rp has control of the srate insriturions.94 W

hen the political institutions of a state favor one group over anorher (rhrough restrictions on the abiliry to vote in elections or rlln for public office),9s in other

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflìct 47

w orcls a hegem

onic state,96 the out-group is likely to feel resentm ent and seek to

change rhe discrim inatory insritutions. The legitim

acy oFa state’s institutions is inportant for reducing the chances of ethnic conflict erupting. Seconcl, in addi- rion to the effects of discrim

inatory policical institutions, w hen a state is defined

by ethnic nationalism , rather than civic nationalism

, ethnic conFlict is m ore

likely to occttr.97 W ith ethnic nationalism

, certain ethnic grouPs are included, ancl others are excludec{. In civic narionalistn, all people are given the sam

e rights regardless of ethnic identity. O

ne finds m ost dem

ocracies prom oting civic

nationalism and thus lessening the potential for conflict betw

een groups’98 The third political factor Brow

n acldresses is intergroup politics: “C onflict is

especially likely if objectives are incornpatible, grouPs are strong and determ ined,

action is feasible, sLrccess is possible, ancl if inter-groLlP com parisons lead to com

– perition, anxiety, and fears ofbeing clom

inatecl.” C hanges in rhe balance of pow

er berw

een erhnic groups can leacl to instabilit¡ and increase the possibility of con- f1ict.99 The em

ergence of w ar in Yugoslavia resulted in m

any w ays from

fears of rhe shift in pow

er from Yugoslavia’s fecleral governm

ent, w hich w

as dom inated

by Serbs, to the various republics, such as Slovenia and C roatia. The shift in

pow er m

eant a change in the echnic balance of pow er in the scate as a w

hole and eventually lecl to w

ar w hen Slovenia ancl C

roatia sought to sececle in orcler to ensure their securiry and protect them

selves from Serb dom

ination.lO 0

The fourth polidcal fac¡or Brow n discusses is elite polirics-the im

portance of politicians w

ho take aclvantage of the instability in a society by exploiting erhnic sentim

enrs.lO l \X/e aclclressecl elite politics, nam

ely the elites them selves,

in the indiviclual level of analysis section, w hich stresses the instrum

entalist explanation for ethnic conflict: elites use ethnicity as a m

eans to m aintain or

gain pow er.

Econom ic and social factors encom

pass “econom ic problem

s” (such as the transition to a m

arket econom y that m

any of the states of tl’re form er Soviet bloc

have experienced), “discrim inatory econom

ic system s,” w

hich can lead to resent- m

ent if one ethnic group is favored over another, and finall¡ “econom ic develop-

m ent and m

odernization” (as discussecl in chapter 1 on m

odernizatron theories) in w

hich econom ic and political expectations increase, w

hich the state is often not able to m

eet.102 D isputes betw

een ethnic groups revolve around access to jobs in the governm

ent. D isputes m

ay also result from rights related to em

ploym ent

in the private sector, rights “that m ay be regulatecl by rules im

posed by the .¡”,..>r103 These econom

ic and social factors, in w hicl-r inequities betw

een ethnic groups are prevalent, can lead to conflict. The inequality in access to econom

ic resources is one of the causes of the conflict in N

orthern Ireland betw een Prot-

estants and C atholics. Protestants rem

ain dom inant in higher paying jobs,

em ploym

ent in the police forces, ancl so forth, relative to C atholics.

48 Ethnic C onflict

Finall¡ cultural discrim ination against m

inoriry ethnic groups can serve as a trigger for conflict. For exam

ple, certain ethnic groups m ay be given preference

for educationai opportunities over another group.104 Ethnic conflicts are often the result of conflict over language and religion-w

hich language, w hich religion

is ¡l-re dom inant one in a society.los In essence, such conflicts arise due to the

“struggle over relative status and position in society.”106 For exam ple, in C

anada there have been perioclic calls for Q

uebec to secede. In large part these tensions are rooted in the division betw

een English-speakers and French-speakers. In 1969 these tensions lecl the federal governm

ent to recognize both as tire official languages of the country. Lnportantl¡ each province is also able to endorse lan- guage policies w

itl-r regard to issues thar fall under rhe aurhority of the provin- cial governm

ents. As a result, French is the official language of Q uebec, w

hile English is the official language in m

ost of the other provinces.107 In acidition to cultural factors, Brow

n aiso notes the im portance of perceptual

factors. By this he m eans the “group histories and group perceptions of them

– selves ancl others.”l08 W

hile there is definitely hisrorical evidence of certain groups having legitim

ate grievances about past treatm ent (relatecl to ¡he “ancient

iratreds” argum ent),€youps also “w

hitew ash ancl gloriÇ

their ow n histories, and

they often dem onize their neighbors, rivals, and adversarl.r.r’109 As noted by Van

Evera, in the case of the Form er Yugoslavia, C

roatian politicians w hitew

ashecl the actions of the C

roatian U stashe, w

ho had rnurclered significant num bers of Serbs

cluring \X/orld \X/ar II. These actions only reinforced Serbs’ perception of insecu- rity vis-à-vis the C

roats, contributing to Serb hostility that played a significant role in tl-re outbreak of the w

ar betw een Serbia and C

roatia rn 199l-1992.110 a¡t. perceptions groups have of them

selves (usually favorable) and oF others (enem y

im ages) can be selÊFulfilling prophecies and lead to conflict. These cultural and perceptr-ral factors are, in essence, about identity. \X/hile

resource issues are sources of conflict, scholars increasingly note the im portance

of intangible factors, such as iclentit¡ as sources of conflict. This does not m ean

that resource issues and idendry issues are m utually exciusive as causes of

conFlict-rather, “bargaining over those [resource] issues w ithout prior and

adequate attention first to iclentity issues has the effect of further polarizing the parties” to conflict.111

As noted in chapter 1, social idenrity theory provides the link betw een pri-

m ordial sentim

ents and the social construction of identiry. O riginared by H

enri Tajfel, social identity theory assercs that “hum

ans define them selves, as w

ell as others, largely in term

s of rhe social groups to w hich they belong.” In iclentifying

w ith a grollp, individuals also distinguisl-r them

selves from those in otirer

groups. W eldon notes that the social groups to w

hich individuals belong endure because sr-rcl-r groups “are also the prim

ary vehicles for childhooci and cultural

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 49

socialization,” m olding people’s view

s of the w orld.112 Social identity theory

links to an individual’s psychological need to belong to a group’ M oreover,

belonging to a group (group idenriry) enhances an inclividual’s selÊesteem , espe-

cially if people beiieve not only that their group is different but that those dif- ferences indicate that their group is better than the other groups.113 The collective self-esteem

that com es From

positive feelings about one’s ow n group

necessitates the (negative) com parison to an out-group.114

Im portantl¡ in-group identity and social categorization can leacl to discrim

– ination against other groups. The lack of tolerance for m

inority groups (and discrim

ination against rhem ) results) as recent research show

s, from “strong

ingroup iclentities, low self-esteetn, and perceptions of threar.”1ls N

egative per- cep¡ions of the enem

y (out-group) and’m utual distrust fuel tl-re PercePtion of

ti-rreat and can leacl to conflict betw een groups. Jeff Spinner-H

alev and Eliza- berh Theiss-M

orse observe that if an in-group believes that the natural hostility of the out-group is causing the conflict, rhe in-group m

ay steP up its aggres- sive actions preem

ptively as a m eans to gain perceivecl control of the situarion

ar hanci.116 Esm

an acldresses psychological (perceptual) factors that contribute to ethnic conflict. H

ow ever, he argues that rhe underlying causes of conflict are “disputes

over real issues such as relative pow er (politics), m

aterial resources (econom ics)’

or respect (culture).”117 W hat one often observes in cases of erhnic conflict is that

w hen the conflict is underw

a¡ concerns about security and status becom e con-

necred. Security fears that com e from

real violence tend to bolster rhe fear of culrural extinction of the group.118 Lake and R

othchild declare that the m ost

com m

on cause of ethnic conflict is “collective fears of the future.” There are tw o

rypes of fears oF the future. O ne involves the fear oF “assim

ilation into a dom i-

nant culture and heger-nonic state.” The other involves the “fear for their physical safety and survival.”ll9 G

roups experience physical insecurit¡ w hich is com

– pouncled by inforrnarion failures (inform

ation abour other groups’ intentions and capabilities), problem

s of credible com m

itm ent by the governm

ent to pro- tect the groups, and the security dilen-rm

a (inducing one grouP to preem Prively

use force against the threatening group). The inform ation fäilures, security

dilem m

a, and problem s of creclible com

m itm

ents by the governm ent w

eaken the state, and the stare is no longer able to m

ecliate betw een groLlPs. A w

eakened state is even less able to “provicle creclible glrârantees of protection for groups.” The [ear groups perceive (either real or im

agined) is exacerbatecl. In the end, Lake and R

othchild conclude, these three strategic dilem m

as lead to conflicc.120 In support of the argum

ent that tangible issues are sources of conFlict, a recent study by C

iayron Peoples found that the relationship betw een political discrim

i- narion against m

inorities and the likelihood of interethnic violence w as quite

50 Ethnic C onflict

strong. W hile the relationship betw

een econom ic and cultural discrim

ination ancl interethnic violence w

as not statisfically significant, he argues that these other rypes of discrim

inition nonetheless m ay have an effèct on interethnic violence

because of exisring political discrim ir-ration. G

roups facing political discrim ina-

tion are unlikeiy to be able to overcom e otl-rer types of discrim

inatiotr.l2l The above discussion of the clom

estic level inclicates that the factors that accollnt for the em

ergence of ethnic conflict are variecl. W ‘hat m

atters is cleter- m

ining w hich factors are relevant for a particular ethnic conFlict. From

there, one can determ

ine w hich responses to ethnic conflict m

ay be m ore successful, and

w hich are likely to fail. W

e explore the clornestic level responses to ethnic violence in the next section.

D om

estic Leve/ R esponses to Violence: The State and lnstitutions

Inherent in this discussion of dom estic level theories and factors that can leacl to

ethnic conflicr is how the sociopolitical context creates interescs, pow

er, and orga- nization of ethnic actors. The clifferent theories and factors point to different reasons for ethnic conflict, but all identify ethnic actors as agents of tl-re conflict. A num

ber of the abo¡e theories establish that once political actors are m obilized,

new interests are created and new

dem ancls occur that m

ay alter the unclerþng distriburion of resources. Therefore, once ethnic conflict is initiatecl the acrors m

ay cteate the conditions necessary to perpetllate the conflict, w hether purpose-

fully or unintentionall¡ regarclless of tire original cause. This claim of agency,

m oreover, is an irnporrant one in the eventual resolurion of ethnic conflict, for

addressing the problem m

eans not only assessing the root cause but also m odify-

ing the ac¡ions of the actors. R esolving internal conflict is difficult. The political

and econom ic system

s are w eak or nonexistent. C

ivil society needs to be rebuilr. W

arring parties fincl ir difficult to give up their w eapons. Trust m

ust be estab- lished, w

hich is difficult w hen people have w

itnessed horrific acts of bloodshed andm

ay w ant revenge instead.122

G overnm

ents m ay respond to dom

estic ethnic tensions and conflicts by granting m

inority rights, territorial alltol1olny) and fecleralism as w

ell as by set- ting up consociational structures in w

hich ethnic groups are given representa- tion in the policy-m

aking arena. G overnm

ents m ay also responcl by engaging in

coercion ancl repression against ethnic groups.123 The governm encal response to

violence is predicated on w hether the goal of tl-re governm

ent is conflict m an-

agem ent or conflict settlem

ent. According to Adam Przew

orski, conflict m an-

agem ent is processing and reclucing the severity of ethnic conFlict. This is

usually a short-term approach to allow

for a change in conditions that m ay

m ake a lasting peace m

ore possible. As such, the conllict m anagem

ent approach recognizes thar ethnic conflict is inherent in m

ulticultural societies and thar it

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 51

rf\ay not be possible to elim inate it. \X/hen ethnic conflict occurs it is m

ecliated

ancl a solution to the current problem is form

ulated ancl im plem

enred.r24 Barbara H

arff and Ted G urr proffer three dornestic ievel principies ro m

anage

erhnic conflict. First, the rights of m inorities should be recognized and prom

oted by both the state and civil sociery. The recognition and prom

otion of the rights of rrrinori¡ies m

eans that “groups should be free from discrim

ination based on race, narional origin, language, or religion.” M

oreover, m inoriry grouPs should aiso

have the righr “to organize and act politically.” The ability to organize and act in rhe political sphere m

eans that groups can ensure their gror-rp interests.12s Sec- ond, to protect m

inoriry rights, instirutions should borh be clem ocratic and

involve pow er sharing. D

em ocratic political system

s enable organrzed m inorities

ro Lrse the party system as w

ell as interest grouPs in order to influence the policy decisions that m

atter ro the grouP. In addition, in dem ocratic system

s rhe peace- ful resolution of conflicrs is accepted and expected. Leaders of m

inoriry groups are expecred to espouse m

oderate, rather than extrelne, political goals, ancl to use nonviolence in achieving them

.I26 Third, w hen conflicts involve issues of selÊ

determ ination, “negotiations For autonom

y w ithin existing states,” rather than

secession and inclependence, provide the best solution. R egional aLltonom

y, or federalism

, provicles for protection of group rights and increasecl access to cleci- sior-r m

aking at the local and regional level, ar-rd even at the central governm ent

1evel.r27 W e exam

ine rhese different responses in m ore detail later in this section.

C onflict settlem

ent goes further than conflict lrranagentent. Stefan \X/olff defines conflict sem

lem enr as aim

ing at establishing an institutional structure thar provides a venue for ethnic groups to have their grievances heard and addressed such rhat groups w

ill Find it in their interesr to Ptlrsue com prom

ise rather than violence as a m

eans to achieve their goals’128 In the end, how ever, as

Esm an cautions, ethnic-based differences afe vety rarely “settled or resolved”

w hen groups rem

ain “under the sam e poiitical roof.” \X/ithout seParation, the

likelihood of new grievances em

erging is high. As a result, at best the hope is that the m

anagem ent and regulation of future grievances is possible and acceptable

to the various groups involved. In this w ay, the m

aintenance of peace is ensured, ancl ethnic differences can be m

ínttnized.rzg

State R esponses to Ethnic C

onftict. A state’s response to ethnic conflict depends on w

hether the state hopes to m anage the situation to the degree that outright

violence and conflict is unlikely-or to achieve a stable ancl long-lasting setclem ent

of rhe ethnic conflict. The clifficulty in regarcl to ethnic conflict is that govern- m

ental actors and their actions vaty gteatly. Ilan Peleg provides a useful distinc- rion betw

een rhe neutral state that seeks to regulate conflict w ithin its sovereignry

ancl the hegem onic stare that prom

otes tl-re interests of the don-rinant ethnic

52 tthnic C onflict

group. The role of governm ental actors is very different in chese tw

o types of states, although the actors are not.130 M

oreover, the responses to ethnic conflict by these tw

o types tf states differ. In a hegem

onic state, governm ental actors are not neutral; instead, they favor

and prom ote the rights of one ethnic group over the others. For exam

ple, during Apartheicl in South Africa, the conrts enforcecl a num

ber of law s that w

ere intended to strip rights aw

ay From Black South Africans. O

ne of these law s, the

N ative Acts of 1956, rem

ovecl the right of appeal from Blacks w

ho w ere forced

from their lancls.l3l

O f course, w

hen thc lregem onic s¡ate is nondem

ocratic, ¡he role o[ govern- m

ental actors in ethnic conflicc is greatly increasecl. \)Tithou¡ a legitim ate check

on their use of force (since autl-rori¡arian leaders are not accountable to the elec- torate ancl cannot be voted out of office for r-rnpopular policies), governm

ental actors can effectively create aircfor exacerbate ethnic conflict. “D

eatl-r Squads” are a particularly horrenclous exam

ple. Typically com prised of a srnall group of

soldiers andf or police, cleath squacls com m

it killings, coercion, rorture, ancl extortion against the enem

ies of the state. The governm ent clenies the exisrence

of the cleath squacls w hile tacitly condoning or, at the very least, com

piicitly tr,rrn- ing a blind eye to their behavior. D

eath squacls in C entral Arnerica operatecl in

the 1980s and 1990s to terrorize incligenous populations as w ell as the polirical

opposition.l32 Thus, a hegen-ronic state m

anages conFlicr by transform ing the state for use

by the clom inani ethnic grollp, ancl is thus exclusivisr in narure. As Peleg

points out, “l-raving been internalized, hegem onic ethnicity is perceived as

‘natural,’ m aking the use ancl abuse of state pow

er for exclusirre erhnic goals norm

al and non-controversial.”l33 The state, in essence, engages in a form of

coercion, in w hich tlre clom

inant group prrrsrres policics rhat enstrre irs con- trol over other groups.l3a Likew

ise, rhe state institr-rtions w ill be transform

ed to enshrine the hegem

onic rule. Tl-rus, tl-re severity ancl cluration of ethnic conflict is redr-rced ancl m

anaged by tl-re prom orion of rhe clom

inanr group’s rights and the disregarcl for other groups’ rigl-rts. It is clear thar such a stare is not dem

ocratic.l35 If the state is nom

inally or previously clem ocratic, it is likely ro becom

e illib- eral. Peleg iclentifies tw

o m ajor variants of illiberal clem

ocracies and. rheir approacl-r to the m

anagem ent of echnic conflict: separatiollist and assim

ilation- isr. In the separationist variant the dom

inant group “clesires to keep itself sepa- rate and superìor vis-à-vis the clom

inarecl group.” Sri Lanka ancl Israel provicle goocl exanrples of this type of hegem

onic stare (derailed in chaprers 6 andT).In both cases, the state (ancl its institutions) is identifiecl exch-rsively w

ith a parriclr- lar clom

inant group (Sri Lankans anclJew s, respectively).136

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 53

In the assim ilationist vâriant, the clom

inant grollP rries to converl the m inor-

ities into the clom inant culture. Turkey’s âttem

Pt to transform the Kurdish

rninority is one such exam ple.i3T Assim

ilationist attem pts by hegem

onic scates

canbe a cause of conflict w hen the suborclinate grollP does not accept assim

ila-

riol, perhaps rebelling against the clon-rinant ethnic groLlP.138 W hen the French

in Algeria (a French colony from the n-rid-nineteenth century uncil inclepenclence

in L962) invoked their m ission ciuilisatrice (civilizing m

ission), they w ere attem

Pt-

ing ro assim ilate Algerians, to m

ake thern into Frenchm en/-w

om en. The French

believed that they had a right to rLlle over the Algerians, and, m ore im

portant, that Algerians m

ust becom e French througl-r the clom

inance of the French lan- guage, law

s, and so forth, at the expense of the indigenous population’s cul- rlrre.139 Such a policy evenrually failed,’and ethnic conflict w

as the result, as Algerians rebelled against French colonial rule, eventualiy leacling to Algeria’s indepenclence.

\ptcally, rhe dom inanr group in l-regem

onic states seeks to settle the conFlict rhrough tl-re expulsion or elim

inarion of the m inority group(s). The hegem

onic grollp tries co create a purely ethnic state. This process m

ay entail m ass expul-

sions and genocicle.laO In rhe breakup of Yugoslavia, the Serbian reliance on

“ethnic cleansing” of ¡he C roat ancl M

uslitr-r n-rinori¡ies is an exam ple of a hege-

m onic stare’s “solution” to ethnic conFlicl. The m

ass genocidal behavior of rhe cirizens of R

w ancla and Burundi also fit into ¡l-ris category, as does the treat-

m enr of rhe African m

inority in Sudan by the Islam ic governm

ent that rules the country.

In the enct, in order “to keep the peace” once a conFlict has taken place, hege- m

onic states engage in control policies. In doing so, Bym an argues, hegem

onic srates attem

pt to lessen tl-re security dilem m

a w hile also keeping in check the

subordinate ethnic groups) but at the sâm e tim

e assuring the clom inant grouPs

that rheir dom inance is guaranteecl. C

ontrol policies inclucie the use of brute force (“use of force against ethnic group m

em bers regardless of echnic political

activity,” just because they are m em

bers of a group) and selective control (use of force against those w

ho m ighr undertake “ethnic political actlity,” in order to

prevenr them from

doing so).141 \X/hile such policies m ighr lessen the security

dilem m

a, these policies are inherently unstable because over tim e subordinate

grollps are likely to challenge the ctom inant grollp for access to the state institu-

tions and an encl to discrim inatory policies. As suborclinate groups m

obilize, both politically and sociail¡ tl-rey challenge the dom

inant group’s hegem onic

position, leacling to future conflict.142 In a neurtral state, the governm

ental acfors do r-rot favor one ethnicity over another; insteacl, they seek to regulate conflicf betw

een the groups’ For exam –

ple, in m ost \X/estern societies w

ith institutionalized dem ocracy and social

54 Ethnic C onflict

rights, the courts clo not lim it the rights of individr”rals on che basis of erhnic-

ity. The role of the courts is to be “color-blind” and enforce the law s w

irhout any dim

inution ofta person’s status due to his or her erhnic background.la3 Thus, a neutral state typically follow

s eirher conflict m anagem

enr or serrle- m

ent in a sim ilar w

ay: by im plem

enting a policy or ser of policies that recog- nize, prom

ote, and protect m inority rights. These policies m

ay range from antidiscrim

ination law s, constitutional prorecrions, and rights of polirical

association and organization to program s to com

pensate for and/or reverse patterns of historical prejudice and discrim

inarion.l44 Such srares, ofren called accom

m odationisc states) prom

ore rhe inciusive political participation of all m

em bers of society.las D

em ocratic institutions and legitim

ate represenrative bodies typicaliy help protect m

inority righrs. W illiam

R iker persuasively argues

that only through tl-re com petirion of interesrs in a liberal, plural, and dem

ocraric fram

ew ork are tiÌe rights of all, rhe rnajority and rhe m

inorities, prorected.146 Im

porrantl¡ according to Peleg, the liberal srare rakes a neurral position w ith

regard to etl-rnicity. Ethnicity is neirher prom orecl nor opposecl. M

oreover, prefer- ential treatm

ent of one erlÌniciry rarher than anorher is not exrended by rhe governm

ent.l4T .

‘W hen confror-rtecl w

ith violenr ethnic conflict, the neutral state uses govern- m

ental resources such as the m ilitary or police to corclon off violence and protect

noncom batants. O

nce the level of violence has decreased, tl-re governm ent turns

its attention row ard conflict settlem

ent, usually through institurional reform .148

A good exam ple of this process is the resum

ption of dem ocracy in Spain follow

– ing tlre cleatl-r of the dictator Francisco Franco tn 1975. C

onfronred w irh nation-

alist calls for autonorny and the threar of violence from arm

ed param ilirary

groups, the governm ent established a new

quasi-federal disrriburion of aurhor- iry. A num

ber of Autonom ous C

om m

uniries w ere established to prom

ote rhe rights of m

inorities ancl give rhem som

e regional aurhoriry. W hen param

ilitary groups such as the Basque separarisrs ETA (Euskacli Ta Askatasuna) resum

e rheir violent cam

paign against the Spanish srare, rhe governm enr uses rhe legal sysrem

to prosecute the com batants. Im

portantl¡ the Spanish state rem ains neurral as

the courts treat the separatists as orclinary crim inals and not as m

em bers of an

underprivileged ethnic m inority.l4e

D em

ocracy, D om

estic Pow er-Shartng lnstítutions, and C

onfltct M anagem

ent: Liberaltsm

, C onsociationalism

, and Federalism . The insriturional approach

em phasizes tl-re role of rules and governing bodies in m

odifying rhe behavior of inclivictuals, eiites, and grollps. The srucly of “consrirr-rrional engineering” suggests that institutions cân play a pivotal role in pushing a sociery row

ard a m ore srable,

ancl, hopefull¡ a m ore dernocratic, structlrre.

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 55

As previously m entioned, a m

ajor difficulry in deeply divided societies is that relationships betw

een grouPs, especially betw een the m

ore dom inant ethnic

group and the m inority groups, are often quite problem

atic. The dom ination of

tlre state andf or governm ent by one ethnic grouP com

Plicates the w orking of

clem ocracy. D

efining dem ocracy is difficult, and there are m

aîy definitions offered by prom

inent scholars. Larry D iam

ond, Juan Ltnz, and Seym our Lipset

scudy the w orking of dem

ocracy in divided societies, and thus their definition is helpful in understanding how

dem ocracy perform

s in divicled societies.150 I)iam

ond, Linz,and Lipset see dem ocracy as a system

in w hich rhree condi-

rions are constant. First, com petition betw

een individuals ancl groups m ust be

m eaningful. In other w

ords, elections and all activities surrounding them m

ust be fair and open ancl produce legicirnate results. Seconcl, particiParion should be inclusive. Inclividuals and groups of all rypes should be able to contribute ro elecrions, politics, and policies. Tl-rird, there need to be freedom

s and liberties to ensure that participation, expression, and other righrs are exercised by all individuals.l’s1

O f course, producing such a dem

ocratic m odel requires the establishm

ent of governm

ental instirudons. Exclusivist m odels are designed to Prom

ote and enshrine the interes¡s of only the dom

inant group (for exam ple, as Apartheid did

in Sourh Africa), w hile accom

m odationist m

odels are inclusive. The set of instiru- riol1s pÍonloted and created to establish a w

orking dem ocracy follow

ing the r¡odel of D

iam ond, Linz, and, Lipset is considered an “accom

Írì.odationist” m

ode1.1s2

There are tw o com

pering accom m

odationist clem ocratic m

ocleis: liberal and consociational. The liberal m

odel, oFten referrecl to as the Anglo-Am erican

m odel, creates institutions that rem

ain neutral in regard to ethnicity. Based on the w

ritings of John Locke, John Stuart M ill, and others, the iil¡eral m

odel em

phasizes individual liberties and Freedom s. C

itizens are equal uncler the law ,

enjoy a set of protected rights, and live under a lim ited governm

ent. D onald

H orow

itz cites a theoretical basis for electoral engineering aim ed at accom

m o-

dation in deeply divided societies. H e argues that election rules thar do not

sim ply replicate existing ethnic grouPS, but rather encourage cross-group coop-

erarion, can break dow n rhe salience of ethnic identities.ls3 Sisk classifies such

an approach as “cenrripetal.’1s4 T’he engineered institutions attem

Pt to pull the erhnic groups and political parties tow

ard a com m

on center. Benjam in R

eilly produces evidence that such centriPetal instittttions can produce prom

ising results.155

Tl-rus, the liberal institutions do not recogntze any particular ethnicity as preÊ erenrial, as rhe insrirurions generally do not recognize echnicity at alll Electoral engineering favors the role of individual voters, inclividual candidates, ancl nego- tiation by non-etl-rnic groups in the legislature. This m

odel also relies heavily on

56 Ethnic C onflict

the pow er of constitutions anct colrrts to regulate conflict w

irhin the system and

deliver fair judgm ents. Further, in a liberal clem

ocrac¡ rhe stare is focused on assim

ilation and integration of the difFerenr ethnic groups.ls6 O

ne of tl-re benefits of the liberal m oclel is that it cle-em

phasizes ethnicity as a salienr trait for polirical action. In orcler to clo so, rhere is usually a need to super- sede clrrrent ethnic identities w

irh a com m

on) overlapping (superordinate) iden- tity. Supporters of the liberal m

oclel point ro rhe U nited States (am

ong orher countries) as a successful application of rhe liberal m

oclel.lsT An “Am erican”

identity is developed and becom es m

ore salien¡ and clom inanr rhan rhe m

any different, and fractured, ethnic iclenti¡ies. In essence, tl-re liberal n-rodel arrem

prs to m

ove a divided society aw ay from

division and tow ard consenslls in a dem

obi- Iization of ethnic appeals and erhnic conflicr, and the em

ergence of a civic nationalism

. O f course, critics argue that the civic-ethnic nationâlism

divide “is m

ore a m yth than a reaIity.” As Spinner-H

alev and Theiss-M orse note, in address-

ing the critics of the civic-ethnic nationalism clivision, “states are not m

erely containers of political practices; there is no such rhing as a culrurally neutral state. Alm

ost all states teach a certain kir-rcl of history to their citizens; celebrate certain holidays, n-rar-ry w

ith cultural ancl religious m eanings; ancl use one or per-

haps tw o lang’-rages.’All of tl-rese are culturally-laden practi..r.rl58 Furtherm

ore, as Esm

an observes, com piere inregration takes a long tirne and also risks the loss

of cultural diversity if people integrate fully.lse The consociational m

odel cliffers sharply from tl-re iiberal rnoclel. Far from

ignoring ethnic differences ancl in clirecr opposition to rhe liberal rnodel, the consociational m

oclel recognizes the existence of clisdnct ethniciries (although the stace itself is neutral, w

irh no one erhnic group clom inanr as in the hege-

m onic state). Furtherm

ore, supporters of tl-re consociational m oclel contend that

the establishm enr of a srable and just sociery m

usr be based on rhe explicit par- ticipation of the ethnic groups. Institutions shoulcl be creared thar allow

ethnic groups to enter into agreem

ent ancl accom m

odarion. Such ân agreem ent pro-

tects grollps’ rights and interesrs.l60 Arend Lgphart builr his consociational m

odel from his study of sm

all, continenral European narions (thar is, Belgium ,

the N etherlands, and Sw

itzerland). H e claim

s that consociational insritucions prodllcecl elite accom

m odation and the developrnent of stable, proctllcrive societ-

ies w hile still preserving ethnic and group identities.16l

Lijphart argues that in order ro builcl a consociarional m odel, rhe srare m

usr actively seek reconciliation betw

een hostile ethnic constituencies. Also, rhe final agreem

ent m lrst be the product of negotiation betw

een pow er-sharir-rg elites, ancl

not the product of any inrernal or external coercion. Elite cooperation w ould

then am eliorate the com

m unity conflicr. To arrive at this elire-driven com

pro- m

ise, four institutions are necessary: propordonal representation, federalism ,

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 57

grancl coalition, ancl m titual veto. Proportional representation for elections

ensures that ethnic differences, ancl their representation by political parties, are replicatecl in the legislature. This form

of election guarantees that ethnic groups l-rave a legitim

ate forum to voice their concerns and interests. Federalism

creates regional alltonom

y For ethnic grollps. M echanism

s to create a”grand coalition” governm

ent prom ote a sharec{ executive. The m

utual veto gives each significant erlrnic group the ability to halt legislation andf or executive clecisions.162

\K/hen ethnic groups are interm ingled, consociational institutions offer a solu-

tion because rrrinority groups are represented in the central governm ent and thus

have an opportr.rnity to engage in the act of governing.163 I. \Xzilliam Zartrnan

argLres that consociational institutions can create new ancl overlapping identities,

such as m ultiethnic or trans-ethnic coalitions rhat m

ove beyoncl singularly eth- nic parties and ethnic m

ajorities.l6a Incleecl, Lijphart argues that consociational institutions are responsible for the etl-rnic cooperation that has brought peace ancl harm

ony to cliviclecl Belgium .l6s

Federalism offers a sol-rtion to ethnic conflict w

hen ethnic grollps are territo- rially (regionally) concentrated because tl’re local political ir-rstitutions ancl com

– perition becom

e tl-re focal point for the tension and hostility that w ould otherw

ise be directed at the central governm

ent.166 Fecleralism can be successfi-rl if it raises

the costs of secessior-r. For exam ple, in certain tow

ns in Kenya, such as N airobi

ancl M om

basa, the Luo occupy im porrant positions “outside their regions.”

Therefore, for the Luo, secession is costly because ofthe loss ofsignificant oppor- tunities in other regions in Kenya w

ere they to secede.167 Som

e scholars argLre that federalism is not necessal’y For pow

er sharing and vice versa. A state couid give a region territorial âutonom

y but not shared pow er

at the central governm ent level.168 C

onsequently, m any scholars m

ake persuasive argum

ents that fecleralisrn provicles the best possible governm ent for a nation of

considerable ethnic and regional clisparity. Especially in territorial federations, fecleralism

is an institutional arrangem ent that provides ethnic andf or regional

com m

unities w irh clue territorial recognition.169 Federalism

m ay also aid in the

lnanagem ent of conflict by provicling m

any political centers, each of w hich m

ay be the locus of resolving clisputes.17o Fecteralism

. m ay constrain central pow

er, thus allow

ing for m ore regional autonorry.l71 Alexancler M

r”rrphy posits that federal system

s provide incentives for groups to create separate policy w ithin

their territorial unit. W hile such policy variance m

ay be difficult for the state as a w

hole, it rnay elim inate, or at least am

eliorate, conflict betw een regional

units.172 M ore generall¡ Sharda R

arh goes so far as to say that fecleralism pro-

m otes peace, securit¡ strength, dem

ocrac¡ libert¡ ancl iclentity.l73 Fecleralism

is not w ithout its critics. K. C

. \X/heare agrees that fecleralism is

one m ethocl by w

hich to solve ethnic conFlict. H ow

ever, W heare arglles that

58 Ethnic C onflict

federalism m

ay produce a constitutional crisis in sorne instances. Such a crisis can occur because of the built-in clisequilibrium

in federalisn-r: the struggle betw

een the im position of cornm

on values by the cenrral governm ent and the

jealous prorection of local pow ers by regional units.174 Jonathan Lem

co eluci- dates a dozen prerequisites for federalism

to be an effective m ethod of scem

m ing

of state dissolution in m ultiethnic states.175

Federalism also suffers from

the problene that m inority groups w

ithin the state rem

ain a m inority in positions ar the federal level.r76 For exam

ple, in the form

er Yugoslavia, each fecleral republic becam e ethnically based.r77 The m

inor- iry groups w

ithin Serbian territory felt threatened by the increasingly ethnically focused acrions of the Serbian governm

ent, and Presiclent Slobodan M ilosevic in

particular. Each group sought to further its interests, thereby contributing to the ethnic securiry dilem

m a w

ithin each republic. M oreover, the Fear alw

ays exists that regional leaders w

ill seek further alltonom y ancl separation From

the central governm

ent, leading to dem ands for independence.lTs

Thus, not everyone agrees that consociational and federal institurions are necessarily benevolent or successful. C

ritics m ake several argum

ents. First, one line of thought sLrgg.ests that the direction of causation points the w

rong w ay.

Institutional change does not leacl to social change. R ather, the m

oderation of cleavages (social change) allow

s the successful irnplem entation of dem

ocratic institutions.lT9 C

onflict reduction requires m echanism

s to disperse the ioci of pow

er, em phasize intra-ethnic divisions, and provide incentives for eli¡e coopera-

tion. Second, elite accom m

odation rnay leacl to political com prom

ise, but it does not leacl to a long-term

solution to the divided societ¡ w hich is often the sollrce

of the conflict. For exam ple, C

am eron R

oss argues rhat fecleralism allow

s allthor- itarianism

to flourish in m any of R

ussia’s eighqr-nine regions and republics.18o R

elatedl¡ Barbara W alter argues that w

hile elites m ighr buy into the consocia-

tional structure, the m asses m

ay not, and thus the consociational agreernent is undem

ocratic.lsl Thircl, ethnic groups often do nor w ant to cooperate w

ith each other, but cooperation is necessary for effective governrnent uncler a propor- tional representation system

as found in consociational structures. Fourth and finall¡ a consociational structure can solidify (ancl perhaps exacerbate) ethnic divisions by rnaking ethnicity m

ore salient. Institutions that separate groups into hierarchical/geographic political units (for exam

ple, fecleralism ) sharpen social

divisions.182 Political parties tend to reflect this salience by prom oting tlìem

– selves as ethnically based.183 For exam

ple, as Yugoslavia’s breakup occurred, political parties clefined them

selves in erhnic terrns, and voting in elections held in 1990 reflected the nationalist/ethnic divisions w

ithin the republics. The use of the Alternative Vote in Bosnia-H

erzegovina led to elections that w ere effectively

an “ethnic census.”184 O ne of Lrjpl-rart’s consociationalist m

odel successes, Beigium ,

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 59

has faced challenges from the tw

o clorninan¡ ethnic groups, Flem ish and W

al-

loons, in recent years. The w ealthier Flernish region has den-rancled greater

auronom y, w

hich is resistecl by the francophones living in W allonia, the poorer

region. The francophones in W allonia w

orry that any reform s w

ill lead to reduc- tions in funding. Such a reduction in funding to the region w

ould im pact the

region’s econom y, already declining relative to that of the Flernish region. The

Flernisl-r parties seek to split the bilingual electoral constituency, Brussels-H alle-

Vilvoorde (BH V). In cloing so, H

alle ancl Vilvoorde, the D utch-speaking colnPo-

nents, w ould “becom

e part of neighboring Flem ish voting districts to the north.”

C onstitutionaliy bilingual Brussels w

ould becom e a discrete districr.lss

Kanchan C handra has also noted that w

hen “linking the politicization oF erhnic divisions w

itl-r the destabilizatiofr of clem ocracy” w

hat often happens is rhe “out-bidding effect.” Ethnic outbidding occurs w

hen ethnic divisions have becom

e politicized to rhe extent that politicai parties are defined ethnically. As C

handra explains w ith regarcl to theories of ethnic outbidding, “rhe em

ergence of even a single ethnic part\/ ‘infects’ the rest of the party system

, ieading to a spiral of extrem

e ethnic bids that destroy col-nPetitive politics altogether.” The result can destabilize dem

ocratic states.186 C handra arglres, how

ever, chat ethnic parties can have a positive effect on dem

ocrac¡ but this depends on w hether the

institutions are able to encourage the overlapping elem ents of e¡hnic identity (for

exam pie, different ethnic groups that share the sam

e religion). 187 1¡” m octera-

rion of ethnic outbidding can occur through the insritutionalization of cross- cutting cleavages. C

handra provides the exam ple of India (w

here there are cross-cutting cleavages in [erm

s of religion and language that have been institu- tionaiized in the constitution as w

ell as in policy areas such as em ploym

ent and education), in w

hich m arginal parties have engaged in ethnic outbidding, w

ith centrist political behavior occurring afterw

ards.lss An exam ple of language law

s as indicators of institutionalized cross-cutting cleavages is presented by Finland. According to Spinner-H

avel and Theiss-M orse, “In Finland m

em bers of a linguis-

tic m inority (Finnish or Sw

edish) that constitutes at least 8 percent of a m unici-

palicy have the right to speak w ith governm

ent officials in rheir native rongue; once the 8 percent threshold is m

et, this linguistic right can only be revoked if tlre m

inority speakers fall to 6 percent.” In this w ay, they argue, linguistic rights

are given to groups, but the set-up also provides for the cl-range in group identities and the em

ergence oFcross-ethnic alliances.189 Additionall¡ if the proportionality of the allocarion is considered unalter-

able, problem s m

ay arise w hen the actual proportional distribution of groups

changes.lgo For exam ple, Lebanon’s governm

ent w as strlrctlrred as a consocia-

tional dem ocracy from

the tim e of independence in 1943 until 1975, w

hen civil w

ar erupted. The relative im portance of the top governm

ent positions reflected

60 Ethnic C onflict

the proportion oF the popr-rlation of each sect: a M aronite C

hristian president, a Sunni M

uslim prirne rninister, a Shiite M

uslim chair of the legislature, and a

G reek O

rthoclox deþuty chair and cleputy prim e m

inisrer. W hile this arrange-

m ent w

orkecl for three decades, it facecl the challenge of the changing propor- tionality of rhe population. The C

hrisrian sects had been a rnajority in the earlier censlls ancl thus w

ere allocated the position of presiclent. O ver tim

e, how ever,

the proportion of the M uslim

population overtook the C hrisrian popularion,

thereby leading to clem ands by the M

uslim secrs rhar the com

position of rhe governm

ent reflect the changed status. Soon, periodic clashes betw eeir groups

erupted into full-scale civil w ar.191

There is yet another difficulty w ith the consociational m

odel: ir neglecrs the international dim

ension of ethnic conflict. C onsociational agreem

ents focus exclusively on dom

estic institutions. Ethnic conflict often has an international com

ponent) and institu¡ional clesign has to take this into account. International institutions (as noced in the section on the inrernarional level of analysis), particularly cross-border legislative or parliam

entary institutions, can prom ore

overlapping (superorclinate) idencities, such as people having both a European iclentity ancl national iclentity. C

ross-cutting cleavages could encourage m ore

m oclerate behavior and nonviolent conflict. C

onsequentl¡ a m echanism

-nam ely

institutions-that can prom

ote overlapping ictentities m ay afford rhe m

eans ¡o resolve, or at least reduce, conflict betw

een opposing groups that results from inequality. In a sim

ilar fashion to the logic of the social consrrucrivist approach, these overlapping iclentities m

ay arneliorate conflict by creating forum s for

expression, opportr-rnities for cooperation, ancl clevelopm ent of m

utual inter- ests.1e2 The problem

is that w hile identities are not fixecl (in contradiction of rhe

prim ordialist approach to ethnic iclenrity), they are hard to change. As Bym

an m

aintains, if a person is a m em

ber of a group thar has experienced violence directed at it by virtue of group identiry “that iclenciry becom

es pow erful and far

m ore salient than com

peting ones.”193 These critiques of consociationalism

and federalism dem

onsrrare the lim irs

and rarir¡ of dem ocratic participatory sysrem

s in ethnically divided states. In rhe end, attem

pting to transition to dem ocracy is difficuit w

hen groups harbor sig- nifican¡ distrust and fears of insecr-rrit¡ polidcal institutions are w

eak, rhere are fears that elections w

ill lead to undem ocraric ourcor¡es (cyranny of the m

ajoriry), and ethnic elites use their clem

ocraric freeclom s (freedom

of the press, erc.) to clissem

inate aggressive ideas and policies.lea Alrl-rough dem ocracy m

ay be diffi- cult to attain, that cloes not firean that states should nor artem

pt to establish dem

ocratic institutions. As Bym an observes, given that dem

ocracy has a proven track record in keeping the peace w

ithin societies, clem ocracy as a soh-rtion m

usr be front and center in acldressing ethnic conflicr.l95

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 61

lnfact,in an analysis of cases of success and failure in term s of pow

er sharing i¡r ethnically diverse scares, Schneckener proffers six structure-oriented and five actor-oriented factors that account for success. The six structure-oriented

fac-

lors are (1) relative equilibrium of the various ethnic groups so that no one

group is a clear m ajority in the state or region; (2) no considerable socioeco-

nom ic clifferences betw

een the groups such that one group is at a significant disaclvantage relarive to the other groupi (3) territorial segm

entation (federal- isrn, or even segregation of cities w

irhin a region); (4) overarching, shared iden- riry to the region or state; (5) cross-cutring cleavages leading to overlapping idenrities and m

em berships; and (6) m

oderate pluralism such that ethnic grouPs

are represented by m ore than one political parry thereby leading to a m

oderate m

ultiparty political system .196 The actor.oriented factors are (1) dom

inant elites (discussed in the individual level section); (2) respect for the existing status quo; (3) m

utual understancling and traditions of com prom

ise by the elites; (4) par- dcipation by all groups, such that they are rePresented at any negotiations

as

w ell as in the actual pow

er-sharing system (this inclucles incorporation of para-

m ílitary ancl exrrem

ist groups); and (5) a com prom

ise solution that is arrived at internally rarher than im

posed from the outside.i9T Schneckener finds that the

actor-oriented factors are m ofe im

portant than the structure-oriented ones in term

s of successfui m anagem

ent of ethnic conflict.198 H e show

s that cabinet governm

ents (rather than presidential system s), flexible ProPortionâl rules, con-

ditional veto righrs, an institutional link betw een the selÊgoverning bodies and

tl-re central pow er-sharing body (thereby lim

iting segm ental autonom

y to certain issues), and political and judicial m

echanism s should be utilized for m

ediating and settling conflicts.lee

Yet, Jonathan H earn cautions that w

hile scholars analyze “general categories of ethnic conflict and political instabiliry” exam

ining particular cases m ay lead

to the recognition of specific solutions that m ight not be recom

m endedby “a

single set of general prescripcionr.r2oO 4t Eiki Berg and G

uy Ben-Porat argue, tackling the underþing cultural and structural causes of conflict and altering the relations betw

een conflicting grouPs are the m eans to settle protracted con-

flicts.2ol In m any cases, these underlying roots of conflict are found at the

clom estic level of analysis, and thus their solutions m

ay be found there as w ell.

IN TER

N ATIO

N AL LEVEL

Kenneth N . W

altz’s influential book M an, the State, and W

ar used the levels of analysis to unclerstancl the outbreak of international w

ar. H e argued that the

international, or rhircl, im age, best captures w

hy w ars occur. The anarchic interna-

tional system , in w

hich no central authority (such as a w orld governm

ent) exists

62 Ethnic C onflict

over states, m eans chat scaces have to engâge in selÊhelp to ensure their securiry

and survival. H e asserts thac “there is a constant possibiliry of w

ar in a w orld in

w hich there “r. t*olo, m

ore states each seeking to prom ote aset of interests and

having no agency above them upon w

hich they can rely for protection.”2o2 The other tw

o levels (dom estic and individual) can explain the im

m ediate causes of

w ar in the sense that a state’s decision to go ro w

ar depends on several factors, such as pow

er, interest, regim e rype, histor¡ size, and location. As he contends,

“S¡ates are m otivated to attack each other and to defencl them

selves by the reason andf or passion of the com

paratrvely few w

ho m ake policies for states and of the

m any m

ore w ho influence ¡he few

.”203 H

e claim s that the international system

explains the outbreak of w ar betw

een states. H

is is a realist explanation, in facr, a neorealist or structural realist expla- nation, because he focuses on the structure of the international system

. Specifi- call¡ the structural elem

ents of the balance of pow er and the anarchic

environm ent enable w

ar to occur: “w ars occur because there is nothing to prevent

,1’t”^.>204 In this w ay, the international, or system

ic, level is “the m ost com

pre- hensive” level because it covers “the totaliry of interactions w

hich take place w

ithin the system aqd its environm

ent.”205 As this section w

ill dem onstrate, analysis at the international level can be use-

ful to explain ethnic conflict, both w ithin and betw

een staces. In essence, “inter- national conditions can provide favorable or unfavorable opportunities for access to resources, legitim

acy and coalition partners.”206 For exam pie, changes

in the balance of pow er in the international system

, such as the encl of the C olcl

W ar, m

ay lead to opportunities for ethnic groups to seek pow er. The case of the

form er Yugoslavia illustrates this w

ell. W hile it w

as a com m

unist countr¡ its leader,Josip BrozTiro, broke aw

ay from the Soviet U

nion in the late 1940s. Thus, during the C

old W ar, Yugoslavia played an im

portant strategic roie for the U

nited Srates as a buffer against the U SSR

. \X/hen the Soviet U nion collapsecl,

ending the C old \X/ar, the U

nitecl States no longer had a need for Yugoslavia to serve as a buffer. This lack of interesr by the w

orld’s only rem aining superpow

er, as w

ell as the deteriorating econom ic conditions w

ithin Yugoslavia, led to a struggle for pow

er betw een the three m

ain ethnic groups (Serbs, C roats, ancl

M uslim

s in Bosnia), each seeking to gain territory and pow er at the expense oF

the others, leading to a conflict lasting m ore than three years.207

Additionall¡ because there is no w orld governm

ent in the international sys- tem

, internal ethnic conflicts can becom e international conflicts if they spread

to other countries across international borders. M oreover, w

hen outside actors provide support to actors involved in the conflict, w

hether in the form of eco-

nom ic, diplom

atic, or m ilitary support, an internal conflict becom

es interna- tionalized. C

onsequentl¡ external involvem ent in internal ethnic conflicts from

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 63

diasporas, as w ell as outsicle states intervening for strategic reasons, can contrib-

ure ro the continuation of ethnic conflict.208 At tl’re sam e tim

e) recognizing the inrernational dynam

ic of ethnic conflicrs (for exam ple, significant num

ber of refugees both w

ithin and across borclers; m eclclling of outsicle Pow

ers in internal conflicts, etc.), international actors (inclividual states, international institr-rtions, ¿_ncl nongovernm

ental organizations) can act to Prevent, m anage, or resolve such

conflicts.209 This section discusses ¡he role that internationai actors can play in prom

oting, as w ell as m

anaging, ethnic conflict.

lnternattonal Level Actors in Ethnic C onflict

As notecl above, international level factors can contribute to the em ergence and

conrinuarion of ethnic conflict. R elevant actors inclucle diasporas (and thus states

w ith erhnic ties ro groups w

ithin other states experiencing ethnic conflict) ancl srates intervening for their ow

n self-interests (as realist theory w ould explain).

D iasporas and Ethnic Ties across State Borders. O

ne can view ethnic kin that live

in a different state, or states, as porential internarional factors in ethnic conflict. These related yer foreign groups can provicle m

aterial ancl em otional support for

ethnic groups. Tl-re diaspora is thus an international actor, or external Party, thar can fuel ethnic conflicr. Altetnatively, by w

ithholding suPPort, the diaspora com –

m unity m

akes ir m ore difficult for ethnic conflict to erlrPt and continu..2lO

¡tt adclition, kin srare (hom

e counrry) relations w ith the diaspora can affect relations

w ith the host country ir-r w

hich the cliaspora resicles. C onsequentl¡ as noted by

Yossi Shain ancl Aharon Barth, “D iasporâs are am

ong the m ost prom

inent acrors that link international and clom

estic spheres of politics.”2l1 D

iaspora is definecl as people w ho have m

igrated from one collnrry to

another. These Foreign m igrants, accorcling to Esm

an, establish their ow n com

– m

unities that provide a sense of connecteclness in an unfam iliar ancl perhaps

“less than friendly environrtent.”2lz Though diaspora groups are able to accul- turate into the host countfy, they naintain their distinctiveness. Im

portantl¡ ethnic cliasporas m

ay act as â dom estic interest group w

ithin their host country to influence policies tow

ard their hom e collntry. Actors in the hom

e country (the governm

ent or other political actors) m ay Llrge rhe ethnic diaspora to provide

sLlpport (econom ic, diplornatic, and m

ilitary).213 States m

ay give support to their ethnic kin residing in other states. These ethnic ties can serve as a m

eans for intervention in tl-re affairs of a country expe- riencing erl-rnic conflict betw

een the ethnic kin and other ethnic groups w ithin a

state. Serbia’s interventioll to sLlpport Serbs living in tl-re Krajina region of C roa-

tia cl-rring the Balkan w ars in the early 1990s is one such exam

ple. States m ay

even go so far as to claim territory in w

hich their ethnic kin resicle (irredentism ).

D rovides an explanâtion for identity-based m

otivations for intrastate and irrrerstate behavior.222

N on-ethnic Ties and External lntervention as a C

ontributing Factor of Ethnic C

O nfliC

t. As a result of nationai self-interest, external states m ay take actions

rhar supporr one ethnic grollP over another in an internal ethnic conflict’ as realism

w ould argue regarding state behavior. For exam

ple, in the 1970s Inclia’s support for Bengalis in East Pakistar-r contributed to the breakup of Pakistan, ancl the creation of rhe new

state of Bangiadesh. In supporting the Bengali lr4uslim

s, India w as able to w

eaken Pakistan, its regional rival.223 States m ay see

other sta¡es beset w ith internal conflicts as “easy targets,” ancl rhus see the

opporrunity “for an eas¡ cheap victory” by engaging in belligerent behavior against the other state, thereby escalating an internal conflict into an interscate confltct.z24 An exam

ple w ould be the R

ussian m ilitary intervention in G

eorgia n

1.992 in support of the secessionist m oveÍtent in South O

ssetia (w hich

w anted to join w

ith N orth O

ssetia, one of the republics in the R ussian Feclera-

tion). R ussia’s goal w

as tw ofold: to persuade G

eorgia to join the C om

m onw

ealth of Indepenclent States and to gain G

eorgia’s consent to having R ussian m

ilitary forces based in G

eorgía.zzs Exrernal pow

ers play a role in the em ergence of ethnic conflict by virtue of

rhe resources they can provide to extrem ists. Such resources can enable them

to overthrow

the governm ent, etìgage ín w

ar, or establish an opPosition govern- fîeît.226 R

ussian support for R ussian-speaking secessionists in the D

niestr region of M

oldova served its strategic interests. In fact, according to Stuart Kaufm

an, R ussia helpecl the D

niestrians start-and w in-the w

ar w ith the

M oldovan gov er r’rnert.2z7 H

ow ever, as w

ith kin state behavior noted previousl¡ exrernal states inlerven- ing to support an ethnic grollp have m

any foreign policy objectives, only one of w

hich m ay be to support an ethnic group in conflict. The state rnay decide that

other foreign policy goals are lrrore im portant or pressing. In addition, dom

estic politics influence an external srate’s decision w

he¡her to intervene and sllPPoft one side of a conflict or another.228

lnternational Level Factors as a M eans to M

anage and Sett/e Ethnic C

onflicts In term

s of international actors that can attem pt to m

anage and settle ethnic conflicts, one can look at individuai states, international governm

ental organíza- tions, ancl nongovefnm

ental organizations. H arff and G

urr argue that interna- tional actors can play a significant role in the protection of m

inoriry rights and the settlem

ent of ethnic conflicts. In addition, international actors m ay need to

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 65

64 Ethnic C onflict

For exam ple, Som

alia claim ecl territory in Ethiopia as its ow

n, given that Som alis

residecl in Etl-riopia.2la By supporting ohe sicie in a conflict, external states “can trigger rl-re secr-rrity

dilernm a by threacening groups’ future securic¡” especially if the exrernal stare

has a historic tie to a specific group. In one exam ple, Iraq’s Sunni Arab leadership

perceivecl a threat from Iran’s Shi’a M

uslim radicalism

and rhe L979 Iranian revolurion. The Iraqi leadership feared that the Shi’a in Iraq m

ight fom enr revo-

lution w ith support from

Iran’s Shi’a. In response, the Iraqi leadership “cracked dow

n hard on Iraqi Shi’a,” especially people w ith connecrions ro lran.215

O f course, there is no guarantee that having ethnic ties to groups in another

state w ill lead to foreign policies in support of the erhnic kin. In an anaþsis of

transstate ethnicity in the new counrries established after the collapse of the

Soviet U nion, C

hades King ancl N eil M

elvin found that ir is ofren difficult ro m

obilize around diaspora issues, as a result of several factors, including tl-re clom

estic politics w ithin rhe kin state.2r6 If there are erhnic m

inoriries in rhe kin stare that are pow

erful enough, they can act as a “constraint on the ability of political elites to use cliaspora issues as a m

ajor clom esric polirical resource.” For

exam ple, U

kraine’s ¡nultiethnic com posirion m

akes it ciiFficulr for dom estic

actors to appeal ro diaspora issues regarding U krainians living in orher coun-

tries.2r7 Also affecting cliaspora-kin state relations are “the institurional srrengrh and resources w

ithin diaspora com m

uni¡ies them selves.” H

ow w

ell a diaspora com

m unity is organized politicall¡ as w

ell as w hether it has significant econornic

resollrces and w hether there is a cohesive com

m unir¡ affects diaspora poiitics.

King and M elvin show

thar the R ussian, U

krainian, and Kazakh diasporas resicl- ing in the form

er Sovier republics have quite w eak ethnic identiry and com

m unal

solidarity. As a result, the kin stare has nor been able ¡o develop exrensive rela- tions w

ith their co-ethnics.2lB Adclitionall¡ w hether the kin srare w

ill engage w

ith the diaspora depencls in large part on rhe diaspora relations w irh erhnic

com m

unities w ithin the host state. Such relations affect w

hether the cliaspora is open to actions by the kin state.2r9

Further constraints arise from the fact thar rhe kin state has m

an¡ and com –

peting, foreign policy goals, only one of w hich m

ay involve relarions w irh its

ethnic diaspora. In o¡her w ords, the inrernational system

acts as a constraint on foreign policy behavior of tl-re kin stare.220 Finall¡ King and M

elvin nore rhar kin state-cliaspora relations are also affected by the econom

ic resources of ¡he kin state. A kin state w

ith lim ited econom

ic resources w ill find it m

ore difficuk to connect w

ith its diaspora.22l In the end, it m

ust be recognized that kin stare-cliaspora relations do m ar-

ter in understanding ethnic conflict. The consrrucrion of ethnic identiry rein- forces the idea of a connection betw

een kin srates and the diaspora, ancl

66 Ethnic C onflict

use coercive m easures) such as m

ilitary intervention, in order to encl ethnic con- flicts, especially w

hen such conflicts involve rhe m ass killing of civilians.22e As

Bym an observes, hðw

ever, m ilitary intervention to end “the fighting and preserve

peace for a short period of tim e w

hile diplom ats forge a polirical serdem

enr and non-governm

ental organizations carry out hum anitarian w

ork” is problem atic.

Anger and hostility rem ain even after a civil w

ar encls. Such anger and hostility are obstacles to production of along-lasting political settlem

ent as w ell as to success

in hum anitarian operations. As a result, he argues that the states in the interna-

rional com m

unity neecl to reconsider how to intervene in civil w

ars.230 Posen argues that in reconsiclering approaches to intervention that w

ill decrease rhe chances of conflict, external actors “m

ust assess the local groups’ strategic view of their situation.” In rnaking such an assessm

ent, external actors should ask: “W

hich groups fear for their physical security ancl w hy? \X/har m

ilitary oprions ar.e available to them

?” Posen notes that lessening the threat perceptions of groups as w

ell as clecreasing their w indow

s of opportunity ro acr aggressively m ay c{ecrease

the likelihoocl of conflict erupting.231 International cooperation, through inrernational institutions, as liberalism

w ould argue, is possjble. H

ow ever, as is evidenr in rhis chapter ancl the individual

case chapters, the w illingness of international institutions, such as the U

nited N

ations or ELrropeân U nion, to intervene clepends in large part on the selÊ

interests of the m em

ber states.232 As Posen asserts, regional conflicts do not threaten rhe security or m

aterial interests of m os¡ external actors. As a result,

international institutions face a credil¡ility problem w

hen they rhrearen ro inrer- vene for hum

anitarian reasons to safeguard groups that w orry about their

future.233 Thus, w hile rhe international com

m unity can play a role in addressing

ethnic conflicts, there are lim its to w

hat the inrernational com m

uniry can, and is w

illing to, do. In this section w e exam

ine the responses international acrors car Lrtilize in orcler to prevent, m

anage) or resolve erhnic conflict: m ecliation,

coercive intervention and noncoercive intervention.234

Third-Party M ediation. Thircl-party m

ecliators are exrernal ac¡ors w ho arrem

pr ro resolve ethnic conflicrs through negotiation ancl cliplom

acy.23s Third-parry nego- tiations ancl cliplom

acy can prom ote confidence-bLrilding lneasures (such as elec-

tions, autonom y, pow

er sharing, and dem onsrrarions of respect) for the w

arring parties.236 Third parties can also persuacle w

arring parries ro accepr m ediation if

the third party can ac¡ as the glrarânror of an agreem ent.237 It is im

portant to recogníze, how

ever, tl’rat there are costs to the m ediators if m

ecliation is unsuccess- fr”rl, including costs to their reputations. They m

ay also experience econom ic cosrs

if the parties to the conflic¡ are tracling partners.z38’U ¡hile rhere are cosrs ro rhe

m ediator, there are also costs to the w

arring parties. Acceptance of m ediation, as

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 67

J. M ichael G

rieg and Patrick R egan assert, “can im

ply w eakness, betray a lack of

resolve, or convey legitim acy on a heretofore unrecognized adversaty.”23g

In m any w

ays, it is easier for individual states to m ediate ethnic conflicts than

for international organizations to do so. International organizations (both regional ancl global) m

ust consider the positions of m em

ber states before acting. Individual states can ttilize “secret ‘back channel’ diplom

acy.” Such back chan- nel diplom

acy provicles rhe foundation for form al negotiations to ¡ake place. In

orcler to ensure that an agreem enc by m

oderates can be enforced, individual srares are also m

ore easily able to deploy m ilitary forces against extrem

ists w ho

m ay be bent on thw

arting che agreem ent.24O

For exam ple, in 1995, concerned

about the possibility of instability in the Balkans, the U nited States deployed

forces to M acedonia (a state that w

as oirce a republic in the form er Yugoslavia)

in an affem pt to prevent an outbreak of violence betw

een the Albanian m inority

ancl che Slavic governfileît.24r In considering the im

pact of m ediation by intergovernm

ental organizations (IG

O s), such as the European U

nion or the U nited N

ations, it is im portant to

recognize that the legitim acy of an international m

ediator is “one of the m ost

effective resources” needed to get the w arring parties to agree to negotiate. The

“sratlrs and respect” of heads of state and other high-level officials (foreign m in-

isters) confer legitim acy to the m

ediators, and m ay lead the w

arring parties to m

oclerate their positions and m ake concessions.242 M

oreover, as discussed in chapter 1, international institutions can reduce the uncertainty that prevails in conFlicts betw

een parties w orried about their future security. International insti-

rutions can provide “objective inform ation about each side’s capabilities, resolve,

and interests.”243 Jacob Bercovitch and Allison H

ouston argue rhar regional organizations (such as the African U

nion, O rganization of African States) “offer the best chances of

successful outcom es in international m

ediation,” w hereas m

ore global interna- tional organizations (such as the U

N ) “have a very poor record in the area of

m ediation.” The difference in outcom

es m ay result from

the fact that the m em

– bers of regional organizations have “com

m on ideals, perspectives, and interests”

that m ay be found w

anting in larger international organrzatrons.244 \X/hile it m

ay be the case that regional organizations have a better chance of a successful olltcom

e, this does not m ean that international organtzations do not

m atter in dealing w

ith conflict. Schrodr and G erner’s analysis of third-parry

m ediation founcl that, in general, m

ediation “does low er the level of conflict

betw een the antagonirrr.1245

M oreover, international organizarions can prom

ote norm s of acceptable

behavior and condem n unacceptable behavior in addressing peace and securiry.

U N

Security C ouncil R

esolution L325 is one such exam ple. In O

ctober 2000, for

68 Ethnic C onflict

the first tim e, the Security C

ouncil passed a resoiution recognizing the effecr of w

ar (both inras.tate and interstate) on w om

en, particularly “as refugees and internally displaced persons, fw

ho] increasingly are rargered by com baranrs and

arm ed elem

ents, and recognizi,?g the consequent im pact this has on durable peace

and reconciliation.” Further, the resolu¡ion “[u]rges M em

ber States to ensure increased representation of w

om en at all decision-m

aking levels in narional, regional and international institutions and m

echanism s for the prevenricn, m

an- agem

ent, and resolution of conflict” as w ell as encourages the support of “local

w om

en’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and [those] that involve w

om en in all of the im

plem enrarion m

echanism s of rhe

peace agreem enrs” (em

phasis in original).246 The resolurion’s call for rhe pardci- pation of w

om en at the negotiating table m

atters for successful and inclusive m

ediation effort.s. In June 2008 the U

N Security C

ouncil w enr furrher in its efforts ro highlighr

the im pact of w

ar on w om

en, particularly in rhe area of gender-based violence. R

esolution 1820 called for the “im m

ediare and com plete halt to acrs of sexual

violence.” The resolution further declared that “civilians account for the vast m

ajority of those adyersely affected by arm ed conflict; rhar w

om en and girls are

particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a racric of w ar ro

hum iliate, dom

inate, instiil fear in, disperse andf or forcibly relocare civilian m

em bers of a com

m uniq, or ethnic groøp; and rhat sexual violence perpetratecl in

this m anner m

ay in som e instances persist after the cessation of hostiiities”

(em phasis added). Speaking for rhe U

nited States (w hich helcl the Securiry C

oun- cil presidency that m

onrh), Secretary of Stare C ondoleezza fuce s¡ated rhar “w

e affirm

that sexual violence profoundly affecrs nor only rhe health ancl safery of w

om en) but the econom

ic and social srability of their narions.” As w irh R

esolu- tion 1325, R

esolution 1820 calls on the relevanr U N

agencies ro consult w irl-r

w om

en and w om

en’s organizations, and include w om

en in decision-m aking pro-

cesses to deal w ith peace and the post-conflict restrucruring ofa country’s social,

econom ic, and political institurions and sysrem

s.247 -¡6″t” rw o Security C

ouncii resolutions are exam

ples of the evolution and application of an inrernarional norm

of acceptable behavior (and condem narion of unacceprable behavior) pro-

m oted by an internationai organizarion in seeking ro m

ediate conflicrs, by tak- ing into account the im

pact of conflicts on w om

en ancl rhe need ro include w

om en at the peace negotiations ancl posr-confiict social, econom

ic, ancl politi- cal institutions.

N ongovernm

enta”I organizacions (N G

O s) are usually involved w

ith distribur- ing hum

anitarian supplies to civilian victim s of ethnic conflicts. But in acldidon

to this, in their efforts to resolve conflicrs, N G

O s; through the provision of

“good offices,” can prom ote dialogue betw

een the w arring parties.24g H

ow ever,

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 69

N G

O s are lim

ired in their effect because extrem ists often attem

pt to unclerm ine

agreelxents concludect by m oderates. In that case, coercive m

easures m ay be

neecled, anct N G

O s do not have these coercive resources at their disposal.2a9

In assessing the success of rnediation in internal conflicts, scholars have founcl that the record is m

ixed. M ichael Brow

n and C hantal cte Jonge O

udraat note several factors necessary for successful m

ediation, including “a clear strat- egy” of rhe m

ecliators (clear political objectives, icleas of how best to achieve those

objecrives, inclucling how to form

an international consensus), preference of at least one sicle to tl-re conflict for “talking ro fighting,” and m

ecliators that have leverage over the w

arring parties (both indr-rcem ents and punishm

ents).2s0 Even w

hen agreem ent is reachecl, there is alw

ays the problem of irnplem

entation and enforcem

enc of the agreernent. Som etirnes w

arring parties are not really inter- ested in a settlem

ent) preferring to use the negotiation process as a m eans to buy

rirne for im proving their n-rilitary situation. D

ue to the significant clistrust that perm

eates the relationship betw een the disputants, there is also the possibiliry

that one or rnore parties to the agreem ent w

ill cheat (for exam ple, groups w

ill w

ithhold w eapons ir-r case they need them

if fighting resum es). Aclditionall¡

leaclers m ay not be able to control the actions of their m

ore extrem ist follow

ers, w

l-ro m ay prefer to fight than to seek peace.Zsl Finall¡ m

ediarion is often unsllc- cessful because the international com

m unity is unw

illing “to provide m ediators

w irh the econom

ic, logistical, police, and m ilitary support needed to oversee the

process of disarm am

ent, integration of the arm ed forces, reparriation of refu-

gees, ancl holding ofgeneral elections.”252

N oncoercive lntervention. N

oncoercive incervention involves actions by interna- tional actors that inclucle positive and negative inducem

ents to get the Parlies in conflict to end their fightir-rg. Em

phasizing interr-rational norm s of acceptable

behavior is neecled. International actors can ostracize states and actors that clo not follow

these international norm s.253 Specificall¡ the international com

m unity

can provide intelligence inform ation to parties to the conflict they suPPort, as

w ell as decline to provide diplom

atic slrpport. Internarional actors can also clecide not to give econornic assistance. ‘fhe “clenial or threatenecl denial of recognition” of the parties to conFlict is another type of nor-rcoercive intervention.2s4

International actors can provicle inducem ents ro groups in conflict in order

to change their behavior to one of cooperation and peace. For exam ple, follow

ing the coilapse of the Sovier U

nion the new ly inclependent states of Estonia and

Law ia both passecl citizenship law

s nraking it l-rarcl for R ussians living in those

countries to becom e citizens. But w

hen both Estonia and Latvia w anted to join

the European U nion, they reversed their resrrictive citizenship law

s so as not to discrim

inate against ti’re ethnic R ussians in their countries.255

70 Ethnic C onflict

International actors can offer foreign aid as a m eans to prevent and m

anage ethnic conflict. Aid can assist in developm

ent projects, such as an irrigation sys- tem

as in the caselof Sri Lanka, w hich had been enm

esl-red in ethnic conflict betw

een the Sinhalese and Tam ils. The Sinhalese and Tan-ril farn-rers needed to

cooperate to fix the irrigation system . The fanners perceived that in cooperating

to repair the system , both sicles w

ould benefit equally. As Esm an notes, ethnic

conflicr m ay be prevented in cases w

here projects are considered to be m urually

beneficial and lead to interdependence am ong ethnic groups.2s6

Foreign aid’s influence in preventing conflict, how ever, is lim

iteci as donors w

orry that providing such aid m ay draw

them into the politics of the country in

conflict. M oreover, foreign aicl often benefirs one group over another, so rather

than reducing conflict, foreign aid m ay actually increase conflict as groups per-

ceive that they are not benefiting at the sarne level as another and respond w ith

increased violence. For exarnple, the Sri Lankan governlnent w as able to obtain

foreign aid for their M ahaw

eli irrigation project, located in territory dom inatecl

by the Tam ils. Insteacl of letting the project benefit the Tam

ils, the governm ent

relocarecl Sri Lankan settlers to the territory. The Tam ils perceived a threat from

the actions oF the gqvernm ent, and rebelled.zs7

In general, noncoercive intervention is lim ited in its effects on the w

arring parties. O

n the positive side, such inten’entions, according to R othchild and

Lake, increase the costs to ethnic leaders in playing on ethnic sentirnents as w

ell as present the e¡hnic leaders w ith reason for accepting international

norm s so that they can gain “recognition, acceptance, and inclusion in the

international com m

unity.” But w hen conflicts are particularly severe, noncoer-

cive intervention is unlikely to be successful. “The m ost that noncoercive in¡er-

vention can do in such situations is to create a clim ate in w

hich ethnic appeals and violer-rce are perceived by all as illegitim

ate and, therefore, m arginally less

likely to 1r” ,tr.¿.r’258

C oerctve lntervention. C

oercive intervention to encl ethnic conflict includes peace- keeping operations, m

ilitary assistance, arm s em

bargoes, econom ic sanctions,

tribunals, and m ilitary force.259 As Byrnan notes, international actors “can fulfill

three roles: they can protect ancl succor the victim s of the oppressive governm

ent; they can help alter the balance of pow

er on the ground, enabling a group to defend itself (oFren as a prelude to or part of a partition plan); or they can heip change the governm

ent, putting in pow er a new

regim e that w

ill be m ore w

illing and able to create peace am

ong hosrile com rnunal groups.”260 International gov-

ernm ental organizations (IG

O s), both regional (that is, the European U

nion, African U

nion) and global (that is, the U nited N

ations), can be perceived as m ore

politically legitim ate, as w

ell as better able to deal w ith the problem

s arising from

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 7l

burclen sharing, in com parison to individual states. C

oncerns over the abiliry to build coalitions of states w

illing to act, over the need to obtain financing for peacekeeping operations, ancl over negative dom

estic public opinion are ever Pres- enr. Yet, as R

othchilcl and Lake acknow ledge, because intervention by clefinition

is a shared effort, resistance both at hom e and abroad rr’aybe dam

pened.26l In attem

pting to be peacem akers, outside Pow

ers often run into difficulties in the long term

. A large num ber of forces are needed to Prevent the resum

ption of violence, and there are “burdensom

e rules of engagem enr.” In aclclition, chere is

no ciear tim e cornm

itm ent as to how

long the international forces w ill be

deployed. Interventions focused on peacetnaking do “little to foster a political serrlem

ent or nation-bLlr\ding.”262 M oreover, such interventions do little to end

rhe vioience, as w arring parties can hicle their w

eapons. D isanning groups does

nor Ltsually increase their securit¡ but in fact can reduce their security ifthey lear the future. W

hen groups are disarm ed, the balance of pow

er can shift dram ati-

cally if even a sm ail num

ber of w eapons are sm

uggled in by one grouP to the detrim

ent of another.263 R esertling people w

ho w ere ctisplaced during the con-

flict, another goal of incervention, is challenging. H aving experienced hostile

intentiolls of other ethnic groups, how can returnees feel safe and secure w

hen they go hom

e? R eturnees m

ay face violence Ltpon their return, as w as the case of

rhose R w

andans w ho irad lled to Zaire during the genocide. \X/hen they returned,

m any w

ere killed.26a As notecl above, coercive intervention includes actuai and threatened use of

m ilitary force to stop the fighting. G

rieg and R egan found that w

arring Parties w

ere highly likely to accept offers oF m ediation w

hen third parties threatened rnilitary intervention.265 External actors can provide m

ilitary sLlpport co one side for security and protection against another ethnic group, rhereby shifting the balance of pow

er betw een the w

arring parties. M ilitary suPPort that shifts rhe

balance of pow er (usually tow

ard the w eaker side) can lead both sides to the con-

flict to m oderate their positions.266 w

hen N ATO

inrervened on behalf of the Bosnian M

uslirns and C roats in 1″995, Bosnian Serbs m

oderated their dem ands

(though the C roats, now

em boldened by N

ATO ‘s suPPott, increased their

dernands).267 Enforcem ent of an agreem

ent can also com e about from

coercive intervention, as such intervention provides sorely needed credibility.26s

W hether using coercive or noncoercive m

eans, international actors intervene w

ith the hopes of affecring rhe oLrtcom e of an internal conflict. O

tttcom es of a

conflict include the regim e type, the econom

ic system , as w

ell as the autonom y

or independence of an ethnic group.269 Internationai actors need to consider intervention so as to lessen the effecrs of such conflicts on neighboring states. Econom

ic instability and refugees m ay incluce neighboring states to

take aclvantage ofrhe conflict and take aggressive actions for their ow n interests

72 Ethnic C onflict

(for exam ple, provicling assistance ro rebels, invading rl-re country). Inrervention

by international actors can clissuade such behavior by neighboring scares.27O Im

portantl¡ as Brôw n ancl cte Jonge O

uclraat argLre, internationai in¡ervention should focus on cooperative (noncoercive) m

eans first, given that coercive inter- vention “is m

ore expensive ancl riskier.” They contencl that w hen the conflict has

led to crim es against hum

anity (for exam ple, genocic{e or rargering of civilians)

or vital interests are at stake, rhen coercive rreans shoulcl be used.z7l G

iven that internal conflicts resulr from insecuriries of the m

inoriry or sub- ordinate, groups as a result of the governm

ent’s policies, KauFm an argues rhat

external actors can ellcolrrage governm ents to institute policies that reassure the

suborclinate groups that they neecl not fear their extinction. Policies of reassur- ance include econom

ic aid ro the group “conclitionecl on peacefr-rl m anagem

ent of the ethnic dispute.”z72 In cases in w

hich one erhnic grolrp w anrs dom

inance over the other groups, external actors can engage in deterrence, nam

ely threaten- ing to provicle support for the sltborclinare groups. In doing so, rhey can induce both groups to m

oclerate tl-ieir clem ancls, ancl thus reduce the m

lltLlal perception of threat.z73 \K/hen dealing w

ith belligerent elites, exrernal acrors can use both inclucem

ents and pr¡nishm ents as m

eans ro change elite behavior, especially if such elites have engaged in ethnic outbiciclirrg. Inclncem

enrs enable elires to rem

ain in pow er (as instrum

encalist approaches to ethnic conflict rrake clear, elites ofren use ethnicity ancl nationalisrn as m

eans to obtain and rem ain in

pow er). The problem

rernains, how ever, if the belligerenr elire, having sroked

m ass resentm

enf and anger, is unable to back dow n. M

oreover, external ac¡ors m

ay be disinclined to provicle inclucernents to ethnic extrernists out of concern for rew

arcling aggressive b eltavior.27 4

Partition as an lnternattonal R esponse to D

em ands for self-determ

ination. -Ihe dom

estic level section earlier in this chapter acldressed clom estic insritr-rrional

arrangem ents that rnay be instituted in an effor¡ to m

anage and settle ethnic con- flicts. In m

any w ays, these arrangem

ents are a function of the international com –

m unity’s bias in favor of m

aintaining territorial bor-rnclaries of states.27s yet, partition, in w

hich the state’s territorial boundaries are redraw n, is an oprion

available to deal w ith ethnic confiict w

hen groups seei< ro secede or m ake irreden-

tist claim s on territory in w

hich their erhnic kin reside. Exam ples include tl’re

partition of Palestine thar creared Israel in 1948 and rhe esrablishm enr of a Kurd-

ish safe haven in northern Iraq in rhe 1990s. Byrnan argues that parririon m ay be

better at reclucing, if not preventing, blooclshecl. As rnany scl-rolars note, the his- torical record on the slrccess of partition in ending violence is m

ixec1.276 At rhe sam

e tim e, studies on partition find that states resulting From

successful parti- tion are m

ore likely to rrove row arcl denocracy.z77

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 73

There are several argum enrs opposing Partition. Partirion could lead to

an escalarion of the conflict, particularly if civil institutions are w eak and

erhnic m inorities are disenfranchised. Partition could lead to additional self-

determ ir-ration and inclepenclence m

ovem ents as groLrPS now

in the new state

seek ro fonn their ow n state. Partition w

eakens the possibility of dem ocracy as

rhe new ethnic m

ajori¡ies cliscrim inate against the m

inorities now residing in

rhe new state. Population rransfers neecled to seParate the groups are likely

ro be rraum atic. There is the question of w

hether the new state w

ill be politi- cally and econom

ically viable. Finall¡ an internal w ar now

becom es an interna-

rional w ar betw

een new countries as a result of Partitton.z7g

The argum enrs in favor of partition include ending the issues that contributed

ro conflict betw een groups, as the grollps are now

seParated. O ccasionall¡ other

oprions m ay not be possible, especially if the central governm

ent is severely w eak-

ened and unstable, ancl thus unable ¡o m aintain order. W

hile dom estic institu-

rions such as federalism and consociationalism

are possible (as discussed in che clom

estic level section), their actual im plem

entation is often quite problem atíc.279

\X/hen the iclentities of the population are incom patible, conflict is likely to re-

escalare ancl clem ocratrzatior^ difficult to em

erge.2So In an analysis com Paring

partition, alrtonom y, and de facto separation of populations in conflicts from

1900 to 2002, Tl-rom as C

hapm an and Philip R

oeder found that the reduction of the incom

patibility of national identities w as m

ore likely to happen w ith partition

as opposecl to auconom y or de facto separation. This is so because both autonom

y and cle facro separatior-r en-rbolclen “ethnopoliticians as national leaders w

ithin an alttonom

ous hom elancl or a de facto entity on one side of the ceasefire line”

ancl allow for the m

ainrenance of separate (and hardened) identities.2sl U nlike

solutions rhat m aintair-r existing territorial borders in w

hich conflicting grouPs m

ust m ake clecisions together on resources, political rePresentation, Positions in

the executive, etc., paftition cloes noc entail the neecl for joint decision m aking

betw een the parties now

that they no longer reside in the sam e terrítory.zgz

Furtherm ore, partition that separates the w

arring parties, according to C haim

Kaufinann, decreases the m otivations as w

ell as the ProsPects for continued con- flict. M

oreover, separating the w arring parties reduces the potential for ethnic

cleansing.z83 As Bym an contends, “Intervention to bolsrer such failed states is as

im m

oral as it is hopeless. H elping deconstruct these stares, on che other hand,

m ay be the m

osr practical and hum ane solution to recurring civil w

ars.”284

The international com m

unity can thus play a favorable role in Prom oting Par-

tition as an option w iren all other options are not possible in order to end the

fighting. Then, in aclclition to recognizing the new state, the international com

– m

uniry can assist in “population transfers, provide for border security, and Press for guaranrees of m

inority rights” (as there are likely to be ethnic m inorities in the

74 Ethnic C onflict

new ly partitioned scates).28s As C

hapm an and R

oeder found in rheir stud¡ the level of dem

ocracy w as m

uch higher for parties to partition, and dem ocracy m

ea- sures w

ere higher iir the post-conflict stage reiative to the pre-conflict stage. They observed that the new

states established as a result of partition “w ere rnore likely

than other new states to be born dem

ocratic and ro enjoy m ore years of posrinde-

pendence dem ocracy.”286 In the end, of course, resolving the significant ethnic

tensions m ay not be possible; as C

arter Johnson astutely rem arks, “it is not clear

w hether this is in anyone’s pow

er.” Separating the w arring parties does reduce the

security threat, and w ith the security threat recluced, m

oderare poliricians m ay

then have an opportunrty to act.287 Im portantl¡ asJohnson founcl in his study of

partitions Follow ing ethnic civil w

ars (1945-2004), only com plete parririons, in

w hich the w

arring parties are separated, are likely ro lead ro peace.288

Lim itations of lnternational R

esponses to End lnternal Ethnic C onflict

In attem pting to deal w

ith ethnic disputes, conflicring groups often have fears for their future securiry as they cannot be com

pletely sure rhar the other parry or parties to the conflict w

ill nor renege on rhe agreem enr and resum

e fighting. Ethnic conflicts beçom

e quite costly because, according to Jam es Fearon, rhe

m ajoríty ethnic group is unable “to m

ake a credible com m

irm enr ro the m

inoriry” ethnic group. For exam

ple, during the disintegrarion of Yugoslavia, C roatia’s gov-

ernm ent engaged in behavior that underm

ined the Serb m inoriry’s securiry

(including the use of the fascist U stashe sym

bols by the new C

roatian governm enr

and constitutional reform s rhar favored ¡he C

roadan m ajoriry). W

hile the C roa-

tian president, Franjo Tudjm an, m

ade verbal assllrances ro the Serb m inoriry the

actual behavior of rhe governm ent threatened the Serbs’ security.z89 In such a

case, groups w ill need a thircl parLy ro provide a credible com

m irm

enr ro any agreem

ent reached.29O As R

othchild and Lake observe, only w hen the groups in

conflict are convinced that tire external actors are com m

itted and w illing to

enforce the ethnic contract that ensures fairness for all ethnic groups “into the indefinite future” w

ill an external guaranree succeed. The fear of rhe furure loom s

larye-if groups in conflict fear that rhe ethnic conrracr that prorects rhem w

ill not continue in the future, such groups w

ill have litrle incentive ro lay dow n their

arm s, and the conflict w

ill continue.291 The problem

, as Fearon sees it, is that “internarion al organtzatíons w ill rarely

be able to m ake such com

m icm

ents creclib\e.”292 C otrntries w

ith strong and w eak

interests in addressing the conflict face challenges in providing rhose glraranrees. Strong countries intervening nay be perceived as raking sides (as w

as rhe case w

ith U .S. support for the Bosnian M

uslim s in opposirion to rhe Bosnian Serbs);

w eak countries are likely to lack the “poliricai srarnina to enforce a new

erhnic contract in the future” (for exam

ple, rhe African U nion’s efforts to rnediate w

ith

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 75

Íegard to the conflict in Sudan in w hich the AU

does not have the econom ic or

m tlirary capabilities ro clo so).293 H

ow ever, Fearon does note that if the m

inority group has ethnic kin in a neighboring state that is pow

erful enough (for exam –

ple, the R ussian m

inority in Estonia can look to R ussians in R

ussia, w ith its

pow erful ethnic kin), the m

ajority ethnic grouP m ay be incluced to m

âke a cred-

ibl..om -itroent to an agreem

ent.Zg4 For peace ro endure, the international com

m unity m

ust be w illing to com

m it

for rhe long haul.zgs The difficulty arises, as Brow n and de Jonge O

uclraat col1- tend, because international actors are not m

otivatecl to act “in the early stages of incernal conflicts, w

hen levels of violence are low ar-rd w

inclow s of oppoltunity

are open.” International actors consider taking actiolì w hen the violence esca-

lates, but at this stage, cor-rflict m anagerrient becoÍnes m

ore elusive.296 The role that external actors play in conflict prevention (focus on underlying

problem s that are the root of conflict and prom

ote long-term soiutions), conflict

m anagem

ent (prevent conflicts from escalating),292 ancl prom

otion of peace is im

portant. \X/hile involvem ent by the international cornm

unity is w elcom

e, con- flict m

anagem ent and resolution w

ill neeci to be accom plished by local parties to

the conflict, as they are the ones w ho w

ill, in m ost câses) rem

ain w ithin existing

rerricorial borders w hen the figl’rting ends, to solve the root causes of the con-

ilict.298 External intervention (rnediation, noncoercive and coercive), according ro R

othchild and Lake, cannot overcom e the strategic dilernrnas tl-rat leacl to fear

and violence am ong ethnic groups. \Vhile inrernational âctors can “facilitate

com m

unication,” inform arion failures are still possible. And security dilem

m as

are hard to m inim

ize by external actors w hen one side to the internal conflict is

facecl w ith the incentive to engage in the preem

Prive Llse of force against another etlrnic group.299 6″ Kaufm

an astr-rtely observes, “Thircl Parties cannot change etl-rnically definecl grievances, negative srereotyPes, sym

bolic disputes, threaten- ing dernographic trencls, or histories of ethnic clom

ination in foreign counlries, ancl they cannot elim

inate the fears of extinction w hich m

ay result.”3o0 In rhe encl, clurable peace rests on clom

estic institutions established after rhe figlrting encls. In an analysis of 111 civil w

ars (1944-1999), Bum ba M

ukherjee Founcl rhar w

hile third-party enforcem ent m

atters for encouraging “the lihelihood of peace in the short run,” ir is dom

estic institutions such as dem ocracy ancl

proportional representation that play the m ore crucial role “for søstainingpeace

in the long run” (em pl-rasis in original).301

C O

N C

LU SIO

N

This chapter has exam ined the literature at the intersection of com

parative poli- tics ancl international relations in an attem

pt to understand the causes of and

76 Ethnic C onflict

solutions ro ethnic conflict. Looking at individual, clom estic, anct internarional

level factors dem onstrates the com

plexiry of ethnic conflicts (in facr, all conflicts). The levels of analyüis fram

ew ork is the founclation of tl-re rem

aining chapters of the book as w

e explore five cases of ethnic conflict. H ow

ever, one cavear the reacler should keep in m

ind is rhar som etim

es rhe distinctions betw een one analydcal

ievel and another m ay not neatly m

atch the factors in an ethnic conflicr. The divi- sion betw

een ¡hese rhree levels helps us understand a conflicr, but not everything w

ill fit nicely into this categorization. In fact, it is the inreraction of these levels that m

akes undersrancling ethnic conFlict so difficult. For exam

ple, Kaufm an’s w

ork dem onstrates that factors at different levels are

necessary for ethnic conflicr ro em erge: m

ass hosriliry (dom esric), belligerent

elires (indiviclual), ancl a securiry dilem m

a (clom esric); he also recognizes the role

played by foreign parrons-an inrernarional level facror.302 4r H arff ancl G

urr note, “Ethnic conflict is not solely or even m

ainly a consequence of clom estic

politics. The poter-rtial for erhnic conFlicr, the issues ar srake, and even rhe lines ofcleavage betw

een contending groups have been shaped ancl reshaped by inter- national “.¡o.r.>r303 D

aniel D ruckm

an astutely ciaim s rhar group loyalty and

collective action “[c¡oss] the boundaries betw een levels of analysis, from

indi- viduals and sm

all inreracting groups ro collectiviries and narions.”304 Elites play a role in rnobilizing rhe m

asses ro engage in conflict (for exam ple, rhrough the

use of dom estic level factors such as ethnic polidcal parties, socioeconom

ic con- ditions, appeals to social identity of rhe group), and rnem

bers of the inrerna- tional com

m unity (individual states or international organizarions) som

erim es

act to prevent ethnic conflicr bur ac orher rin-res supporr ethnic groups in rheir w

ar aim s. Thus, w

har w e propose is a m

ulrilevel analysis of erhnic conflict.30.5 As w

ill be dem onstrated in the case study chaprers rhar Follow

, all three levels are necessary to exam

ine in order to understand ethnic cor-rflicr.

N O

TES

1. J. D avid Singer, “Internarional C

onfiict: Three Levels of Analysis,” rfforld Politics L2, no. 3 (April 1960): 453-461; J. D

avid Singer, “The Level-oÊ Analysis Problem

in Internarional R eladons,” ‘W

oild Politics 14, no.1 (O cro-

ber 1961): 77-92; Kennerh W akz, M

an, tbe State, and ‘W ar: A Tbeoretical

Anaþsß (N ew

York: C olum

bia U niversiry Press, 1959).

2. O le R

. H olsd, “The Polirical Psychology of International politics: M

ore than a Luxur¡” Political Psjtchologt 10, no. 3 (1989): 495-500. See also Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem

in Inrernarional R elations,” 88-89.

3. Jercl A. R osati, “The Pow

er of H um

an C ognition in the Study of W

orld Politics,” International Stødies R

euiew 2, no. 3 (Autum

n 2000): 47.

4. M ichael E. Brow

n, “The C auses of Internal C

onflict: An O vervisw

,” i¡ N

ationølism and Ethnic C

onflict, ed. M ichael E. Brow

n, O w

en R . C

ote Jr., Sean M

. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. M iller, rev. ed. (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT

Press, 2001), 1″7. 5. Jean Blondel, Political Leadersbip: Tocuards a G

eneral Anaþsis (London: Sage, re87).

6. C arhy G

orrnley-H eenan, Political Leadership and tbe N

orthern Ireland Peace Process: R

ole, C apacitlt, ønd Effect (N

ew York: Palgtave’ 2007).

7. Lew is J. Edinger, ‘Approaches ro rhe C

om pararive Analysis of Political

Leadership,” R euiew

of Politics 52, no.4 (Auturnn 1990):5I2-5I3. 8. Edinger,’Approaches ro rhe C

om parativeAnalysis of Political Leadersi-rip,”

513-514. g. R

osati, ,.The Pow er of H

um an cognidon in the Srudy of w

orlcl Politics,” 48-50. See also Edinger, ‘Approaches ro the C

om parative Analysis of

Political Leadership,” 509-523; M ark Shafer, “Im

ages and Policy Prefer- ences,” Political Psjtcholog L8, no. a Q

997): 873-829. 10. M

any scholars have sruclied leaders’ im pact on foreign policy decision m

ak- ing, recognizing the im

portance of the individual level of analysis. Though by no m

eans an exhaustive list, eviclence of this bocly of w ork can be founcl

in a special issue of International Stítdies R euieø, w

hich publishecl six articles on leaders and foreign policyrnaking’ “Leaders, G

roups, and C oalitions:

U nclerstanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policym

aking,” Interna’- tional Studies R

euieø 3, no. 2 (Sum m

er 2001): 5-250. 11. R

osati,,,The Pow er of H

um an cognirion in rhe study of w

orld Politics,” 56-s7.

12. G eorge W

. Bush, “President D elivers State of the U

nion Address” (January 29, 2002), http: f I geor gew

bush-w hi tehous e’ archives’ gov/new

s/releases/ 20 02 I 0 I I 20020129 – 1.l.hrm

l. L3. R

osari, ,,The Pow er of H

um an cognition in the study of w

orld Poli- tics,” 66.

14. R osati, “The Pow

er of H um

an C ognition in the Study of W

orld Poli- ttcsr” 67.

15. R osati, “The Pow

er of H um

an C ognition in the Study of \Vorld

Politics,” 59. L6. R

osati, ,,The Pow er of H

um an cognition in rhe srudy of \[/orld Politics,”

60. See also fuchard K. H errm

ann and M ichael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the

Enem y Im

age and Spiral M odel: C

ognitive-strategic R esearch after the

C old W

ar,” Internøtional O rgønization 49, no.3 (Sum

m er 1995): 415-450;

D aniel D

ruckm an, “N

ationalism , Patriotism

, and G roup Loyalqt A Social

Psychological Perspective,” M ersbon International Shl’dies R

euiew 38 (1994):

43-68.

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 77

78 Ethnic C onflict

17. N oel Kaplow

itz, “Psychopolirical D im

ensions of Inrernarional R elarions:

Tlre R eciprocal Effeccs of C

onflict Sraregies,” Internøtional Studies Q uarteþ

28, no. 4 (D eèernber I98$: 376,377.

18. D ruckm

an, “N ationalism

, Patriotism , and G

roup Loyalt¡” 55. 19. Shannon Lindsey Blanton, “Im

ages in C onflicr: The C

ase of R onalcl R

ea- gan ancl El Salvador,” International Strdies Q

uarteþ a0 $99Q : aI.

20. Jam es D

. Fearon ancl D avid D

. Lairin, “Violence and rhe Social C onsrruc-

tion of Etl-rnic Idenrit¡” Internøtionøl O rganízation 54, no. 4 (Aurum

n 2000): 853-854. See also M

iltonJ. Esm an, An Introrluction

to Etbnic C onflict (M

alden, M

ass.: Polity Press, 2004) 33-34. 21. Fearon ancl Lairin, “Violence and the Social C

onstrucrion of Ethnic lden- tiry” 855. See also Ashurosh Varshne¡ “N

arionalism , Erhnic C

onflicr, ancl R

ationalit¡” Perspectiues on Politics 1, no. 1 (M arch 2003): 87-88.

22. Fearcn and Laitin, “Violence ancl the Social C onsrrucrion of Erhnic Iden-

dry” 855-856. 23. StuartJ. Kaufm

an, “Spiraling ro Ethnic \Var: Elites, M asses, and M

oscow in

M oldova’s C

ivil W ar,” Interna.tiond.l Secw

ritl 2L, no.2 (Fa,II L996): 109. 24. Ted R

obert G qrr, “\X/hy M

inorities R ebel: A G

lobal Analysis of C om

m unal

M obilization and C

onflict since 1945,” International Political Science R euiew

14, no.2 (April 1993): 167. 25. M

arc H ow

arcl R oss, “The R

elevance of C ulture for rhe Srudy of Polirical

Psyclrology and Ethnic C onflict,” Political Pslchologt 18, no. Z (L997):309.

26. R oss, “The R

elevance of C ulture for rhe Stucly of Polirical Psychology and

Ethnic C onflict,” 304-305. See also G

avan D uffy ancl N

icole Lindstrom ,

“C onFlicting Identities: Soliclary Incenrives in the Serbo-C

roatian \X/ar,” Journal of Peace R

esearcb 39, no. I (2002): 70. 27. R

oss, “The R elevance of C

ulture for the Study of Polirical Psychology and Ethnic C

onflict,” 319. 28. Stephen Van Evera, “H

yporheses on N ationalism

and W ar,” in N

ationalism and Ethnic C

onflìct, ed. M ichael E. Brow

n, O w

en R . C

oreJr., Sean M . Lynn-Jones,

and Steven E. M iller, rev. ed. (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT Press, 2001), 48,53.

29. Yan Evera, “H ypotheses on N

ationalism and W

ar,” 53. 30. Fearon ancl Laitin, “Violence and rhe Social C

onstruction of Ethnic Iden- tit¡” 864-865.

31. Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social C onsrrucrion of Erhnic lden-

tit¡” 865. 32. D

avid A. Lake and D onald R

othchild, “spreacling Fear: The G enesis of

Transnational Ethnic C onflict,” rnTbe Internøtional Spread of Ethnic C

onflict: Fea4 D

iffusion, and Escalation, ed. D avicl A. Lake and D

onald R orhchild

(Princeton: Princeron U niversiry Press, 1998), 19.

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 79

33. Lake ancl R othchild, “SpreadingFear,” 2O

.

34. D aníel L. Byrnan, Keeping tbe Peace: Lasting Soløtions to Ethnic C

onflicts (Balni’ m

ore: Jol-rns H opkins U

niversity Press, 2002) 35. 15. Bynran, Keeping the Peace,38. See also Stephen M

. Saidem an, “Explaining

rhe Inrernational R elations of Secessionist C

onflicts: Vulnerability versus Ethnic Tres,” Internd’tional O

rganization 51, no. 4 (Autum n 1997):721-753′

36. Kaufrnan, “spiraling ro Ethnic W ar,” L09.

37. Kal:’fir’an, “Spiraling to Ethnic W ar,” Il4.

38. Kanfm an, “spiraling to Ethnic W

ar,” II7-118. 39. D

avíd C arm

ent and Parrick Jam es, “Internal C

onstraints and Interstate Ethnic C

onflícq” Jou.rnal of C onflict R

esoløtion 39, no. 1 (M arch 1995): 87. See

also Lake and R othchild for a discussion of elites’ use of diversionary w

ars, “Spreacling Fear,” 31.

40. C arm

ent anclJam es, “Internal C

onstraints and Interstate Ethnic C onflict,”

90. 41. Lake and R

othchild, “Spreading Fear,” 31. 42. C

ar-;rrent andJam es, “Internal C

onstraints and Interstate Ethnic C onflict,”

91..

43. C arrnent anclJam

es, “Inrernal C onstraints and Interstate EC

hnic C onflict,”

93. 44. Bym

an, Keeping tbe Peace, 129. 45. U

lrich Schneckener, “M aking Pow

er-Sharing W ork: Lessons from

Successes and Failures in Ethnic C

onflict R egulation,” Joørnal of Peace R

esearch 39, r-ro. 2 (M

arch 2002):224. 46. Schneckener, “M

aking Pow er-Sharrng W

ork,” 224. 47. Schneckener, “M

aking Pow er-Sharing W

ork,” 225. 48. Bym

an, Keeping the Peace, 81. 49. Byraan, Keeping the Peace, 82. 50. Bym

an, Keeping the Peace, 96-97. 51. Stephen John Stedm

arr, “spoiler Problem s in Peace Processes,” in N

ational’ ism

and Ethnic C onflict, ed. M

ichael E. Brow n, O

w en R

. C oteJr’, Sean M

. Lynn- Jones, and Steven E. M

iller, rev. ed. (C am

bridge, M ass.: M

IT Press, 2001), 366. 52. Stedm

an also m entions the tyPe of spoilers (lim

ited, greed¡ total) and “locus of che spoiler problem

” (spoiler as leader or follow er). Stedm

an, “spoiler Problem

s in Peace Processes,” 369-372. 53. Stedm

an, “spoiler Problem s in Peace Processes,” 374-375.

54. Frederic S. Pearson, “D im

ensions of C onflict R

esolution in Ethnopolitical D

ispuces,” /ou.rnal of Peace R esearcb 38, no. 3 (2001): 28O

.

55. Kenneth Arrow , Social C

hoice and Indiuiduøl Valøes (N ew

York: !Ø iley and

Sons,1951).

80 Ethnic C onflict

56. D onald L. H

orow itz, Etbnic G

roøps in C onflict (Berkeley: U

niversiry of C ali-

fornia Press, 1985) 653,657. 57. H

orow it z, Etitnic G

roups in C onflict, 186-194.

58. Andrew R

eynolds and Tim orhy D

. Sisk, “Elecrions and Electoral System s:

Im plications for C

onflicr M anagem

ent,” in Elections and. C onflìct M

anage- m

ent in Africø, ed. Tim othy D

. Sisk and Andrew R

eynolds (\X/ashington D

.C .: U

nited Srates Institure of Peace, 1998), LI,36. 59. M

ichael J. Soclarno, C om

parøtiue Politics: A G lobal Introdøction (Boston:

M cG

raw -H

ill, 2008), 274. 60. R

eynolds and Sisk, “Elecrions and Electoral Sysrem s: Im

plicarions for C on-

flict M anagem

enf.’) 61. Tim

othy Sisk, D em

ocrøtization in South Africa: Tbe Elusiue Social C ontract

(Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1995).

62. G at:riel A. Alm

ond, R ussell J. D

alton, G . Bingham

Pow ell Jr., and Kaare

Strom , “Interest Articulation,” in C

om pørutiue Politics Todajt: A \Xlodd View

, ed. G

abriel A. Alm ond, R

ussell J. D alron, G

. Bingham Pow

ell Jr., and Kaare Strom

, 8th ed. (N ew

York: Pearson Longm an, 2006),65.

63. Sodarno, C om

paratiue Politics, 283. 64. Atrow

, Social C hoice and Indiuidøøl Values.

65. Anthony D ow

ns, An Econom ic Theorjt of D

em ocracl (N

ew York: H

arper ancl R

ow , 1957).

66. M ancur O

lson, The Logic of C ollectiue Action: Pøblic G

oods and the Theory of G

roups (C am

bridge, M ass.: H

arvard U niversiry Press, I97l),21..

67. O lson, Tbe Logic of C

ollectiue Action. 68. O

lson, The Logic of C ollectiue Action,6L

69. Jam es G

. M arch andJohan P. O

lsen, “The N ew

Insritutionalism : O

rgani- zatronal Facrors in Polirical Lífe,” Am

erican Political Science R euiew

78 Q

e8\:738. 70. M

arch and O lsen, “The N

ew Institutionalrsm

,” 742. 71,. M

arch and O lsen, “The N

ew Institutionalrsm

,” 747. 72. G

eorge Tsebelis, Veto Plalers: H ow

Political Institøtions W ork (Prrnceron: Prince-

ton U niversity Press, 2002), 2.

73. M ark Kesselm

an, Joel Krieger, and \X/illiam A. Joseph, “Inrroducing C

om –

parative Politics,” in Introdøction to C om

paratiue Politics, ecl. M ark Kesselm

an, Joel Krieger, and \[/illiam

A. Joseph, 3rd ed. (Bosron: H oughton M

ifflin, 2004),8.

74. Jam es M

arch and H erberr Sim

on, O rganizations (N

ew York: W

iley and Sons, 1es8).

75. M arch and Sim

on, O rganizations

76. Steven E. Lobell and Philip M auceri, “D

iffusion and Escalation of Erhnic C

onflict,” ín Ethnic C onflict and International Politics: Explaining D

ffision and,

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 8l

Escalation, ed. Steven E. Lobell and Philip M auceri (N

ew York: Palgrave,

2004), l. //.

Esm an, An lntrod.øction to Etbnic C

onflict, 3. 78. Esm

an, An Introdøction to E*tnic C onflict, 3.

79. Esm an, An Introduction to Ethnic C

onflict,75. Stuart Kaufm an argues that

there are several necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions for ethnic con- flict: “ethnically defined stereotypes, negative stereorypes, dem

ographic threats, histories of ethnic dom

ination, em otion-laden ethnic sym

bols, reciprocal fears of group extinction, de facto political anarcI7y, and political space and m

ilitary m eans [o act.” The three proxim

ate callses of ethnic w ar

are m ass hostiliry belligerent elites, and security dilem

m as. Kaufm

an, “Spi- raling to Erhnic W

ar,” ll4. 80. Jack Snyder, ‘Averting Anarchy in the N

ew Europe,” rn Tbe C

old W ar and

After, ed. Sean M . Lynn-Jones (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT Press, l99l), L24.

81. Stephen Van Evera, “Prim ed for Peace: Europe after the C

oldW ar,” inThe

C old W

ar and After, ed. Sean M . Lynn-Jones (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT Press,

L99r),2r4-2t5. 82. Ted R

obert G urr, “The R

evolution-Social-C hange

N exus: Som

e O ld Theo-

ries and N ew

H ypotheses,” C

om pøratiue Politics 5, no. 3 (ApriI 1973): 359-

392;’Ied R obert G

urr, “W ‘hy M

inorities R ebel: A G

lobal Analysis of C

om m

unal M obilization and C

onflicc Since 1945,” International Politicøl Science R

euiew 14, no.2 (April 1993): 1,61,-20L.

83. See also John H utchinson and Anthony D

. Sm ith, “Introduction,” in Eth-

niciry, ed.John H utchinson and Anrhony D

. Sm ith (O

xford: O xford U

niver- sity Press, 1996), 3-I4,

84. Brow n, “The C

auses of Internal C onflict,” 5.

85. Brow n, “The C

auses of Internal C onflict,” 5.

86. Brow n, “The C

auses of Internal C onflict,” 5-6.

87. Barry R . Posen, “The Security D

ilem m

a and Ethnic C onflict,” Søruiaal 35,

no. 1 (Spring 1993):28. 88. Posen, “The Security D

ilem m

a and Erhnic C onflict,” 38. See also Bym

an, Keepingthe Peace, 17-22; Kaufm

an, “Spiraling to Ethnic W ar,” L08-L38.

89. M yron R

othbart, “Intergroup Perception and Social C onflict,” in

C onflict betøeen People and G

roøps: C a.øses, Processes, and R

esoløtions, ed. Stephen W

orchel andJefîrey A. Sim pson (C

hicago: N elson-H

all ,1993), 93-L09.

90. D ean G

. Pruitt, “D efinition of the Situacion as a D

eterm inant of Inter-

national Action,” in International Behauior: A Social-Pslchological Anaþsi5 ed. H

erberc C . Kelm

an (N ew

York: H olt, funehart and W

inston, L965), 393-432; D

eborah W . Larsen, “Trust and M

issed O pportunities in Inter-

national R elations,” Political Prycbolog l8 (L997): 72I. Bym

an argues that

82 Ethnic C onflict

the security dilem m

a is berrer understood “as an explanation for the co1Ìtinuation of conflict or for escalation of existing tension to violence rather than å, o.. for w

hy peaceful societies sucldenly becom e violenr,,

(Keeping the Peace, 19). 91. Brow

n, “The C auses of Inrernal C

onflíct,” 6-7. 92. Brow

n, “The C auses of Internal C

onflict,” 7. 93. Brow

n, “The C auses of Internal C

onflicr,” 8. 94. Esm

an, An Introdøction to Etbnic C onflict. C

layron Peoples exam ines dara For

m ore than tw

o hundred grollps and one hundred countries, focusing on m

inoriry groups and types of cliscrim ination ar-rd their relarionship to

interethnic violence. See C layron D

. Peoples, “H ow

D iscrim

inarory Policies Im

pact Interethnic Violence: A C ross-N

arional, G roup-Level Analysis,,,

Internøtional Joørnal of Sociolog 3 4, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 7 I-9 6.

95. Peoples, “H ow

D iscrirninatory Policies Lnpact Interethnic Violence,” 73.

96. Bym an, Keepingtbe Peace,3I-32; Ilan Peleg, D

em otøtizingtbe H

egem onic State:

Political Tiansform ation in the Age of Identitlt (C

am bridge: C

am bridge U

niver- siry Press, 2007).

97. Brow n, “The Ç

auses of Inrernal C onFlict,” 8.

98. Brow n, “The C

auses of Internal C onflict,” 8-9.

99. Brow n, “The C

auses of Internal C onflict,” 9.

100. Kristen P. \X/illiam s, ‘(IÍìrernarionalizarion

oF Erhnic C onflicr in rhe Bal-

kans: The Breakup of Yugoslavia,” ín Ethnic C onflict ancl International Politics:

Expløining D ffitsion and Escalation, ed. Steven E. Lobell and Philip M

auceri (N

ew York: Palgrave, 2004),76; LenardJ. C

ohen, Brohen Bonds: The D isinte-

gration of Yugosløuia (Boulder: ‘W esw

iew Press, 1993), 266.

101. Brow n, “lfhe C

auses of In¡ernal C onflict.”

102. Brow n, “The C

auses oFlnternal C onflicr,” 10.12. See also Peoples, ,,H

ow D

iscrim inatory Policies Im

pact Interethnic Violence,” 73. 103. Esm

an, An Introduction to Ethnic C onflict, 79.

104. Brow n, “The C

auses of Internal C onflict,” 12. See also peoples, “H

ow D

is- crim

inatory Policies Im pact Inrerethnic Violence,” 23.

105. Esm an, An Introduction to Etbnic C

onflict,82. 106. Bym

an, Keeping the Peace, 22. 107. Esm

an, An Introdøction to Etbnic C onflict,83, 139.

108. Brow n, “The C

auses of Internal C onfltct,” L2.

109. Brow n, “The C

auses of Internal C onFiict,” 12.

110. Van Evera, “H yporheses on N

ationalism and \X/aq” 50-51.

llr. Jay R othm

an and M arie L. olson, “From

lnreresrs ro Idenrities: Tow ards a

N ew

Em phasis in Inreractive conflicr R

esolurion,” Jottrnal of peace R esearch

38, no. 3 (2001):291.

1L2. Steven A. \X/elclon, “The Institu¡ional C ontext oF Tolerance for Ethnic

M inorities: A C

om parative, M

ultilevel Analysis of lVestern Europe,” Am eri-

can Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (April 2006): 332. Í3. Jeff Spinner-H

alev ancl Elizabeth Theiss-M orse, “N

ational Identiry and SelÊEsteem

,” Perspectiues on Politics L, no. 3 (Septem ber 2003): 519.

114. Spinner-H alev and Theiss-M

orse, “N ational Identity and SelÊEsteem

,” 521. See also Jeffrey R

. Seul, “‘O urs Is the \X/ay of G

od’: R eligion, Identit¡ and

Intergroup C onflict,”/ol.rrnd,l of Pea,ce R

esearch 36, no. 5 (1999): 553-569.

115. W eldon, “The Institutional C

ontext of Tolerance for Ethnic M inorities,” 333.

1ff. Spinner-H alev and Theiss-M

orse, “N ational Idendry and SelÊEsteern,” 522.

ll7. Esm an, An Introdw

ction to Ethnic C onlTict, 89.

118. Bym an, Keepingthe Peace,23.

L19. Lake and R othchilcl, “spreading Fear,” 7-8. See also Bym

an on hegem onic

arnbitions as a cause of ethnic conflict. H e argues that hegem

onic conflict is “the m

ost clifficult type of conflict to solve.” This is so because the sub- ordinate groups are expected to rem

ain suborctinate to the hegem onic

ethnic group (both in term s of status ancl security). Bym

an, Keeping the Peace,29-34.

L20. Lake and R othcl-rild, “spreading Fear,” 4, 8-10. Stuart Kaufm

an argues that an ethnic securiry dilem

m a goes beyond the neorealist notion of a security

dilem m

a-rather than anarchy and possible security threats leading ro the dilem

m a, “an erhnic security dilernm

a [also] requires reciprocal fears of group extinction.” See Kaufm

an, “Spiraling to Ethnic W ar,” ll2.

121. Peoples, “H ow

D iscrim

inatory Policies Im pact Interethnic Violence,” 89,

92-93. I22. M

ichael E. Brow n and C

hantal de Jonge O udraat, “Internal C

onflict and International Action: An O

vervieq” in N øtionalism

and Ethnic C onflict, ed.

M ichael E. Brow

n, O w

en R . C

ote Jr., Sean M . Lynn Jones, and Steven E.

M iller (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT Press,2001), 188.

123. Bym an, Keepingtbe Peace; Esm

an, An Introdøction to Ethnic C onflict.

124. Adam Przew

orski, D em

otacl and the M arhet: Political and Econom

ic R eþrm

s in Eastern Eørope and Latin Am

ericø (C am

bridge: C am

bridge U niversiry Press,

1ee1). L25. Barbara H

arff ancl Ted R obert G

ttr, Ethnic C onflict in W

orld Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder: W

estview Press, 2004), 182.

1.26. lJ.arff and G urr, Ethnic C

onJlict in W oild Politics, 184.

I27. IJa$f and G urr, Ethnic C

onflict in W oild Politics, 186.

128. Stefan W olff , Etbnic C

onJlict: A G lobal Perspectiue (O

xford: O xford U

niversity Press, 2006), 1,34-135.

129. Esm an, An Introdw

ction to Etbnic C onflict, L72.

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 83

84 Ethnrc C onflict

130. Ilan Peleg, “Transform ing Ethnic O

rders to Pluralist R egim

es: Theoretical, C

om parative, and, H

istorical Analysis,” irt D elnocracl and Ethnic C

onflict: Adt,ancing Pôace in D

eepþ D iuided Societies, ecl. Aclrian G

uelke (N ew

York: Palgrave, 2004), 7 -25 .

13L. Peleg, “Transform ing Erhnic O

rders to Pluralist R egirnes.” O

n exclusionary clom

ination, see also Esm an, An Introdctction to Etbnic C

onflict. L32. Peleg, “Transform

ing Ethnic O rclers to Pluralist R

egim es.”

L33. Peleg, “Transform ing Ethnic O

rders to Pluralist R egim

es,” 12-13; Ilan Peleg, ‘Jew

islr-Palestir-rian R elations in Israel: From

H egem

ony to Equalíqt?” Inter’ nøtional Journal of Politics, C

u’lht’re and Societl 17, no. 3 (Spring 2004): 426-427. 1.34. Elizabech C

righton anct M artha Abele M

ac Iver, “The Evolution of Pro- tracted Ethnic C

onflict: G roup D

om inance and Policical U

nclerdevelop- m

ent in N orthern lreland and Lebanon,” C

om pøratiue Politics 23, no. 2

(January l99l):128. 135. Peleg, “Transform

ing Ethnic O rders to Pluralist R

egim es,” 14.Pelegdistin-

gr-rishes betw een tw

o types of hegem or-ric regim

es: m ajority and m

inority. A m

ajority hegernonic regim e is defined as a state in w

hich one ethnic group is the.”core nation.” This “core nation” is abie to use the state lo m

aintain hegem onic rule and exciucle all other groups. In the case of

m inority hegem

onic regim es, the m

inority ethnic group is clom inant,

“negating the m ost basic rights of the m

ajorir¡ including the right of par- ticipating” in politics. In l¡oth câses, lhe state is exclusivist-one ethnic group (w

hether m ajority or n-rinority) dom

inates tire state and political institutions af the expense of other ethnic grouPs. Such states are undem

– ocratic. See Peleg,’Jew

isl-r-Palestinian R elations in Israel,” 429.

L36. Peleg, “Transform ing Ethnic O

rders to Pluralist R egim

es,” 14; Peleg, ‘Jew

ish-Palestinian R elations in Israel,” 430. Sam

m y Sm

ooha and Theodor H

anf define an ethnic dem ocracy as a state in w

hich one ethnic group is dom

inant, dom inance that is institutionalized. Im

portantl¡ they claim that

such a clem ocracy is clifferent “from

other types of dernocracy in according a structured superior status to a particular segm

ent of tl-re population and in regarding the non-dom

inant groups as iraving a relatively lesser claim to

the state and also as being not fully loyal.” They continue, “Its m ost out-

standing m anifescations are restrictions on certain indiviclual and collective

rights ancl on the full expression of the national iclentity of the non-clom i-

nant grolrps.” The state is not neutral. Sam m

y Sm ooha and Tl’reodor H

anf, “The D

iverse M ocles of C

onflict-R egulation in D

eeply D ivided Societies,”

International Joørnal of C om

paratiue Sociologt 33, nos. L-2 (1992): 32. I37. Peleg, “Transform

ing Ethnic O rders to Pluralist R

egim es,” 14;Peleg,”Jew

‘ ish-Palestinian R

elations in Israel,” 430; Esm an, An Introdøction to Ethnic

C onflict, 125-127.

I evels or Analysis ¿nd l- lhnic C onllicl 85

138. Bym an, Keeping tbe Peace, 30-31.

139. Bym an, Keepingthe Peøce,33.

140. Peleg, “Jew ish-Palestinian R

elations in Israel,” 430. 141. Byrnan, Keeping the Peace, 44-49. 142. Bym

an, Keeping tlte Peace, 45-46; C righton ancl M

ac lver, “The Evolution of Protracted E¡irnic C

onflict,” 128. 143. Peleg, “Transforrning Ethnic O

rclers to Pluralist R egim

es.” 144. W

illiam FI. R

iker, Liberølism . against Popølisn (Prospect H

eights, Ill.: \X/ave- lancl Press, 1982).

145. Peleg,’Jew ish-Palesrinian R

elations in Israel,” 426-427. 146. fuker, Liberalism

against Popølism . See also Peleg, ‘Jew

ish-Palestinian R

ela- tions in lsrael,” 427.

147. Peleg, ‘Jew isl-r-Palestinian lìelations in Israel,” 427.

148. fuker, Liberalism against Popølism

. 149. Jolrn G

ibbons, Spanisb Politics Tbdal (M anchester: M

anchester U niversity

Press, 1999). 150. Larry D

iam ond, Juan Linz, ancl Seym

our Lipset, “Introcluction: \X/hat M

akes for D em

ocracy?” tn Politics in D eueloping C

ountries: C ornpa.r¡ng Experï

ences u,itb D em

.oaaclt, ed. Larry D iam

ond, Juan Linz, and Seym our Lipser,

2ncl ed. (Boulcier: Lynne R ienner, L995).

151. D iarnortd,Ltrtz, and Lipset, “Introduction: W

hat M akes for D

em ocracy?”

152. D iam

ond,Linz, ancl Lipset, “Introduction: W ha¡ M

akes for D em

ocracy?” 153. H

orow irz, Ethnic G

roups in C onJlict.

154. Sisk, D em

.ocratization in South Africa. 155. Benjam

in R eill¡ D

em ocracy in D

iuided Societies: Electoral Engineeringfor C on-

flict M anagem

ent (C anbridee: C

am bridge U

niversity Press, 2001). 156. Peleg, “Transform

ing Echnic O rders to Pluralist R

egirnes”; Sm ooha and

H ar-rf, “‘Ihe D

iverse M odes of C

onflict-R egulatior-r in D

eeply D ivicled Soci-

eties,” 33; Esm an, An Introdøction to Ethnic C

onlTict, 155-156. 152 Peleg, “Transforrning Ethnic O

rders ¡o Pluralist R egim

es.” 158. Spinner-H

alev and Theiss-M orse, “N

ational lclentity ancl SelÊEsteenl^,” 524. O

n chis point see aiso Jonathan H earn, R

ethinhing N øtionalism

: A C riticøl

Inn’oduction (N ew

York: Palgrave M acm

ilian, 2006). H e states that “m

ore civic or liberal form

s of nationalism are hardly a-cultural but, in Fact, have

evolved out of a particlrlar culture-history and generally prom ote that

culture” (p 9O )

159. Esrnan, An lntroduction to Etbnic C onflict, 169 170.

160. Arend Lrlpharr, D em

ocracl in Pløral Societies (N ew

H aven: Yale U

niversiry Press, L977); Sm

ooha and H anf, “f’he D

iverse M odes of C

onflict-R egulation

in D eeply D

ividecl Societies,” 32-33. 161. Lijphart, D

em ocracl in Plørøl Societies.

86 Ethnic C onflict

162. Lijphart, D enxocrdc)) in Plural Societies.

163. Alicia Levine, “Political Accom m

odation and the Prevention of Secessionist ,,. :l-,

Violence,” iri The International D im

ensions of Internal C onflict, ed. M

ichael E. Brow

n (C am

bridge, M ass.: M

IT Press, 1996), 3Il-340; Esm an, An Introd.uc-

tion to Ethnic C onflict, t4L-I42.

L64. I. W illiam

Zarrm an, “Purting H

um pry-D

um pty Together Again,” in The

International Spread of Ethnic C onflict: Fea4 D

ifføsion, and Escøløtion, ed. D avid

A. Lake ancl D onalcl R

othchild (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press,

1998),3t7-336. 165. Arend Lijphart, C

onflict and C oexistence in Belgiu.m

: The D lnam

ics of ø C øbør-

øþ D iuid.ed Sociery (Berkeley: U

niversity of C alifornia Press, 1981).

1,66. Levine, “Political Accom m

odarion and rhe Prevention of Secessionisr Violence,” 33L.

167. H orow

itz, Etbnic G roups in C

onflict, 626. 168. Schneckener, “M

aking Pow er-Sl-raring W

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onclition: Ideolog¡ Political Prac- rice and Sociai Justice,” in Federølism

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høllenge, ed. G rahan-t

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itz, Ethnic G roøps in C

onflict. 170. D

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17L. Sm ith, “M

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ew D

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I74. K. C . W

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175. Jonathan Lem co, Political Stabilitl in Federal G

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reer). 176. Brendan O

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ianluigi G

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onald \X/introbe (C am

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eorge Schopflin, “The fuse and Fall of Yugoslavia,” inTbe Politics of Etbnic C

onflict R egølation, ed. John M

cG arry and Brenclan O

‘Leary (London: R out-

leclge, 1993), 172-203. 178. Levine, “Political Accom

m odation and the Prevention of Secessionist Vio-

lence,” 33O ,332.

179. }{orow itz, Etbnic G

roups in C onflict.

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 87

180. C am

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and D em

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om m

ønist and Post-C

ornm u,nist Studies 33 (2000): 403-420.

181. Barbara F. lValter, “D esigning Transitions from

C ivil W

ar: D em

obilization, D

em ocratization, and C

om m

itm ents to Peace,” in N

ationalisnt and Ethnic C

onflict, ed. M ichael E. Brow

n, O w

en R . C

ote Jr., Sean M . Lynn-Jones, and

Steven E. M iller, rev. ecl. (C

am briclge, M

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I82. Eric A. N ordlinger, C

onflict R egølation in D

it,ided Societies (C am

bridge, M ass.:

C enter for International Affairs, H

arvard U niversiry, 1972);Levrne, “Politi-

cal Accom m

odarion and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence,” 335. 1,83. Levine, “Political Accom

m odation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence.”

184. R eill¡ D

em ocrøcy in D

iuided Societies, 1.43-1.44. 185. “Belgium

‘s Pitiful Policies,” Tbe Econom ist, July 16,2008, w

w w

econom ist

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?st ory _id: lI7 39 59 4. 186. Kancl-ran C

handra, “Ethnic Parties ancl D em

ocratic Stabilit¡” Perspectiues on Politics 3, no. 2 (June 2005): 235. O

n ethnic ourbidcling see Jam es D

. Fearon and D

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rganizøtion 54, no. 4 (Aucum n 2000): 864-865.

187. C hanclra, “Ethnic Parties and D

em ocratic Stabiliry” 236.

188. C l-randra, “Ethnic Parties ancl D

em ocratic Stability,” 239.

189. Spinner-H alev and Theiss-M

orse, “N ational Idenriry and SelÊEsteem

,” 525. 190. Levine, “Political Accom

m oclation and the Prevention of Secessionis¡

Violence,” 335. 191. Lijphart, D

em ocracy in Plural Societies, 147-I57.

192. N eal G

. Jesse and Kristen P. W illiam

s, Identi4t and Institøtions: C onflict R

edøc- tion in D

iuided Societies (Albany: SU N

Y Press, 2005). See also N ina C

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esearcb 4L, no. 5 Q

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an, Keeping the Peace, 1.52. 1 9 6. Schneckener, “M

aking Pow er-Sharing \X/’ork,” 2ll -214.

197. Schneckener, “M aking Pow

er-Sharing W ork,” 214-217.

198. Schneckener, “M aking Pow

er-Sharing W ork,” 218.

199. Sclrneckener, “M aking Pow

er-Sh arrng W ork,” 224.

200. H earn, R

ethinkingN ationalßm

, 237. 201. Eiki Berg ancl G

uy Ben-Porat, “Introduction: Partition vs. Pow er-Sharing?”

N ations and N

ationalism . 14, no. 1 (2008): 31.

202. W altz, M

an, tbe State, and W a4 227.

203. W alcz, M

an, tbe State, and \Ya1 232.

88 Ethnic C onflict

204. W altz, M

an, the State, and.W ar, 232.

205. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International R

elations,” 80. 206. Lobell and M

auceri, “D iffusion and Escalation of Ethnic C

onfli.ct,” 2. 207. W

tlIíam s, “Internationalization of Ethnic C

onflict in the Balkans,” 75-94. 208. Esm

an, An Introduction to Etbnic C onflict, 102-103.

209. Esm an, An Introdøction to Etbnic C

onflict, 1.L9. 210. Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “D

iasporas and International R elations

Theor¡” International O rgønization 57, no.3 (Sum

m er 2003): 449-479.

211. Shain and Bartl-r, “D iasporas ancl International R

elations Theor¡” 451. 212. Esm

an, An lntrodu.ction to Etbnic C onflict, 104.

213. Esm an, An Introduction to Ethnic C

onflict, 105-106. 214. D

avid C arm

ent and Patrick Jam es, “Explaining Third-party Intervention

in Ethnic C onflict: Theory and Evidence,” N

ations and N ationalism

6, no.2 (2000): I9a.

215. Bym an, Keeping the Peace, 4O

.

216. C hades King and N

eil J. M elvin, “D

iaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, For- eign Polic¡ and Security in Eurasia,” Internationøl Secw

riryt 24, no.3 (\Vinter I9e9l2ooo): t\0.

2I7. Krng and M elvin, “D

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219. King ancl M elvin, “D

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. Krng and M elvin, “D

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222. Shain and Barth, “D iasporas ancl International R

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7. 224. Lake and R

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atthew Evangelisca, “H

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er Soviet U nion,” tn Tbe International D

im ensions of Internal C

on-

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n (C am

briclge, M ass.: M

IT Press, 1996), I2I-1,22. 226. Kasfm

an, “Spiraling to Eti-rnic \X/ar,” 110, 118. 227. Kattfm

an, “Spiraling to Ethnic W ar,” 110.

228. H orow

itz, Ethnic G roups in C

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urr, Ethnic C onflict in W

orld Politics, 188-190. 230. Bym

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ilem m

a and Ethnic C onflict,” 43.

232. D onald R

othchild and D avid A. Lake, “C

ontaining Fear: The M anagem

ent of Transnational Ethnic C

onflicr,” in Tbe International Spread of Ethnic

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 89

C onflict: Fear, D

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onald R oth-

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233. Posen, “The Security D ilem

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235. Kasfm an, “Spiraling to Ethnic W

ar,” L33. 236. Esm

an, An Introdøction to Ethnic C onflict, 109; R

othchild and Lake, “C ontain-

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. R egan, “W

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hen D o They Say Yes?” 762-763.

239. G rregand R

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an, An Introduction to Ethnic C onflict, 109-110.

24I. Esrnan, An Introdøction to Ethnic C onflict, ll0.

242. Jacob Bercovitch and Allison H ouston, “The Study of International M

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eborahJ. G erner, “An Event D

ata Analysis of Third- Party M

ediation in the M idclle East ancl Balkans,” Joørnøl of C

onflict R esolø-

tion 48, no. 3 (June 200a):322. 246. U

m red N

ations Security C ouncil R

esolution 1325 (O ctober 31, 2000).

247. U nired N

ations, “security C ouncil D

em ands Im

m ediate ancl C

om plete

H alt to Acts of Sexual Violence against C

ivilians in C onflict Zones, U

nani- m

ously Adopting R esolution 1820 (2008),” Security C

ouncil SC /9364,

D epartm

ent of Public Inform ation (June 19, 2008), w

w w

.un.org/N ew

s/ Press/docs/2 008 I sc9 3 6 4.doc.htm

. 248. Esm

an, An Introdøction to Ethnic C onflict, lL4.

249. Esm an, An Introduction to Etbnic C

onflict, L15. 250. Brow

n and de Jonge O udraat, “Internal C

onflict ancl International Action,” 168.

251. Brow n and deJonge O

udraat, “Internal C onflict and International Action,”

168. See also R othchilcl and Lake, “C

ontaining Fear,” 223-224. 252. R

othchild and Lake, “C onraíntngFear,” 224.

253. R othchild and Lake, “C

ontaining Fear,” 215. 254. R

othchild and Lake, “C ontaining Fear,” 216.

90 Ethnic O onflict

255. Spinner-H alev ancl Theiss-M

orse, “N ational Iclendry and Self-Esteern,” 524.

256. Esm an, An Introduction to Etbnic C

onflict, L18. 257. Esm

an, An innod.uction to Etbnic C onflict, 116-117.

258. R othchilcl and Lake, “C

ontaining Fear,” 2L6-2I7. 259. Brow

n and deJonge O udraat, “Internal C

onflict and Internatiorral Action,” 163-t92.

260. Bym an, Keeping the Peace, 178.

261. R othchilcl ancl Lake, “C

ontainingFear,” 221.. 262. Bym

an, Keeping the Peøce, 183. 263. Bym

an, Keeping the Peace, 184-185. 264. Bynan, Keeping the Peace, 185 186. 265. G

ríegand R egan, “W

hen D o They SayYes?” 777.

266. Posen, “The Security D ilem

m a ancl Etirnic C

onflict,” 44; Stephen E. G ent,

“G oing in W

hen It C ounts: M

ilitary Inrervention ancl rhe O u¡com

e of C ivil

C onflicts,” International StØ

dies Q uarteþ 52 (2008): 713-714; R

othchild ancl Lake, “C

ontaíntng F ear,” 2I7.

267. R othcl-rild and Lake, “C

ontaining Fear,” 217-18. 268. R

othchild ançl Lake, “C ontaining Fear,” 218.

269. G ent, “G

oing in V7hen it C ounts,” 715.

270. Brow rt and de Jonge O

udraat, “Internal C onflict and International

Action,” 185. 271. Brow

n and cle Jonge O uclraat, “Internal C

onflict and International Action,” 188.

272. Kasfm an, “Spiraling to Ethnic W

ar,” I34. 273. Kaufm

an, “Spiraling to Ethnic lVar,” 135. 274. Kaufm

an, “Spiraling to Ethrric W ar,” 136-137.

275. Bym an, Keeping the Peace, I74.

276. Bym an, Keepingthe Peace, 155-169.

277. Bym an, Keeping tbe Peøce, l7l.

278. ‘Ihom as C

hapm an and Philip G

. R oeder, “Partition as a Solution to W

ars of N

ationalism : The Im

portance of Institutions,” Am erican PoliticaL Science

R euieø 101, no. 4 (N

ovem ber 2007): 677; C

arterJohnson, “Partitioning ro Peace: Sovereignt¡ D

em ograph¡ ancl Echnic C

ivil W ars,” International Secø-

riryt 32, r-ro. 4 (Spring 2008): 151; C haim

Kaufm ann, “Possible and Im

pos- sible Solutions to Ethnic C

ivil W ars,” tn N

ationalism and Ethnic C

onJlict, ed. M

ichael E. Brow n, O

w en R

. C ote Jr., Sean M

. Lynn-Jor-res, and Steven E. M

iller, rev. ed. (C am

bridge, M ass.: M

IT Press 2001), 478-482. 279 . Bynan, Keeping the Peace, I72-I73; Jol’tnson, “Partitioning to Peace,” 151. 280. C

hapm an ancl R

oeder, “Partition as a Solution to VØ ars of N

ationalism ,” 679.

Levels of Analysis and Ethnic C onflict 91

)81. C hapnan and R

oecler, “Parririon as a Solution to W ars of N

ationalism ,”

679-680. )82. C

hapm an ancl R

oecler, “Partition as a Solurion to W ars of N

ation- alism

,” 681. 283. Kaufm

ann, “Possible ancl hnpossible Solutions to Ethnic C ivil W

ars,” 445. 284. Bym

an, Keepingtbe Peace, 176. 285. Bym

an, Keepingthe Peace, 175;Johnson, “Partitioning to Peace,” 151. 286. C

hapm an and R

oecler, “Partition as a Solution to W ars of N

ationalism ,”

689. 282 Johnson, “Partitiouing co Peace,” L51. 288. Johnson, “Partitioning to Peace,” 161. 289. Jam

es D . Fearon, “C

om m

itm ent Problem

s and the Spread of Ethnic C on-

flict,” in The International Spread of Etbnic C onJlict: F’ear, D

iffusion, and Escalø- tion, ed. D

avid A. Lake ancl D onald R

otirchild (Princeton: Princeton U

niversity Press, 1998), II8-I20. O n the need to design credible guarantees

see also Barbara W alter, “D

esigning Transitions from C

ivil W ar: D

em obiliza-

tion, D em

octatizatior\ and C om

m itm

ents to Peace,” in N ationalism

and Ethnic C

onflic6 ecl. M ichael E. Brow

n, O w

en R . C

oteJr., Sean M . Lynn-Jones, and

Steven E. M iller’, rev. ed. (C

am briclge, M

ass.: M IT Press, 200L), 415 443.

290. Fearon, “C om

m itm

ent Problem s and the Spread of Ethnic C

onflict,” 107 -126.

291. R othclrild and Lake, “C

ontainíngFear,” 219.

292. Fearon, “C ornm

itm ent Problem

s and the Spreacl of Ethnic C onflíct,” I23.

293. R othchild and Lake, “C

ontainingFear,” 2’1.9.

294. Fearon, “C om

nritm ent Problem

s ancl the Spread of Ethnic C onflict,” 123.

295. Brow n and deJonge O

udraat, “Internal C onllict ancl International Action,”

t9I. 296. IJrow

¡, and deJonge O uclraat, “Internal C

onflict and International Action,” 184.

297. Brow n ancl cleJonge O

uclraat, “Internal C onflict and International Action,”

180-181,184. 298. Iìothchild ancl Lake, “C

ontaining Fear,” 221-222. 299. R

orhcl’rild ancl Lake, “C ontainìngFear,”

225. 300. Kar-ifm

an, “Spiraling ro Ethnic W ar,” I33.

301. Bum ba M

ukherjee, “D oes Third-Party Enforcem

ent or D om

estic Institu- tions Prom

ote Encluring Peace after C ivil W

ars? Policy Lessons from an

Ernpirical -Iesr,” Foreign Policl Anaþsß 2 (2006): a28. 302. Kaufm

an, “Spiraling to Ethnic W ar,” 109.

303. H arff and G

urr, Ethnic C onflict in W

orld Politics, 5,

92 Ethnic C onflict

304. D ruckm

an, “N acionalism

, Patriotism , and G

roup Loyalty,” 54. See also Pearson, “D

im ensions of C

onflict R esolution in Ethnopolitical D

isputes,” 275-287. I

305. Though focusing in large part on the individual level of analysis (providing a critique of the system

ic level), D eborah \Velch Larson Llses a m

ultilevel approach ro explain U

.S. policy in the C old W

ar. D eborah W

elch Larson, The O

rigins of C ontøinm

ent: A Psjtchological Explanatioø (Princeton: Princeton U

niversity Press, 1985).

C H

APTER3 N

orthern lreland: Protestants, G atholics, and

“The Troubles”

¡ff n M

arch 16,2006, a joint hearing of tw o U

nited States congressional sub- llfcom

lnit¡ees observed a m om

ent of silence and prayer before the m eeting

began. The joint hearing w as entitled “The N

orthern Ireland Peace Process: Polic- ing Advances and R

em aining C

hallenges.” It w as com

prised of the Subcom m

it- ree on Africa, G

lobal H um

an fughts, and Inrernational O perations and the

Subcom m

ittee on Europe anci Ernerging Threats, both of w hich w

ere part of the C

om m

ittee on International R elations in the U

niced States H ouse of R

epresenta- rives. At 2:58 p.rr¡. in room

2172,R ayburn H

ouse O ffice Building, the H

onorable C

hristopher H . Sm

ith oF N ew

Jersey presided over the m om

ent of silence for a brave defense attorney from

N orthern Ireland.l

R osem

ary N elson w

as killed alm ost six and a half years earlier by a car bom

b as she clrove m

ere blocks aw ay from

her hom e. Exacdy seven years before to the

clay of the 2006 hearing, this brave attorney from N

orthern Ireland gave tesri- m

ony to a sim ilar congressional com

m ittee. She described how

her job represent- ing C

atholic defendants, som e of w

hom w

ere accusecl of terrorist crim es, had led

to her life being threatened by the R oyal U

lster C onstabulatory (R

U C

), w hich w

as the police force of N

orthern Ireland at the tim e. She said that they had threat-

ened her m any tim

es, both directly and through her clients. \Xzithin m om

ents of her death, allegations of collusion by public servants circulated, pointing at the R

U C

, the N orthern Ireland O

ffice of the British governm ent, the British Arm

¡ and other British state agencies. These allegations continue to this day.2

O n N

ovem ber 16,2004, rhe British secretary of srate for N

orthern Ireland, the R

r. H onorable Paul M

urph¡ M P, announced a public inquiry into the death

of R osem

ary N elson. The inquiry (know

n as the R osem

ary N elson Inquiry) w

as established uncler section 44 of the Police (N

orthern lreland) Act of 1998. This act to reform

policing in N orthern Ireland w

as passed by the British H ouse

of C om

m ons after the conclusion of the 1998 G

ood Friclay Agreem ent in

Belfast, w hich w

as agreed to by m ost m

ajor parties in N orthern lreland, repre-

senring the m ajority of both C

atholic and Protestant citizens. Tl-re public inquiry w

as called after a retirecl C anadian Suprem

e C ourt judge, Peter C

or¡

93