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Table of Contents

1. Introduction 3
1.1 Incident Response: Data Loss Prevention is critical 3
1.2 Proactive Response to the Insider Threat 4
2. Sanitization Process Guidelines by DoD Standards 5
2.1 TheODAA Process Manual, Version 3.3 (DSS) 6
2.2 The Current NIST Sanitization Guidelines 6
2.3 THE (DSS) ASESSMENT AUTHORIZATION PROCESS MANUAL (DAAPM). VERSUS NIST 7
2.3.1 How to Drive Policy Reform? 8
3. Data Eradication on Solid State Drives 9
3.1 Physical Drive Destruction/Pulverization/Incineration 9
3.2 Disk Drive Degaussing 9
3.3 Non-Destructive Drive Erasure 11
3.4 Data Encryption-Secure Erase 13
4.1 ThePlatform Setup: 2.0 Terabyte Aegis Padlock DT External SSD. 16
4.2 Secure Erase Procedures and Verification 18
4.3 Forensic Tool Verification 18
4.4 Guidelines for the adoption of a Revised Policy 21
4.4.1 Industry Implementation of revised erasure techniques 23
5 Conclusion 24
5.1 Application of Proposed Research 24
5.2 Future Discussions/Involvement 25
Glossary 26
Bibliography 27

DIGITAL FORENSIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC ERASE PROCEDURES FOR SOLID STATE DRIVES: A RESPONSE FOR POLICY REFORM IN INCIDENT RESPONSE
1. Introduction
1.1 Incident Response: Data Loss Prevention is critical
The committee on National Security System (2) prepared instructions for incident response with an aim of putting emphasis on the significance of prevention of data loss. The instructions by the commission established the minimum actions that are needed when making a response to information spillage especially on data that has been classified to be of national security importance into an information system that is unclassified. In addition, the instruction applies when there is spillage of higher-level classified information into a low-level classified information system or to a system that has not been accredited to the category of restrictive label of information that is part of the non-government systems (The committee on National Security System). Moreover, the instruction is applicable to spillage of national security information that is classified on any information system (IS) be it commercial, government or private. In the cases of commercial or private systems where there lacks contractual requirement with agency, department or government heads, the instructions by this commission will provide for an investigation or inquiry in accordance to the reference 3 b and c (The committee on National Security System). When this happens, actions that have been established by the instructions of this committee will have to be implemented in the most practical manner.

1.2 Proactive Response to the Insider Threat

The Defense Security Program (DSS) processes classified and secret information as part of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP). The DSS provides user accounts to people whom they believe are responsible to keep classified information crucial to the organization (DSS). Privileged user accounts are issued to individuals who are authorized by the government to perform various significant functions which include; controlling the DSS system, monitoring the system, data transfer and administration functions which are not accessed by general users (DSS).
Organizations protect access to the system by providing security-relevant functions that controls the insider threat mitigation (Bloomfield, Kateryna and Robert). Such threat functions are imposed on removable media, which may be inserted to the system through various ports such as the Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports, the Input/output ports, Compact Disc or the Digital Versatile Disk Drives. Systems with classified information have restrictions that deny unauthorized users the ability to write on the removable media. Limiting access to various functions in the system enables only the authorized users to access the system and denying the unauthorized users the ability to perform security functions, configuring various permissions available in the system and setting audit logs (Bloomfield, Kateryna and Robert). Security-relevant information includes accessing control lists, setting up rules for the routers and the system’s firewall, configuring conditions for security services and management of key information among others. Organizations ensure that when the system is on default, all write functionalities are disabled and when there is a need to access them, users have to login so as to ensure that only the authorized users access the system (Bloomfield, Kateryna and Robert).
The distribution of privileged accounts in the organization is limited. This is because the organization makes sure that it has the least number of users who are authorized to perform various classified functions. The organization may also provide super user accounts to some employees who are known as the system administrators who are assigned unique duties different to the authorized users such as operating commercial off-the-shelf systems (Bloomfield, Kateryna and Robert). Through the control of user accounts, the organization is able to differentiate between the allowed privileges assigned for various users utilizing the domain and local accounts given by the company to manage the information system and configurations for key security issues (Abrams, and Joe).
The organization gives the employees various privileges and reviews these privileges annually. Users are given DTA roles that validate the user privileges. In case the organization needs to make certain adjustments to its operations, it has the right to remove or reassign the privileges to concentrate fully on its mission or business needs (Abrams, and Joe). Additionally, the organization may also introduce insider threat problems that are assigned to the organization by the NIPSOM. Depending on the adjustments made in the organization, the privileges may change with time. Abrams and Joe explained that such changes in the organization include threats to the organization, new missions or business functions and change in technology among others.
2. Sanitization Process Guidelines by DoD Standards

The ‘DoD’ standards is a term that has often been used in the industry of data sanitization. This standard for erasing data from hard drives first appeared in early days when the data-sanitization industry was still evolving (Richard). This standard was initially published in 1995 in the National Industrial Security Program’s Operating Manual and provides specification of the process that hard drives are overwritten with patterns of zeros and ones (Richard). There are three secure passes and verification which are required before the final pass. In pass 1, all the addressable locations with binary locations are overwritten while in the second pass those locations with binary ones acting as compliments of the first are overwritten. The final process is overwriting addressable locations that have a random pattern. When using the DoD standards to erase data from a hard drive one is able to prevent software- based file recovery methods which ensures that no data is recovered from the drives (Richard). The last updated version of the standard was in 2007 and it no longer provides specifications for an overwriting pattern.
2.1 The ODAA Process Manual, Version 3.3 (DSS)
The DSS states that if there is evidence that there was spillage of national security information that is classified, the owner of the information should get an immediate notification in addition to the activity security manager, information assurance manager and the Incident Response Center with the responsibility. The personnel responsible should make a preliminary inquiry with an aim to establish whether the information deemed classified was subject to comprise, loss or unauthorized disclosure (DSS). If the initial outcome from the preliminary investigation shows that there was a spillage, there should be immediate steps taken to prevent and have the problem contained to avoid future repetitions. In all the actions taken to protect and isolate the information deemed classified from access that is not authorized there should be continuity of operations. Some of the factors that are part of the continuity of operations are level of classification, and information category, impact of the investigations, and information perishability. However, this old manual failed to address proper solid-state drive sanitization without destruction.
2.2 The Current NIST Sanitization Guidelines
Sanitization is rare in many organizations and therefore, organizations that have trusted and tested sanitization technology are advised to share the information to others through public websites and forums such as the Federal Agency Security Practices website. Organizations with sanitization services assist individuals with mobile devices which have inappropriate sensitivity or impact levels due to insufficient built-in sanitization (Kissel, Regenscheid, Scholl, and Stine 36). Sanitization helps to show information which is contained in mobile devices which have volatile removable memory. The users are advised to interact with manufacturers of their devices so as determine the type of data that is stored in the removable memory which also helps to show whether sanitization should be added or not (Kissel, Regenscheid, Scholl, and Stine 36).
When using the current generation of mobile devices such as iPhones and iPads, solid-state sanitization takes few minutes due to the data encryption of these devices and having the support of cryptographic erase. Sanitization assists the organization in verifying various sanitization tools such as the degaussers (Kissel, Regenscheid, Scholl, and Stine 36). Some of the functions involved with sanitization in the organization include calibration of the equipment, testing the equipment’s and assisting in maintenance of the equipment.
Sanitization can be used for documentation and certification of electronic media. Kissel explains that the certification may include an electronic record or a piece of paper showing the actions taking place (Swanson, and Michael). Solid-state sanitization is important to an organization since the process of recording can be done automatically with a highly level of confidentiality. Users who use solid-state sanitization acquire the following results after the documentation. The users are able to obtain the model of a product, the manufacturer, serial number, media type, media source and the tools used among others (Swanson, and Michael).
2.3 THE (DSS) ASESSMENT AUTHORIZATION PROCESS MANUAL (DAAPM). VERSUS NIST
One of the critical aspects that differentiates between NIST and the DAAPM is the incorporation of the benefits of solid-state drive sanitization that has been outlined in the “NIST 800-88” manual into this guide. The significant benefit of Sanitizing a Solid State Drive with Crypto-Erase techniques over Destruction will save millions of dollars in DoD Industry.

2.3.1 How to Drive Policy Reform?
Frequently, the Defense Security Service (DSS) will provide opportunities for partner organizations in the industry to be part of the bi-annual or annual referendums for purposes of airing their voices over certain concerns or at times offering their opinions for the revision of specific policies. The organizations, which report to the Defense Security Service (DSS), are contracted by the Department of Defense (DoD) as technical security guidance and cognizant security agency. These contracted companies are provided with an opportunity to provide suggestions on substantive policy reform. In August 2017 at the Defense Security Service Headquarters, a DSS referendum was help up where partners in the DoD industry made open discussions on the cryptographic erase procedures for organizations using Apple iPhones (U.S Department of State). Modifications were proposed to the policy on the DSS Authorization and Approval Manual (DAAPM). The modifications would see AES-256bit encryption key resets on Apple iPhones that had been involved in data integrity incidents specifically classified data spills and a continuation of use without being destroyed.

3. Data Eradication on Solid State Drives
3.1 Physical Drive Destruction/Pulverization/Incineration
Breaking of disk drives, destroying them by grinding them into microscopic pieces and removing the disks from disk drives are some of the methods, which can be used to ensure that data stored in these disks is not recovered. Additionally, in emergencies, the best way to prevent data recovery is by bending the disks. Outdated documents from the government such as the DoD 5220.22M contain data which has crucial information regarded as secret by the government and therefore, the storage medium containing this data which is mainly the magnetic disks should be physically destroyed. However, destruction of documents that are larger than 512-bytes and 1/125” is difficult. CMRR has been used to study disk fragments that have been destroyed. The study involves small disk fragments that tend to become smaller as the linear and track densities increases. Additionally, the data collected is stored as recorded media bites in magnetic microscopes. Hard disks are some of the most complex storage products to destroy while the products that are easier to destroy include: USB drives, magnetic disks and optical media among others (Bell, and Richard).
3.2 Disk Drive Degaussing
The use of degaussers is another method used to eliminate any traces of magnetic data on the disk drives. Degaussers are used to create strong magnetic fields that help to erase the content contained in hard disk drives. The degaussers clean all the data available in the disk drive including track and disk motor magnets. Additionally, degaussing of disk drives serves the same function as physical destruction since in both cases, the disk drives become useless. Data sanitization is evaluated by the CMRR using commercial degaussers.
Disk magnetic coercivity is one of the most important fields in the disk storage since it is used to write bites on the magnetic media. However, drive designers continue to use magnetic recording by increasing the linear density that in turn increases the magnetic coercivity. Additionally, the fields responsible for erasing the disks are increased. Therefore, any degaussers which are faulty or old may not be able to erase new hard drives. Degaussers are also designed to erase data perpendicularly or horizontally which means that the new perpendicular recording drives cannot be used to erase any data from old longitudinal recording drives.
As technology develops and evolves, it is expected that the next generation wills use high magnetic coercivity disks. The modern technology aims at performing tasks with efficiency and therefore the use of laser light in the magnetic disk drives is necessary that raises the temperature of the magnetic medium thus reducing the magnetic coercivity. In some cases, it is difficult to achieve degausser field needed to erase disks especially for drives using the Heat Assisted Magnetic Recording (HAMR). Therefore, the only option left is to destroy the drives physically since the degasser field cannot be achieved at room temperatures.
With an aim to make degaussing of data on hard disk drives impractical, modern notebook or laptop computers are being manufactured with “Hybrid drives” whereby the data is not affected through degaussing. Therefore, other methods for sanitizing these drives have to be invented.

3.3 Non-Destructive Drive Erasure
One of the tasks which is considered difficult includes sanitizing data available on a hard disk drive. When a file is deleted, only its name is removed from the special disk sectors of the directory structure. When the deletion happens, the user data tends to be part of the drive data storage sector where it is possible to retrieve it until the new data overwrites the sectors. On the other hand, when a hard disk drive is reformatted, the servers and the file directory are cleared which happens to be the links connecting to the storage sectors. Nonetheless, the user data is intact and it is possible to recover it until such a time when the sectors are overwritten. It is critical to note that software utilities with the capabilities of overwriting personal data files are vulnerable to attacks by a virus or make an error. Therefore, there is need for constant modifications that allow the incorporation of computer operating systems and hardware which are evolving (Guyot, Bandic, Cassuto, Espeseth, and Sanvido).
It is of importance to note that it is hard for external software to be dependable in sanitization of user data that has been stored in hard disk drives. There are numerous commercial software packages that are available from the DoD 5220 variations which makes an approximately 35 overwrite passes. However, in many of the drives available today, multiple overwrites have been considered non-effective compared to a single overwrite. In some of the drives, off-track overwrites are considered to be efficient and effective despite the fact that there lacks the type of drive external command. Sometimes, there overwrites can even take approximately 24 hours to have a hard disk drive with large capacity erased. In many of the IT facilities which are busy, this kind of time is not available meaning that the IT personnel will often choose to use shortcuts to make the work easier (Wei, Laura, Frederick and Steven).
In addition to this, it is worth pointing out that DoD 522o overwriting is faced with other shortcomings. First, it only has the capability to erase a drive’s Maximum Address that in many instances can be set lower than its original capacity. This would mean that it cannot erase reallocated blocks or even miss some of the extra partitions. Eternal overwrites lacks the ability to access sectors that have been reallocated in most of the hard drives an implication that data recorded is left on some specific sectors. The shortcoming here is that some exotic forensics with knowledge and understanding of external overwrites could conceivably decode and recover these sectors to serve purposes not anticipated. Consequently, while drive systems and enterprise-class drives (SCSI/FC/SAS/iSCSI) have the capability have the user blocks tested for read and write, mass market drives (PATA/SATA) lacks the ability to write, read, or detect blocks that have been reassigned because they lack logical block address to enable access by the user.
The function of the ANSI T13.org committee is overseeing the IDE also known as the interface specifications in addition to governing the SCSI interface specification. When this happens, a secure erase is established into the hard disk that makes it less vulnerable to an attack by malicious software than the software utilities from outside. In the entire ATA interface drives that were manufactured after the year 2001 that is drives with capacities of 15 GB and beyond, the SE command has been implemented as per the testing done by CMRR. Additionally, there exists an internal secure erase command that has been standardized specifically for the SCSI drives but it remains optional and cannot be implemented to those drives which have undergone testing. Secure erase has been regarded as a positive form of data destroying command that achieves data shredding electronically. When the execution of this command happens, the drive is forced to make an internal complete erasure of the user data which is available in the record areas. This is done by overwriting including the g-list records that could have readable data in the disk sectors that have been reallocated being that they are sectors which drives do not utilize because there is hard errors. SE is an extra to the ‘format drive’ command that exists in the storage system software and the computer operating systems (Bodeau, and Richard). The result of this is that there is no addition of costs to the hard disk drives. There is no other software which is required after the secure erase command has been implemented in the disk drives as it has the ability to erase a single on-track erasure on data available on a disk drive. The United States National Security Agency published an Information Assurance Approval for a single pass overwrite after CMRR had made a technical testing revealed that the presence of multiple on-track overwrite passes amounted to no extra erasure (NIST). The U.S. (NIST) (800-888), has approved the secure erase and it has been permitted by Computer Security Resource Center.
3.4 Data Encryption-Secure Erase
Laptop computers have been used for recording data although there have been risks since these laptops are not encrypted. The introduction of 2.5-inch hard disk drives has helped to encrypt the data in the laptop computers before any recording takes place. Additionally, the 2.5-inch hard disk drives provide full data encryption and protect the data in laptop computers from forensic data recovery. Moreover, by discarding the encryption key securely, the drives provide new methods to sanitize the data on hard disk drives (Lyakhovitskiy, and Microsoft Corporation).
Questions as to why data encryption is done on disk drives instead of computers are raised considering that the computers can have applications which access data installed. The computers are considered to have many data functions which involve data management. Encrypting data using the computers would defeat the many data management functions involved in the computer which include: data virtualization, data compression and de-duplication, archiving of data, advanced routing, and thin provisioning of data among others (Lyakhovitskiy, and Microsoft Corporation). All these computer operations are significant in inspecting the data and exploiting the structure of the user data and therefore, defeating these operations would cause penalties to organizations regarding the speed and costs incurred. Additionally, if data encryption takes place in the computers, all other functions involved in data management become nonfunctional. De-duplication can be used as an example to show that finding identical sets of data is not possible if encryption takes place in computers. Another example is the data compression whereby ratios fall from 2:1 to less than 1:1 (Lyakhovitskiy, and Microsoft Corporation).
Data encryption on computers is discouraged although in-drive encryption can be done in the computer which provides double encryption to the drives thereby providing more security to the data. The in-drive encryption solve problems related to removable storage in computers such as tape backups and laptop disks. Due to the rampant cases on data theft and loss of backup tapes, the hardware-based tape drive encryption could be adopted by many people to minimize these cases. Full Disk Encryption and Enhance Secure Erase (FDE E-SE) provides encrypted user data on disks by securely changing encryption keys on internal drives. This occurs by the help of E-SE command in the modern specifications of ATA ANSI. To determine the security of data in disk drives and ranging the level as confidential, secret, top secret or higher, the FDE E-SE needs to be protected against advance forensic analysis (Lyakhovitskiy, and Microsoft Corporation).
Due to the fact that the disk drives are available globally, the US Commerce Department denies the encryption of disks with 256 bits or higher therefore limiting the FDE E-SE to AES_128-bitencryption.The AES is considered to be a symmetric encryption scheme and therefore, the AES-128 needs computation similar to the AES-256. Additionally, it is important to note that when the FDE E-SE operates, it provides data encryption double the amount of AES-128.Paranoid-level security cannot be considered secure for data encryption since crypt-texts available in the FDE disk drives can be removed by normal OW SE after the FDE E-SE operates (Lyakhovitskiy, and Microsoft Corporation).
The Trust Computing Group is working on developing an open industry for encrypting data. The TCG is comprised of various members with the same objective which include the HGST, Seagate, Fujistu and WD.SE through encryption is also included whereby the operations are steady with ANSI standards for ATA drives. The CMRR is looking for ways to reduce the speed required to erase data by testing the FDE E-SE drivers which use only 15 milliseconds to finish an E_SE compared to the conventional secure erase which takes more than an hour to erase a 750 GB ATA-interface hard disk.

4 Incident Response Policy Reform
4.1 ThePlatform Setup: 2.0 Terabyte Aegis Padlock DT External SSD.

Figure 4.1.1: Aegis Padlock
In this figure, the DT Drive is in default with the red color a sign of the lock status. The Aegis Padlock is a secure storage system and a moveable hard drive. It keeps the data save even when the drive has been removed from the enclosure (Dell).

Figure 4.1.2: Aegis Padlock
The above figure shows when the Aegis Padlock is unlocked having a green color, that is the mode after Pin Number (Dell).

Figure 4.1.3: Aegis Padlock
This figure shows the DT Drive USB 3.0 and power ports (Dell).

Figure 4.1.4: Padlock DT

Finally, in this figure, the Driver Serial number for SSD model has been shown (Dell).
4.2 Secure Erase Procedures and Verification
There are three main steps in any successful Wipe Drive process:
Step 1
• Reset the encryption key. This is done by having to programmatically reset the encryption key at the start of the process where stored data is immediately deemed unreadable and irretrievable, even to the wiping program.
Step 2
• Wipe the hard drive with a standard DoD 5220.22-M wiping scheme. When this happens, the drive is overwritten using the pattern desired and the old data is eliminated from the drive.
Step 3
• Reset the encryption key a second time: This process ensures that any data which is left in sectors unreadable including the wipe data irretrievable and makes preparation for the drive to be re-used (White Canyon).
4.3 Forensic Tool Verification

Figure 4.3.1: WinHEX version 17 File Search of “Confidential” Word Document
The figure above shows the capability of WinHEX, which mostly helpful in data recovery, computer forensics, IT security and low-level data processing. It makes inspection and editing of all types of files and is enabled to recover data from deleted files or hard drives which have been corrupted.

Figure 4.3.2: Disk Investigator Forensic software
In this figure, a disk investigator forensic software has been shown. This has the capability of discovering all which is hidden in the hard disk of a computer. It is also useful in recover of data which is lost as well as verifying effectiveness of disk and file wiping programs and finally undelete files previously deleted (Karabiyik, and Sudhir)

Figure 4.3.3: Autopsy 4.4.1 Forensic Software. No Office files including targeted Word document are discovered.

By examining the hexadecimal contents of the securely erased Solid State Drive, important pieces of information can be uncovered about the Primary NTFS partition and any extended partitions, and lack of discovering the

Figure 4.3.4: Sample MS Word Document titled “Confidential File—SAMPLE ONLY” stored on Padlock Drive to test capabilities of Secure Erase operations.
4.4 Guidelines for the adoption of a Revised Policy

Page 135 current statement on the sanitization of Solid State Drives

Adopting the following policy revision within the Defense Security Service Assessment and Authorication Process Manual allows for proper sanitization of Solid State Drives without Destruction:

4.4.1 Industry Implementation of revised erasure techniques
Industry Implementation should start with any DoD Contractor and partner to DoD Cognizant Security Agencies (CSA) such as the Defense Security Service to create an “Incident Response Plan”. This incident response plan should include “Cryptographic Secure Erase” procedures backed by NIST 800-88 guidelines.
An Additional Industry Implementation within a larger corporate environment can include “PXE Network Boot” options

Figure 4.4.2: PXE Network Deployment for multiple crypto-erase possibilities in multiple workstations

5 Conclusion

5.1 Application of Proposed Research
In today’s society, organizations across the world are relying on mobile computing, high speed networks for easier access to information, and sharing at all levels. However, the wide open access has presented new challenges to protection of data. The challenges facing organizations in terms of data protection range from protection of their intellectual property, compliance with the highly regulated services, as well as retail and insurance industries. Regardless of the challenge being faced, organizations need to know places where their most confidential information is stored and who accesses it and at the same time determine the best ways of preventing its loss. The initial step to long-term, sustainable data protection is the recognition that these challenges exist and be committed to an enterprise-wide initiative which involves processes, people, and technology to address the risk of data loss. When a decision has been made to have the risk addressed, there is need for organizations to establish a clear plan which has specific tasks, steps, objectives, and resources to achieve both the long-term and short-term goals. This research can be applied in numerous organizations to safeguard loss of data. Some of the organizations which might find it useful include companies manufacturing hard-drives, those that have specialized in data recovery from malfunctioning drives as well as mobile manufacturing organizations.
5.2 Future Discussions/Involvement
As technology continues to evolve, the discussion provided currently in this report research might change. Improved technology brings both benefits to the society as well as challenges. Due to constant developments and the increase in knowledge pertaining erasure of data from hard drives, there is need for new policies and standards that reflect the current situation in the society. It is critical that in the future, policies and guidelines make it hard for unauthorized parties to get hold of classified information. For this to happen, it will require the input of all stakeholders.

Glossary

DoD 5220 DoD Directive 5220.22M, “National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual,” January 1995 provided specifications of utilizing 3 overwrites for erasing data on the disk drives.

Secure Erase (SE): Technique to sanitize the data stored on a hard disk drive through the internal command.
TCG Trusted Computing Group responsible for data security standards.

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