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Article
The new political economy of private security
Adam White University of York, UK
Abstract This article maps out a new research agenda for interpreting the trajectory and dynamics of domestic private security provision in advanced democratic countries: the ‘new political economy of private security’. It proceeds on the basis that the key challenge in this field is to construct an agenda which takes account of how both the economic context (shifts in supply and demand) and the political context (state- centric conceptions of legitimacy) of domestic security simultaneously serve to shape the conduct of contemporary private security providers. In attempting to meet this challenge, the article not only builds upon the important theoretical research already undertaken in the form of the nodal governance and anchored pluralism models, but also sheds new light on the nature of domestic private security today.
Keywords agency, culture, economics, legitimacy, market, politics, private security, state, structure policing
Introduction
Domestic security provision is undergoing a significant transformation. In advanced democratic countries across the world, monopolistic and state-centred systems of secu- rity provision are increasingly giving way to more pluralistic systems in which public police forces and private security companies work alongside one another in fragmented security networks. This transformation affects the delivery of many core human goods— including peace, democracy and human rights—on a daily basis. Given the importance of these issues, the expansion of domestic private security has attracted considerable
Corresponding author: Adam White, Department of Politics, Derwent College, University of York, York Y10 5DD, UK. Email: adam.white@york.ac.uk
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academic attention in recent decades, giving rise to a series of different empirical and theoretical lines of enquiry (key contributions include: Johnston, 1992; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Loader and Walker, 2007; Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983; Wood and Shearing, 2007; Zedner, 2009). While these lines of enquiry have served to deepen our understanding of this trend, there is a lack of joined- up thinking in this research area. Scholars pursuing different research questions have a tendency to talk past one another, leaving underexplored a number of important issues such as private security growth patterns, the dynamics of legitimation, the logics of secu- rity regulation and the relationship between security and the public good. One reason for this fragmentation is that there have been few attempts to link together these different lines of enquiry within a broadly pitched research agenda. The purpose of this article is to develop such an agenda: the ‘new political economy of private security’.
The construction of this agenda is guided by a normative commitment to the ‘new political economy’ framework developed by Gamble et al. (1996).1 In this framework, the traditional dichotomies between politics/economics, states/markets and structure/ agency are consciously broken down and reframed within an integrated approach designed to give expression to the multiple bounded rationalities which drive social phe- nomena (Gamble et al., 1996: 5–6). This is a particularly useful approach with which to (re)order current empirical and theoretical research on domestic private security because this research is often characterized by such dichotomies. Some of the most pressing issues in this field are situated in the space where politics/economics, states/markets and structure/agency collide with and mutually constitute each other. Furthermore, this approach generates valuable insights by introducing a contemporary political science perspective into an area of research presently dominated by criminological enquiry, thereby leading to a more multidisciplinary understanding of these issues. As such, the prefix ‘new’ in the title not only reflects a normative affiliation with a specific analytical framework, but also emphasizes the fact that the article maps out important new empiri- cal and theoretical terrain.
Against this backdrop, the article proceeds in three stages. First, it is argued that the majority of empirical research on domestic private security has (implicitly) been con- ducted within either an economic context which focuses upon the laws of supply and demand or a political context which emphasizes the deeply embedded cultural belief that security is an inherently governmental function. Consequently, it is reasoned that one of the main challenges in this field is to put together an agenda which encourages researchers to investigate how both of these contexts serve simultaneously to shape the everyday conduct of domestic private security actors. Second, it is contended that while the two main theoretical frameworks in this area—the nodal governance model (see Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007) and the anchored pluralism model (see Loader and Walker, 2006, 2007)—both make useful contributions to the challenge of guiding researchers towards the political economy of private security, nei- ther provides a balanced and integrated framework. Third, it is thus argued that a new series of research questions, methodological techniques and analytical propositions are required in order to steer future research more effectively in the direction of the political economy of private security.
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Political and economic context
Over the past two decades or so, researchers from a range of disciplines have contributed important insights into the dynamics of domestic private security in advanced demo- cratic countries. On the surface, this multidisciplinary body of literature appears to bring into frame a wide array of trends which defy simple categorization. From a new political economy perspective, however, it is possible to identify two meta-trends: the first relates to the economic context of domestic private security and the second relates to the political context.
Economic context
Economic context refers to the shifting laws of supply and demand in the domestic secu- rity sector. Research conducted in relation to this context tends to produce an economic narrative in which private security providers are conceptualized as economic actors whose primary motivation is to take advantage of market fluctuations so as to expand their commercial operations. This narrative begins with an examination of some well- known shifts in supply and demand in the immediate post-war era, before moving onto more contemporary economic developments.
During the middle decades of the 20th century, domestic security sectors in many advanced democratic countries were dominated by well-resourced public police forces. In accordance with post-war Keynesian economic policy, rising demand for domestic security was, at this time, usually met with an increase in the supply of public policing resources (Ayling et al., 2009; Braithwaite, 2000). As such, there was little demand for private security. However, cracks in this monopolistic system began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s with the onset of fiscal crisis in many advanced democratic (Keynesian) states. As investment in public services declined in line with resource constraints and an emergent neoliberal governing mentality, public police forces were no longer sufficiently well resourced to satisfy demands for domestic security, in turn creating a security vac- uum which was duly exploited by business-savvy private security providers (see Jones and Newburn, 1998: 98–104).
Although this often cited scenario has a great deal of analytical purchase, it does not provide the full picture. While state investment in public services did decline during the 1970s and 1980s, in many countries state investment in public policing actually contin- ued to rise. Braithwaite (2000: 49), for instance, observes that between 1970 and 1990 the number of public police officers in Britain and the United States increased by 35 and 64 per cent respectively. On the surface, this observation appears to invalidate the above scenario. Yet on closer inspection this is not necessarily the case. This is because the rise in spending on the public police did not in fact manage to keep up with demand for domestic security, which from the 1970s onwards accelerated at an increasingly rapid pace. As a consequence, there was still a supply side deficit which private security pro- viders were able to exploit, but the deficit was caused by escalating demand for domestic security rather than by declining state investment in public policing. Why was demand accelerating at such a pace?
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To begin with, crime rates in many advanced democratic countries were rising steadily during this era, stimulating demand for domestic security provision (Gurr, 1977; Maguire, 2007). Furthermore, as Reiner (1992) points out, patterns of crime in many of these countries were also becoming more complex in line with the gradual pluralization of class, gender, identity and religious social relations, making it difficult for monolithic public institutions such as the police to combat criminal activity. This explains not only why demand for security was increasing in general, but also why a sizeable proportion of this demand was being satisfied by private security providers, for the services delivered by these flexible market-based organizations could (in theory at least) be more effec- tively tailored towards the localized and particularistic security needs which were result- ing from these trends (Wood and Shearing, 2007).
A further source of demand has come from the emergence of security fetishism. In many advanced democratic countries there has been an increasing desire to ameliorate subjective feelings of insecurity—which are spreading as a consequence of shifting pat- terns of crime and the rise of an increasingly individualistic neoliberal world view— through the accumulation of ever more security products and services (Jones and Newburn, 2006; Neocleous, 2008; Zedner, 2003). Importantly, this fetishism is self-per- petuating. The more public or private security officers there are patrolling publicly accessibly spaces, the more citizens are reminded of their insecurity, thereby further stimulating their desire for security products and services (Zedner, 2003: 163). Whether or not the fuelling of such insecurity is a conscious business strategy used by private security providers to maintain a healthy demand for their services is a matter of debate. Some argue that it can be seen as a kind of conspiracy (Neocleous, 2008: 145–160). It is likely, however, that such insecurity is equally as much one of the many unintended con- sequences of private security provision.
Lastly, shifting property relations have also stimulated demand for domestic private security by enhancing the capacity of citizens to choose between different modes of secu- rity provision. The key trend here is the emergence of what Shearing and Stenning (1981, 1983) have famously termed ‘mass private property’—that is, expansive tracts of private property which are used predominantly as public spaces, such as shopping centres, indus- trial complexes, gated communities and so on (see also Kempa et al., 2004). On this property, Shearing and Stenning (1983) observe, landlords have the legal right to employ private security providers in order to control access to and behaviour within their borders. This in turn creates a latent demand for private security, which can easily be actualized if landlords are dissatisfied with—or simply want to supplement—public policing.
These economic fluctuations in supply and demand have a profound impact upon the conduct of private security providers. Importantly, though, this is by no means the whole story. As further research has demonstrated, the activities of private security providers are also shaped by the political context of the domestic security sector.
Political context
Political context refers to the deep-rooted political norms which are centred around the idea that domestic security ought to be exclusively provided by the state, entirely free from the interference of commercial interests. Research conducted in relation to this
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context tends to produce a political narrative in which private security providers figure as political actors seeking to navigate their way through this complex political terrain in an effort to legitimate (and thereby enhance the appeal of) their commercial operations. This narrative begins with an exploration of the historical relationship between the pub- lic and private sectors in relation to domestic security, before moving on to the conse- quences of this relationship for contemporary private security providers.
While no state has ever actually exercised a true Weberian-style monopoly over secu- rity provision, a number of advanced democratic states came close enough to this ideal- type institutional arrangement during the mid-20th century to give the broad impression of one. Furthermore, the discourse of political leaders in these countries frequently drew upon the idea of a state monopoly in order to justify the state’s activities, in turn serving to further reinforce this broad impression (Shearing, 1992). As such, populations across the globe have gradually come to expect that the state ought to monopolize domestic security provision and, by extension, to regard any institution which appears to under- mine this monopoly as immoral and unjust (see Brodeur, 2007: 119–120; Garland, 1996: 448–449; Rawlings, 2003: 61). In many advanced democratic countries, these expecta- tions have transformed into inter-subjective norms which mark out the socio-political contours of domestic security provision today. One significant consequence of these norms is that as private security providers expand their operations they tend to encounter resistance because their presence grates against popular expectations about how security ought to be delivered (Loader, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Loader and Walker, 2001, 2007). They have accordingly developed a number of political strategies designed to circum- vent this resistance.
For example, many providers have openly sought to recruit into their ranks moon- lighting and retired public police and military officers in order to incorporate (former) representatives of the state monopoly into their commercial operations. In some coun- tries, such as the United States, moonlighting is especially common. Sklansky (1999: 1176) remarks, for instance, that in some US metropolitan police departments more than half of the police officers are employed by private security providers in some capacity. Furthermore, according to Stewart (1985: 761) ‘some cities permit such officers to wear their uniforms, badges and guns on the theory that increasing police presence in an area is a public as well as private benefit’ (see also Ayling et al., 2009: 133–156). This policy serves to blur the boundary between public and private policing in a manner which plays to the advantage of private security providers, since it confers upon their operations a degree of the symbolic state-like legitimacy which is widely expected of domestic secu- rity actors. In other countries, such as Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom, a paral- lel dynamic takes place with regard to retired public police and military officers, who are integrated into the ranks of private security companies in what seems to be a similarly conscious effort to create the general impression of ‘stateness’ (Ayling and Shearing, 2008; White, 2010; Yoshida, 1999).
A further (and related) strategy utilized by private security providers has been to issue uniforms to their officers which mimic the uniforms of the public police. Despite the fact that this practice is banned or severely restricted in many countries (see Bunyan, 1977; White, 2010; Yoshida, 1999), it goes on unabated across the world. This is an important trend because, as Thumala et al. (2011: 294) remark, ‘the use of uniforms, badges and
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vehicles that resemble those of the police (and are designed to do so) are all indicative of an attempt to secure legitimacy by association’. This visual sleight of hand once again appears to be designed to give private security providers an air of ‘stateness’ in anticipa- tion that it will appeal to the deep-seated state-centric political norms which permeate the domestic security sector.
In addition to these largely symbolic strategies, private security providers have also made great efforts to develop legally grounded relations with state institutions through statutory regulation. In Britain, for example, a powerful alliance of private security pro- viders lobbied in favour of regulation for almost 40 years before this institutional arrange- ment was finally codified in the form of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 (White, 2010). Similar scenarios have occurred in other such geographically diverse locations as France and Australia (see Ocqueteau, 1993; Prenzler and Sarre, 1998, 2006). In many respects, regulation represents the legitimation strategy par excellence, for although it entails the implementation of restrictive bureaucratic red tape upon commercial security operations, it also gives these operations a concrete semblance of ‘stateness’. This in turn allows private security providers to market themselves not as commercial organizations working in line with private goods and profit margins, but rather as state-deputized insti- tutions functioning in accordance with the state-guaranteed public good (White, 2010).
The political context of domestic security shapes the activities of private security providers to a significant degree. From a new political economy standpoint, however, it is critical to recognize that in reality this political context runs alongside and overlaps with the economic context examined above. It seems clear that the laws of supply and demand in the domestic security sector are mediated by a set of deeply embedded politi- cal norms about how security ought to be delivered. However, this is an under-appreci- ated dynamic. Researchers in this field rarely make explicit and systematic connections between these political and economic contexts, tending instead either to focus on these problems in isolation or to make only rudimentary linkages between them. Consequently, one of the key challenges in this field is to develop an agenda which encourages research- ers to investigate how both the economic context and the political context of domestic security have the effect of jointly shaping the conduct of contemporary private security providers. The remainder of the article represents an attempt to meet this challenge from a new political economy perspective. It does so in two stages: first, it explores the degree to which the two main theoretical frameworks in this research area can be used to con- tribute towards this agenda, thereby taking advantage of the conceptual work already done in this field; second, it expands upon these frameworks in order to construct the new political economy of private security.
Nodal governance and anchored pluralism
Over the past couple of decades, two theoretical frameworks have come to dominate the study of domestic security: the nodal governance model and anchored pluralism model.2 Both set out to conceptualize today’s security landscape in a broad sense—focusing on the activities of state and non-state actors in both advanced and emerging democracies— and therefore provide numerous insights which fall beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes, however, these two models are important because—in the abridged
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formulations set out below—they stand at the forefront of conceptual research into domestic private security in advanced democratic countries. As a consequence, they serve to mark out the terrain of what has so far been accomplished in meeting the chal- lenge of developing a research agenda which explicates how both the political and eco- nomic context of domestic security simultaneously serve to shape the conduct of private security actors.
Nodal governance
The nodal governance model came to prominence in the mid-1990s (though its intellec- tual roots can be traced back to the early 1980s) as the first explicit attempt to conceptu- alize the increasingly pluralized domestic security sector.3 The key nodal governance theorists are Shearing, Johnston and Wood (see Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing, 1996, 2006; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007)—though many others have contributed towards the development of the model, taking it in a number of interest- ing directions (for example Dupont, 2004; Kempa and Singh, 2008; Kempa et al., 2004; Marks and Wood, 2010). Together these scholars have made a significant contribution towards the task of understanding contemporary security provision in its various forms. Importantly, though, when viewed from a new political economy perspective, it can be argued that these scholars have a tendency to focus more upon the economic context of domestic private security than the political context.
The model emerged as a way of interrogating and generalizing Shearing and Stenning’s (1981, 1983) empirical findings from the early 1980s about the relationship between mass private property and the emergence of domestic private security. As a result of this focus, its proponents have primarily been concerned with first ‘mapping’ the pluralized security arrangements which exist in localized geographical spaces—or ‘nodes’—and then working out how these nodes relate to one another in broad security networks. In order to construct such nodal maps, they have drawn upon the key concepts of gover- nance theory, such as institutions, practices, mentalities, knowledge and resources (on governance theory in general see Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Smith, 1993, 1999; on nodal mapping see Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood, 2006; Wood and Shearing, 2007). The key stipulation they make when constructing these maps is that no a priori emphasis ought to be placed on public security arrangements at the expense of private ones. To do so would, in their view, essentially mean falling back into the monop- olistic system which is in the process of being transcended. Instead, they argue, the con- stitution of each node must be approached as an ‘empirically open question’ with no preconceived disposition towards either the public or private sphere (Shearing and Wood, 2003: 404).
Using this theoretical framework, the nodal governance theorists have set about the task of mapping out the contemporary security landscape. The breadth of this mapping is impressive and stretches beyond the focus of this article, covering parts of Latin America (Wood and Cardia, 2006) and Africa (Kempa and Singh, 2008; Marks and Wood, 2010; Shearing and Berg, 2006) as well as global terror networks (Shearing and Johnston, 2010) and global security institutions (Wood and Shearing, 2007). With regard to domes- tic security in advanced democratic countries, they have illustrated how in recent decades
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many—if not most—of today’s nodes are populated not only by public sector institutions such as the police, but also private sector institutions such as private security providers. So as citizens move between different nodes during the course of their daily lives—from shopping malls, industrial complexes and gated communities to airports, city centres and national border points—they encounter a variety of security regimes which are charac- terized by both public and private institutions, practices, mentalities, knowledge and resources (see, for example, Button, 2007, 2008; Kempa et al., 2004; Shearing and Stenning, 1987; Van Steden, 2007).
Within this broad framework there does appear to be space to accommodate both the economic and political context identified in the previous section. However, when analys- ing the dynamics of domestic private security, researchers using this model have a nota- ble tendency to focus more upon the economic context of domestic security than the political context. In particular, they repeatedly explain the growth patterns of domestic private security by citing the emergence of mass private property set against the back- drop of changing patterns of crime and rising insecurity. To be sure, they do also discuss important political trends such as the shift in governing mentalities from ‘welfare liberal- ism’ to ‘lean-state, market-orientated models of neo-liberalism and neo-conservativism’ (Kempa et al., 2004: 575; see also Ayling et al., 2009; Shearing and Wood, 2003). But such discussions—with their focus upon the deepening logic of the market and the shrinking of the political sphere—if anything have the effect of consolidating the central- ity of economic context in their writings rather than balancing it against the equally important political context. As such, references to the political context of domestic pri- vate security are rare. To date there has been no systematic attempt by researchers work- ing within this framework to investigate either the legitimation activities in which most private security providers are presently engaged or the political rationalities which lay behind them. Instead, these providers are generally regarded as being unconstrained by the state-centric political norms which structure the contemporary domestic security sec- tor in many advanced democratic countries.
This is not to say, though, that the nodal governance model precludes analysis of this political context. Given the model’s ‘empirically open’ standpoint, there is no reason why such legitimation activities—together with the causes which lay behind them—cannot be mapped onto security nodes where they occur. However, there is a plausible reason why this context has not featured prominently in nodal governance analysis. It is because the model has frequently been framed—especially by Shearing, Johnston and Wood—as an explicit critique of those state-centred ‘Westphalian’ analyses of domestic security provision which came to prominence during the monopoly era and continue to influence much social science research today (see in particular Shearing, 2006: 29–30; Shearing and Johnston, 2010: 496–498; Shearing and Wood, 2003: 418–419). According to these theorists, the problem with such state-centric analyses is that ‘they attempt to grasp what is happening from the vantage point of what is being superseded’ (Shearing and Wood, 2003: 418)—they seek to interpret the present and future through the prism of the past. With this in mind, Shearing, Johnston and Wood have explicitly designed the nodal governance model to conceptualize the post-monopoly era of security provision. This of course explains why the model is so effective at capturing many of the more radical trends in the contemporary security sector. The counter-critique of this futuristic
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orientation, however, is that domestic security provision today—particularly in advanced democratic countries—is still shaped by the legacy of the monopoly era, as evidenced by the ongoing influence of those political norms whose origins can be traced to the discur- sive and institutional formation of the state monopoly over security provision. So while the model does not preclude analysis of the political context, the way in which it is framed may go some way towards explaining why no systematic analysis of this context has yet been advanced within the nodal governance literature.
Anchored pluralism
The anchored pluralism model is closely associated with the writings of Loader and Walker (2001, 2006, 2007) and has emerged as the main alternative to the nodal gover- nance model as a lens through which to interpret the changing nature of the contempo- rary security landscape.4 This model too has made a significant contribution towards the project of deconstructing the dynamics of private security provision today. When viewed from a new political economy perspective, however, it can be seen that this model has a tendency to focus more upon the political context of private security than the economic context.
Like the nodal governance theorists, Loader and Walker regularly employ the lan- guage of governance theory and make reference to shifting economic forces in order to understand the trajectory of contemporary private security provision. The key point of departure between the two models concerns the role of the state in both normative and empirical terms. Whereas the nodal governance theorists adopt no consistent nor- mative position with regard to the ideal role of the state, arguing that such questions ought to be addressed on a node by node basis, Loader and Walker do assume an explicit normative position in this regard. While appreciating the potentially hazard- ous nature of state security provision, they reason that a reformed and reconstituted state represents the most effective, morally just and socially responsible means of delivering security today. In their view, the state should ‘anchor’ the plurality of secu- rity actors in the contemporary security sector firmly in the public interest (Loader and Walker, 2006, 2007). This normative position runs alongside a strong empirical focus on state security provision, especially its influence on contemporary social rela- tions. As such, Loader and Walker view the monopoly era and the state-centred ‘Westphalian’ models of security provision as having a continuing relevance for today’s domestic security sector.
The full reach of Loader and Walker’s writings goes beyond the scope of this article, since they extend from the domestic into the global sphere (see Loader and Walker, 2007). It is thus necessary to focus on that part of their work which seeks to develop further and generalize Loader’s empirical findings from the mid-1990s about the role of symbolism and cultural power in the relationship between domestic public and private security (Loader, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). In order to understand this relationship, Loader and Walker have developed a series of innovative connections between contemporary domestic security provision and the deeply embedded political norms which have perme- ated this sector throughout the course of modern history. They focus in particular on those norms rooted in Enlightenment political thought—especially the social contract
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philosophy of Hobbes (1996, Books 1 & 2) and Locke (1988, Book 2)—where the idea of a war-ridden state of nature in which each individual looks after his or her own inter- ests (including security) is contrasted with a peaceful and prosperous civil society ordered by a benevolent state. Loader and Walker (2001: 20) develop this connection as follows:
[a]s an institution intimately concerned with the protection of the state and the security of its citizens, one that is deeply entangled with some profound hopes, fears, fantasies and anxieties about matters such as life/death, order/chaos and protection/vulnerability, the police remain closely tied to people’s sense of ontological security and collective identity, and capable of generating high, emotionally charged levels of identification among citizens.
In this conceptualization, the public police are cast as representatives of the Enlightenment project to vanquish ‘death, chaos and vulnerability’ (i.e. the state of nature) and to maxi- mize ‘life, order and protection’ (i.e. a peaceful and prosperous civil society). For Loader and Walker, the association between the public police and civility has for many people become naturalized: ‘the most basic grid of meaning through which we see the world’ (Loader and Walker, 2007: 44). It is because of this connection, they go on to reason, that today’s police forces in many advanced democratic countries enjoy such high levels of symbolic power, cultural support and legitimacy, even in the face of repeated controver- sies (see also Loader, 1997b). Importantly, however, for Loader and Walker this ‘basic grid of meaning’ has the opposite effect on private security provision, for ‘the logic of market allocation offends against the social meanings that have come to be attached to security in liberal democracies’ (Loader, 1997c: 381). Because private security provision grates against people’s cultural attachment to public policing—and by extension the Enlightenment project to build a peaceful and prosperous society—it is widely regarded as being immoral and unjust, enjoying very little symbolic power, cultural support or legitimacy.
Loader and Walker thus mark out important conceptual ground in relation to the polit- ical context of domestic security. They illustrate, for instance, why private security pro- viders invest so much time and effort into legitimation activities, such as incorporating (former) representatives of the state monopoly into their ranks, appropriating the sym- bolism of the state and, in some extreme cases, lobbying for a system of statutory regula- tion. It is because they are consciously seeking to disassociate their operations from the commercial logic which so ‘offends’ against popular sensibilities about domestic secu- rity and to instead align their operations with the Enlightenment project to vanquish ‘death, chaos and vulnerability’ and maximize ‘life, order and protection’. However, the economic context of domestic private security features less prominently in their writings. While they appreciate that domestic private security has expanded in line with shifts in supply and demand, they provide limited guidance on how to investigate this economic context. This is problematic because in leaving these supply and demand factors in the background they have a tendency to downplay the agency of private security providers. In their writings, these providers are engaged in a struggle to reconcile their activities with the political norms which permeate the domestic security sector, but it is not clear whether or not they ever make any progress. Indeed, it often appears as though they are
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forever destined to lose out to the culturally superior and symbolically more powerful public police forces. Yet this is far from being the case, for these providers have capital- ized upon fluctuations in supply and demand to the extent that they are now engaged in frontline security operations in advanced democratic countries across the globe. Despite the constraining influence of the deeply embedded political norms which structure the domestic security sector, they do have the power to change the constitution of this sector over time.
There is no inherent reason why such economic factors cannot be more fully inte- grated into the anchored pluralism model. Loader and Walker could certainly retain their insights about the way in which private security providers are constrained by inter-subjective political norms while at the same time placing more emphasis on the way in which these providers are empowered by the shifting laws of supply and demand. There is, however, a likely explanation for this omission. Building the logic of the market more comprehen- sively into their analysis does have the knock on effect of moving their empirical narra- tive ever further away from their normative ideal of a state-anchored security system and thus generates an increasing degree of tension between the empirical and normative dimensions of their model. Of course, this tension is by no means irreconcilable, but it does require a new balance to be struck. So while the anchored pluralism model does not preclude analysis of this economic context, the way in which the model is normatively framed may go some way towards explaining why no systematic analysis of supply and demand has yet been advanced within this literature.
The new political economy of private security
It is clear that one of the key challenges in this field is to construct an agenda which encourages researchers to investigate how both the economic context and the political context of domestic security have the effect of jointly shaping the conduct of contempo- rary private security providers. The purpose of this section is to map out such an agenda in the form of the new political economy of private security. This will be done by setting down a series of research questions, methodological techniques and analytical proposi- tions which can be used to study the political economy of private security in a systematic, balanced and integrated manner. It is important to emphasize, however, that the rationale behind this agenda is not to reject the contributions of the nodal governance and anchored pluralism models, but rather to reformulate a number of the key insights articulated in these models within a new political economy framework.
When investigating the dynamics of domestic private security in advanced demo- cratic countries, researchers should pose two sets of questions and then draw upon two interlinked methodological techniques in order to develop answers to these questions. The first set of questions should relate to the economic context of domestic security and to the corresponding economic rationality which emerges out of this context. What fluc- tuations in supply and demand are responsible for facilitating the expansion of private security providers? What business strategies are these providers using in order to capital- ize upon these fluctuations? And how are these strategies impacting upon the delivery of domestic security? The methodological technique of nodal mapping—as developed by the nodal governance theorists—should then be used to develop answers to these
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questions. In this way, it should be possible to explore how crime patterns, citizen inse- curity and property relations vary between different nodes and to investigate how private security institutions, practices, mentalities, knowledge and resources have taken shape in response to these trends.
The second set of questions should then relate to the political context of domestic security and to the corresponding political rationality which emerges out of this context. What inter-subjective political norms are serving to constrain the activities of private security providers? What political strategies are these providers deploying in order to negotiate their way through these norms? And how are these strategies impacting upon the provision of domestic security? Next, the methodological technique of historically grounded cultural investigation—as developed by the anchored pluralism theorists— should be used to develop answers to these questions. In this way, it should be possible to understand both how and why private security providers are using a variety of legiti- mation strategies—including state-orientated recruitment policies, the appropriation of state symbolism and the pursuit of statutory regulation—in order to enhance the appeal of their operations to an often sceptical population which expects domestic security pro- vision to be monopolized by the state.
Once these questions have been posed and corresponding answers have been devel- oped using the appropriate methodological techniques, researchers should then seek to integrate these economic and political dimensions into a single narrative. This process of integration should proceed in line with two key analytical propositions. First, it is impor- tant to recognize that the conduct of private security providers in advanced democratic countries is not generally constituted in relation to a singular rationality, but is rather pushed and pulled in accordance with (at least) two different rationalities: one economic and the other political. Second, it is crucial to recognize that the differential conduct which results from these two rationalities is in many instances mutually constitutive. For instance, private security providers can often only successfully capitalize upon market fluctuations by simultaneously engaging in legitimation strategies. Conversely, they can often only successfully realize these legitimation strategies by using the resources and influence they have accrued from taking advantage of market fluctuations. As such, researchers should regard private security providers as political economic actors moving back and forth within a political economic dialectic.
Using these research questions, methodological techniques and analytical proposi- tions, it is possible to shed new light on a number of key issues which are situated in the space where politics/economics, states/markets and structure/agency impact upon and mutually constitute one another. These issues include (but are not limited to): private security growth patterns and trajectories; the dynamics of legitimation; the relationships between private security providers and state institutions; the competing logics of regula- tion; and the connections between security and the public good. In order to provide a more concrete demonstration of how these issues can be interpreted through a new politi- cal economy lens, it is useful to explore briefly some of the core questions facing researchers in this field.
How have private security providers become so prominent? In economic terms, they have expanded their operations by responding to a series of fluctuations in the laws of supply and demand. In doing so, they have acted as successful businessmen operating in
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line with an economic rationality which prioritizes the logic of the market. The progress of this economic expansion should be charted using the analytical technique of nodal mapping, which serves to delineate how security provision in localized spaces is increas- ingly being defined by the practices, mentalities, knowledge bases and resources of com- mercial actors. However, this expansion has not been guided by economic rationality alone. In political terms, they have engaged in a series of activities designed to reconcile their commercial operations with the state-centric political norms which structure the domestic security sector. In doing so, they have acted as skilled political strategists func- tioning in line with a political rationality which prioritizes the logic of legitimacy. This process should be interpreted through a historically grounded cultural lens designed to situate these providers within the broader socio-political trajectory of domestic security provision.
What is their relationship with the state? Private security providers often have a com- plex relationship with the state. In economic terms, the state is a competitor, contractor and partner. The balance between these roles is fluid and should therefore be mapped out node by node. In political terms, however, the state represents the primary source of the legitimacy needed by these providers to gain a firm foothold in the domestic security sector. In order to appropriate this legitimacy, they can either borrow from the symbolism of the state at a distance or they can steer their commercial activities into a position where they are directly controlled by state institutions through statutory regulation. This process usually takes place throughout the entire security network, rather than being isolated in particular nodes, and should be examined through a historically grounded cultural lens which cuts across the range of nodes under examination.
What is their relationship with the public good? Their relationship with the public good is similarly complex. In economic terms, this relationship varies contract by con- tract. This is because while public sector contracts usually direct private security opera- tions towards some conception of the public good, private sector contracts often point them in a very different direction. According to this economic logic, then, the relation- ship between private security providers and the public good is determined externally by the preferences of their clients, and these preferences should once again be mapped out node by node. In political terms, however, these providers are simultaneously engaged in an ongoing effort to reconcile their operations with the state-centric political norms which permeate the domestic security sector, and it is important to note that these norms are intimately associated with the idea of security as a public good. As such, this process of reconciliation causes private security providers to internalize the logic of public good to a certain degree—that is, they essentially become the bearers of the public good when they attempt to appeal to the expectation that security ought to be delivered exclusively by the state. This political process generally takes place across the entire security net- work, not simply in isolated nodes, and as a consequence it should once more be inter- preted through a broadly pitched and historically grounded cultural lens.
What lies ahead for security provision? It often seems as though the rise of private security signifies the emergence of a new (postmodern) era of pluralized domestic secu- rity provision in which nodal networks are fast eclipsing the monopolistic arrangements of the modern era. In one sense this is certainly true. It is also the case, however, that for decades private security providers have been actively reconciling their operations with
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the state-centric political norms which are synonymous with the modern era. So while the reality of domestic security provision may have moved steadily away from these monop- olistic arrangements, the popular idea of security provision has not. Many people in advanced democratic countries remain extremely attached to the idea of a state monopoly over security provision. This enduring attachment has compelled private security providers to advertise themselves not simply as commercial organizations delivering private goods, but also as state-deputized organizations acting in accordance with the public good. In decades to come, then, domestic security provision will no longer be dominated by the modern state as it once was, but neither will it rapidly progress into a postmodern system in which the idea of a state monopoly is long forgotten. The 21st century will see domes- tic security in a period of notable flux in which a nodal network of pluralized security provision overlaps with traditional, state-centred political norms whose origins can be traced back to the Enlightenment.
The common thread running through these answers is the dynamic interplay between politics/economics, states/markets and structure/agency—interplay which lies at the heart of new political economy analysis. It is important to note, however, that the nature of this interplay is likely to vary according to geographical location. This is because certain countries have experienced more pronounced shifts in supply and demand than others. For example, while private security officers significantly outnumber police offi- cers in Canada, South Africa and the United States, this relationship is inverted in a number of European countries (Brodeur, 2010: 268–275), indicating different rates of expansion. Likewise, some countries (for example, the United Kingdom, Canada and France) appear to have more deeply embedded state-centric political norms than others (for example, the United States) (White, 2010).5 As such, researchers should be prepared to strike different balances between the influence of political and economic contexts and rationalities as they move between different countries. Nevertheless, elements of this new political economy narrative can be found in most advanced democratic countries. It is for this reason that there is great utility in drawing upon this research agenda.
Conclusion
The rise of domestic private security over recent decades has been driven by multiple and competing contexts and rationalities. In all this complexity it is easy to miss the bigger picture. This is why it is necessary to construct broadly pitched and ambitious agendas which guide researchers towards new and important lines of enquiry. The new political economy of private security constitutes one such agenda. By setting out a series of research questions, methodological techniques and analytical propositions for studying the space where politics/economics, states/markets and structure/agency clash with and mutually constitute one another, it has marked out significant new academic territory. Of course, no agenda or theoretical framework can capture all the processes at work—the social world is too infinitely complex for that. But in providing the tools which allow researchers to address core issues relating to domestic private security in new ways, the new political economy of private security should be utilized alongside other agendas and theoretical frameworks in this field so as to generate as many insights about this social phenomenon as possible.
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Notes
I would like to thank Mary Bosworth, Ian Loader, Martin Smith and three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful and insightful comments. All errors remain my own. I would also like to acknowledge gratefully the financial support I have received from the ESRC (grant number RES-000-22-3062) during the course of this research.
1. The ‘new political economy’ framework is comprehensively set out in the eponymously titled journal New Political Economy.
2. It is important to note that in reference to nodal governance and anchored pluralism the term ‘model’ does not relate to the formal, predictive modelling which is found in positivist—or behavioural—social science. Rather, it relates to the less formal, exploratory modelling which is found in post-positivist—or interpretivist—social science. This type of modelling is driven by the more modest ambition of developing a coherent set of conceptual propositions with which to help the social science researcher make sense of and interpret social phenomena.
3. It could be argued that there are Marxist analyses of the trajectory and dynamics of contem- porary private security provision which predate the nodal governance model (see Spitzer, 1987, 1993; Spitzer and Scull, 1977). However, these writings were never galvanized into an explicit model as such, but rather stood more as isolated—though important—contributions towards this field of research.
4. It should be acknowledged from the outset that Loader and Walker often use the anchored pluralism model as a normative lens as opposed to an explanatory one. Following Crawford (2006), however, it is argued here that this model can be regarded as both an explanatory and normative lens.
5. It is important to acknowledge that the new political economy of private security is, for the most part, only relevant to advanced democratic countries precisely because in many other countries the existence of inter-subjective state-centric political norms is patchy and uneven at best—usually because domestic security provision in these countries has at some point in recent history been dominated by authoritarian states whose repressive actions have served to counteract rather than reinforce the presence of such political norms.
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Adam White is Lecturer in Public Policy at the University of York, UK. His research focuses on the governance of security, public policy and the changing nature of the state. These interests are multi-disciplinary, lying at the intersection of politics, international relations, criminology and socio-legal studies. He has recently published The Politics of Private Security: Regulation, Reform and Re-legitimation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
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Original Article
The Private Security Industry Act 2001 and the security management gap in the United Kingdom
Mark Button Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth, 141 High Street, PO1 2HY , Portsmouth , UK . E-mail: mark.button@port.ac.uk
Abstract The passing of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 introduced regulation to much of the private security industry in England and Wales. This legislation has, however, only provided partial regulation, with several areas of the private security industry subject to no or limited control. This article examines the gaps in the regulation of those who manage security departments and companies. It illustrates some of the weaknesses in not fully regulating the management of security and how this gap may have implications for the ultimate success of the legislation in transforming this sector, particularly in failing to change the culture of the security industry. The article concludes with a model for regulating security managers, which could be used to enhance the UK regulatory system, but which could also be utilised in other jurisdictions where there is no or minimal regulation of security managers. Security Journal (2011) 24, 118 – 132. doi: 10.1057/sj.2009.13 ; published online 12 October 2009
Keywords: private security ; regulation ; Private Security Industry Act 2001 ; security management
Introduction
The expansion in size and role of the private security industry in policing in recent years has become well documented by researchers ( Shearing and Stenning, 1987 ; Loader, 1996 ; Jones and Newburn, 1998 ; Wakefi eld, 2003 ; Crawford et al , 2005 ; Sarre and Prenzler, 2005 and Sarre and Prenzler, 2009 ). This has provoked many debates, one of the most signifi cant of which has concerned the regulation and governance of private security ( Jones and Newburn, 1998 ; Prenzler and Sarre, 1999 ; Stenning, 2000 ; Johnston and Shearing, 2003 ; Button and George, 2006 ; Zedner, 2006 and Loader and Walker, 2007 ). Calls for greater statutory con- trols in the United Kingdom reached a climax during the 1990s. This was largely because of the then rapid expansion of the industry, particularly patrols of public areas; exposes of criminal involvement; excessive violence in the night-time economy perpetrated by door supervisors and generally poor standards of performance ( House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 1995 ; Police Foundation and Policy Studies Institute, 1996 ; Lister et al , 2000 ; Sharp and Wilson, 2000 and Hobbs et al , 2003 ). These culminated in the Private Security Industry Act (PSIA) 2001, which set up the framework for control of the industry. During the 2000s the debate has moved on to the limitations of the system introduced; alongside the effi ciency of the regulator in implementing the legislation ( Zedner, 2006 ; Button, 2007a, 2008 ; Jones, 2007 and National Audit Offi ce, 2008 ).
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There is, however, one aspect of the discussion over the regulatory structures that has received relatively little attention, which in the author ’ s view, is one of the most critical factors for achieving some of the aims of the legislation. Security managers either employed to manage security staff in security fi rms or as specialists employed by non-security bodies overseeing and managing security staff who protect their organisation have been largely excluded from licensing and / or the competency-raising framework of the legislation. This is a major gap and impediment to raising the overall standards of the industry, as well as an omission in creating a truly accountable private security industry. It is this gap, which will be the focus of this article. This is also a common gap in many other jurisdictions with no or limited licensing requirements on managers and as such many of the arguments apply to them too (see Cunningham et al , 1990 ; Prenzler and Sarre, 1999 ; Button, 2007a and Sarre and Prenzler, 2009 ).
This article will start by exploring some of the rationale for the legislation before outlin- ing the main provisions introduced. It will briefl y outline some of the general limitations of the legislation before engaging in a much more critical analysis of the gaps that have emerged relating to security managers. Some of the traits and quality issues concerning security management will then be assessed, before moving on to examine the importance of seeking to change security managers as a basis of cultural and organisational change in the private security industry. The article will end with proposals for closing this gap in regula- tion, which also has relevance for many other jurisdictions where security managers have little or no additional licensing requirements.
Transforming the Private Security Industry
In May 2001, the PSIA received its Royal Assent. This set the statutory framework for regula- tion of the private security industry in England and Wales (which has subsequently expanded to Scotland and Northern Ireland). The legislation was enacted as part of the Labour Govern- ment ’ s broader strategy to reduce crime and disorder, to remove criminals from the private security industry and to raise the standards of the industry. As Charles Clarke MP, the Minister of State at the Home Offi ce, when presenting the Bill for fi rst reading, stated,
This bill forms part of the government ’ s commitment to reducing crime and disorder. It introduces statutory regulation to the private security industry to drive out criminals and drive up standards. It will assist the building of important crime reduction partner- ships between police, the private security industry and others. ( Hansard , 28 March 2001, col. 967)
Central to these objectives has been a desire to improve the credibility of the industry to enable stronger partnerships to be formed between the public and private sectors, as well as increase the extent of private sector involvement in the criminal justice system ( Home Offi ce, 1999, 2001 ). Such partnerships have been promoted further with the Police Reform Act 2002, which enables further contracting out of police functions to the private sector, and most signifi cantly, for private security to be given special powers in return for compliance with police-led accreditation schemes. 1
It was clear from the statement of Charles Clarke that the government sought signifi cant changes in the private security industry, with a major increase in its performance. This
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was to be echoed and expanded upon by the fi rst signifi cant offi ce holders of the body established to implement regulation, the Security Industry Authority (SIA). The fi rst Chair, Molly Meacher, outlined her interest in European, and particularly Swedish, regulatory models in informing the development of the new regulatory structures. As she stated,
We are very interested in Europe. Most interesting to us is Sweden. That ’ s why we are going there later this month, because they seem to have quite a radical regula- tory system similar to what we are trying to do in Britain. We are trying to learn how others have gone through the problems we are currently struggling with. ( Professional Security, 2002 )
In the SIA ’ s fi rst Corporate and Business Plan, 2003 – 2006, John Saunders, the then Chief Executive, made clear his vision for the SIA in implementing the Act:
Perhaps the Act ’ s most important contribution is that it provides sound foundations for introducing fundamental changes, creating a private security industry that is healthier, more successful, dynamic and fi t to pursue new market opportunities. Above all, an industry that is respected and proud of its reputation. (cited in SIA, 2003, p. 7 )
And the second Chair of the SIA, Peter Hermitage, was also clear in what was needed:
… nothing less than transformation of the industry – eradicating criminality, increasing professionalism and skills, improving career paths and employment prospects, providing reassurance for security users and for the wider public. ( SIA, 2003, p. 2 )
With only 7 years since the passage of the legislation and such a large and complicated industry to transform, it would be unfair to expect major improvements so quickly. How- ever, one would expect structures to have been set in place that will yield results in the medium to longer term. As the following sections will reveal, there are signifi cant gaps in the foundations that have been laid, the most signifi cant of which is the regulation of secu- rity managers. Before this is considered it would be useful to set out the main provisions of the PSIA and some of the general criticisms that have been made so far.
The PSIA 2001
The legislation established a new non-departmental public body (NDPB) (or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation (quango)) called the SIA ( Button, 2003 ). 2 The SIA has a wide range of functions, but the most important relate to the licensing of individuals operating in sectors in the private security industry subject to regulation. As the legislation stands, this includes:
door supervisors (contract and in-house); vehicle immobilizers (contract and in-house); security offi cers (contract); close protection offi cers (contract); keyholders (contract); public space surveillance (CCTV) (contract);
• • • • • •
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private investigators (contract) (not yet implemented); security consultants (contract) (not yet implemented).
Licences for frontline staff are based upon an identity check, a criminal records ’ check and a competency requirement (for further information on the requirements including the standard of character, see SIA, 2007 ). These standards vary for different types of licences. In these designated sectors, licences are required for all employees from the most junior to most senior. The legislation did not introduce the compulsory licensing of fi rms; instead it created a voluntary scheme (approved contractors), although again there is scope to make it compulsory under secondary legislation. The legislation gave a great deal of discretion to the Home Secretary, the Chief Executive and the Chair (and Board) of the SIA in creating the actual standards and in the ability to create secondary regulation.
There are a number of general weaknesses in the regulatory system that has been created and that have been identifi ed. Briefl y, these are set out below (for a more detailed critique, see Zedner, 2006 ; Button, 2007a, 2008 ; National Audit Offi ce, 2008 ; Panorama, 2008 and SIA, 2008 ).
Ambitions and mentality of regulation : Concerns have been raised on the standards cre- ated by the SIA, which have critics claim that have been built on the already existing voluntary standards, which are considered by many to be too low and have not stretched the industry. Concerns have also been raised of how close the SIA is to certain sections of the private security industry and that it may have been ‘ captured ’ by the major interest groups. Training : The standards of training have been criticised as not adequate. The 3-day class- room and one on the job mandated for security offi cers is minimal when compared to many EU countries and adds only 1 extra day on the pre-regulation voluntary standard. Criticism has also been made of the administration of the examinations where training providers can administer their own tests, creating potential confl icts of interest. Voluntary Approved Contractors Scheme : Firms do not have to be ‘ approved ’ ; it is purely a voluntary measure. In-house security offi cers : A major part of the security industry is still exempt, as in-house offi cers do not need to be regulated. Costs and bureaucracy : There has been criticism of the costs of a licence, the length of time it takes for the SIA to process them, the overall costs of the SIA and failure itself to do what it expects those it is regulating to do (vetting of its own staff for example). Loopholes : Some loopholes have been exploited such as criminals who would not be entitled to run a security company becoming ‘ security consultants ’ where no licence is currently required.
One gap that has received relatively little attention, however, is the licensing require- ments for managers. There are, very broadly, three types of managers of security. Security companies supplying security services employ managers. G4S, the largest company in the United Kingdom, employs hundreds of managers in different positions to manage its substantial force of security offi cers ( G4S, 2009 ). Those operating in the designated sectors where regulation is in force require licences. If they perform frontline duties, they need to undergo the same training as the category of licence they manage and if not, they require
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a non-frontline licence. For the purposes of clarity, these can be called ‘ contractor security managers ’ . These managers, nevertheless, are not subject to any additional training require- ment under the licensing regime, either as frontline or non-frontline licence holders.
The second type of security manager is employed by non-security organisations, such as ordinary companies, local authorities, hospitals, shopping centres and so on, to manage or advise on security. The specialist security managers undertake a wide range of different functions and are often given a variety of job titles ( George and Button, 2000 ). For example, some are given functions more related to ‘ advising ’ an organisation on security, compared to some where they manage the security of the body ( George and Button, 2000 ). Some may also take on wider functions, such as safety, risk, cleaning and facilities management. The most common names used are ‘ security manager ’ , ‘ security advisor ’ , ‘ loss control manager ’ and ‘ protection manager ’ . For most organisations this type of specialist is employed in-house, although a very small number are contract. For the purposes of clarity, these can be called ‘ security specialists ’ (for ease of clarity, throughout this article, security managers will refer to both these and contractor security managers).
Many SMEs (small and medium enterprises) and even some large organisations, how- ever, do not actually employ a ‘ security specialist ’ . In these, a general manager, facilities manager and a personnel manager might have responsibility for security as part of a wider range of functions and it is bought in, where specifi c expertise is required. These are the third type of managers of security. For ease of clarity, these can be called ‘ general managers ’ .
The licensing arrangements for the latter two ‘ security specialists ’ and ‘ general manag- ers ’ are muddled and potentially open to loopholes. For example, if the ‘ security specialist ’ or ‘ general manager ’ manages or supervises licensed staff (but does not engage in frontline activities), they require a non-frontline licence, which is issued in the form of a letter. If they do engage in frontline activities and if they operate in the sectors subject to additional con- trols (door supervisors and vehicle immobilisers), they would require a frontline licence, but in the other designated sectors, unless they are employed under contract, they would not require a frontline licence, only the non-frontline ( SIA, 2007, p. 6 ). If only directions are given on behalf of someone else, this becomes much murkier. The SIA guidance states that if the person gives,
… directions to a licensable individual on the customer ’ s behalf, you are not consid- ered a manager or supervisor of that person. In addition, if you are engaged by the fi rm providing the security services, to give directions only, you are not required to be licensed. ( SIA, 2007: p. 8 )
This will no doubt fuel much legal activity in the future over what constitutes ‘ direc- tions ’ , ‘ management ’ , ‘ supervision ’ and so on. This is an issue that will be returned to later in this article. The more important issue, however, is that a ‘ non-frontline ’ licence does not require a competency element. This might be acceptable if there were voluntary arrangements in place, which meant that most in these positions are suitably qualifi ed through education and training. As the following section will reveal, this is not generally the case and most signifi cantly, failing to enhance the quality of security managers by some form of competency requirement and changing their mentalities is missing one of the most impor- tant elements in succeeding in organisational and cultural change – changing the managers and leaders ( Williams et al , 1993 ; Schein, 2004 and McKenna, 2006 ).
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The State of Security Management in the United Kingdom
There is a common perception that security managers are former police offi cers or ex-servicemen in the United Kingdom as well as in many other countries ( Whiting and Cavanagh, 2003 ; Briggs, and Edwards, 2006 and Gill et al , 2007 ). Unfortunately, there has not been much recent research to quantify this, which seems strange when the grow- ing research on security offi cers is examined and managers in the related area of the public police (see Reiner, 1991 ; Michael, 2002 ; Wakefi eld, 2003 ; Long, 2003 and Button, 2007b ). The most recent research in the United Kingdom carried out by Hearnden (1993, 1995) found that 76 and 61 per cent by 1993 were recruited from a military or police background in 1991. If the research was conducted today, it would probably show a dominance of the military and police, but probably not to the same extent. If the United Kingdom is similar to the United States, more recent research in the United States found only 29 per cent of security managers are not coming from a mili- tary, police or intelligence background illustrating that the dominance is still strong ( Whiting and Cavanagh, 2003 ). Given that security management is often a second career, it is no surprise to discover the average age found by Hearnden (1995) was 50.2 years. Hearnden (1993) also discovered some negative orientations concerning training and education. Of the surveyed security managers, he found:
62 per cent had no vocational qualifi cations and managers rated the possession of them as the fourth least important attribute of a good security manager; 38 per cent had not attended in the previous 2 years at least one outside course or seminar; 59 per cent worked for organisations, which had no formal training needs analysis; 40 per cent were unable or unwilling to identify a single personal training requirement.
Again, one must stress that the research is dated, and since it was published, there has been an expansion in higher education related to security. Nevertheless there are still many working in the industry as a second career after the military or police to supplement their pensions. In many areas, self-perpetuating ex-military and ex-police appoint subordinates and successors from the same background as themselves.
Clearly, there are benefi ts from the skills, experience and networks that ex-service and police personnel bring to the security industry, but the second career mentality does have some negative consequences. It may infl uence many manager ’ s orientation, as the job is a supplement and it is something many have achieved through their experience rather than qualifi cations. For some, there is little incentive or desire for further training and education. When security management is juxtaposed against other managerial specialisms, such as personnel, safety, risk and so on, these are dominated by people who have made it a fi rst choice career, who are in it for the long haul and as a consequence are prepared to invest time in securing the appropriate development through training and education to achieve their position.
Perhaps another illustration of the lack of commitment to training and education among many managers are the limited learning routes into security management. Training and educational achievement are of marginal importance in the broader security occupation. There is no recognised industry benchmark qualifi cation for entrance and there are only a limited number of higher education courses provided by the universities when compared
•
• • •
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to related specialisms, such as safety and computer security ( Button, 2008 ). This is beginning to change with the Security Institute (the main professional association in the United Kingdom) launching a certifi cate and diploma in security management aimed as entry-level awards for security managers. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent these will become the currency of entrance to managerial positions in the security industry.
The status of security management can also be juxtaposed to some of the other managerial specialisms in organisations. If human resource (or personnel), health and safety, facilities, purchasing, marketing, public relations, accounting, risk, quality and, of course, security, to name the most popular, are considered, all of these functions have sought to pursue ‘ profes- sional projects ’ to ultimately enhance their status and effectiveness. In doing so, however, their success has been very different and security management has been lagging in achiev- ing ‘ professional ’ status. A good indicator of an occupation becoming a ‘ profession ’ is the representative body receiving ‘ Chartered Status ’ . ‘ Royal Charters ’ , which have been grant- ed since the thirteenth century, are now conferred by the sovereign on advice of the privy council, ‘ for bodies that work in the public interest (such as professional institutions and charities) and which can demonstrate pre-eminence, stability and permanence in their particular fi eld ’ ( Privy Council Offi ce, nd ). All of the specialisms bar facilities, risk and, of course, security have received Royal Charters (see Table 1 ). Facilities and risk also have much more established bodies with larger memberships, an established suite of qualifi cations (and accreditations of other vocational and higher education courses) for entrance to the industry and as such are much further down the road to a profession and a chartered status.
Quality of security managers
There is not a great deal of research to assess the quality of security management, but there is a degree of anecdotal evidence. In a study of the value of security, Gill et al (2007) found some damning criticisms of security management as well as some very good and
Table 1 : Selected management and management support functions compared
Management function Professional body Chartered status and year achieved
Security The Security Institute Not yet achieved Risk Institute of Risk Management Not yet achieved Facilities British Institute of Facilities Management Not yet achieved Quality The Chartered Quality Institute 2006 Public relations Chartered Institute of Public Relations 2005 General Chartered Management Institute 2002 Health and safety Institution of Occupational Health and Safety (IOSH) 2002 Human resource Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 2000 Purchasing Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply 1992 Marketing Chartered Institute of Marketing 1989
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outstanding practice. It is worth repeating verbatim some of the comments they recorded that demonstrate some of the more negative attributes. One interviewee stated,
… most senior security people are just plain thick. Many cannot write basic policy or process, as much as they may understand what needs to be achieved and they cannot articulate a business case. (in, Gill et al , 2007, p. 52 )
Another interviewee in their study stated,
From police and military I have seen a few who are good and there has been a missing of signifi cant opportunities for business. Especially the ex military, they are like kids with no organisational awareness. Their people skills and ability to understand cultures of business are lacking because they have not grown up in a business environment. In something like nuclear work then a military background maybe important. The greater the competitive environment in which a company participates the less easy it is to appoint someone from a military background. There needs to be the most effective cultural fi t. (in Gill et al , 2007, p. 52 )
Evidence has also been found of some security managers lacking knowledge and under- standing of how to prevent problems from occurring and been too reactive. As Challinger (2006) argues,
Some security decisions appear to be made after a breach of security has occurred. Some are made when it is simplistically assumed that continued security is no longer needed. Some are made when it is feared that business will be lost if security is not in place to reassure customer. (p. 586)
Challinger also goes on to argue that many decisions made in security are not based upon evidence. In the well-established professions such as medicine, a doctor will, in theory, prescribe a treatment or advice on preventative measures that are based upon scientifi c evidence and will also no doubt keep up-to-date on the latest advances through reading appropriate journals and attending conferences.
Perhaps another good illustration of the quality of some security managers is their infl u- ence in the boardroom. As Garcia (2006) argues,
A common theme of customers of security professionals alike is that the business for security must be made in order to acquire the resources necessary to protect assets. It is agreed that this is a necessary step, but there appears to be a lack of preparation by many security professionals in making this case, particularly compared to their peers in other divisions across the enterprise. (pp. 513 – 514)
There are many challenges to getting security taken seriously in the boardroom. To many boards, it is not considered a priority and security is not integrated into the broader strategies ( Challinger, 2006 ). Some consider security is not a problem because they wrongly believe that there are no problems of staff theft, fraud or comparable incidents. Some boards actu- ally consider security a nuisance, getting in the way of the core business and creating bureaucracy. Worse, some boards might even consider security is the enemy harassing ‘ honest ’ staff. There are some evidence that boards in larger companies are starting to take crime risks more seriously after 9 / 11 ( Levi et al , 2003 ). Therefore, the skills required by a security manager need to include the ability to persuade board managers by talking their
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language and fi tting their agendas. Unfortunately, for many organisations, there is a belief that anyone can do security ( Challinger, 2006 ).
These quality issues, it could be argued, are problems for the employers of security managers to grapple with, rather than for the state to intervene with minimum standards. If organisations wish to hire security managers who possess no security qualifi cations, cannot speak the language of business, do not know how to prevent crimes and cannot infl u- ence the board, that is their prerogative. This argument in the author ’ s view is only partly acceptable. As the following section will show, there are positive reasons for intervening to mandate standards for security managers in achieving the original aims of the legislation alongside plain governance issues. It is also possible to create structures that set minimum standards, beyond which the sector itself can work to create more ambitious voluntary standards.
Cultural Stasis in the Private Security Industry
The changes sought with the passage of the PSIA require nothing less than a fundamental change in the ‘ way things are done ’ , which amounts to a fundamental cultural change. The values, attitudes, aspirations and working practices – to name some of the most impor- tant – all needed to transform, if the industry is to do so as well. Cultural and organisational change has been the subject of a huge amount of research. Setting aside the ‘ top-down ’ or ‘ bottom-up ’ methods of change briefl y, what is clear in this research is the importance of leaders and managers in the change process ( Williams et al , 1993 and Schein, 2004 ). Managers and leaders as promoters of change, holders of resources and role models among many other functions possess many of the ‘ tools ’ necessary to engender change. It is very unlikely that the culture of ‘ contractor security managers ’ and ‘ security specialists ’ will have changed as a result of the requirements the SIA has so far established, and as a conse- quence, it has neglected one of the most important building blocks to transformation of the industry. In the related sector of the public police where there have been many more attempts to change culture, reforms would not have been contemplated without bringing managers and leaders into the process as well as the frontline staff. The transformation of security managers is central to successfully changing the security industry ( Briggs and Edwards, 2006 ).
The security managers are also very important role models, and by failing to extend competency standards to them, this sends out the wrong messages to those at the bottom of organisations. By ignoring standards for managers, it is sending out a message of the lack of importance of training and education to a sector where such views are already prevalent. It is interesting to juxtapose the introduction of regulation in the private security industry generally in the United Kingdom, with regulation of healthcare security in the National Health Service (NHS). Here, there was a conscious decision to introduce standards for man- agers in all NHS trusts in the fi rst place where every NHS trust must employ an ASMS (accredited security management specialist) who has undergone a basic training course. Under this scheme, they must complete a training course that lasts about 5 weeks and equates to Level 3 / 4 on National Qualifi cations Framework (NQF) and 40 Level C credits towards the fi rst year of an undergraduate degree. These specialists also provide a network for the NHS to seek to further instigate change ( Department of Health, 2003 ).
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Earlier discussion alluded to the ‘ top-down ’ and ‘ bottom-up ’ methods of cultural and organisational change. In police services, in some countries, there have been major initia- tives of cultural change. Some have argued that traditional ‘ top-down ’ approaches have not succeeded and a wider range of strategies need to be pursued, including ‘ bottom-up ’ driven from recruitment and training onwards ( Chan, 1999 ). The SIA has focused much of its attention on changing from the ‘ bottom-up ’ . The most effective change is bound to require this as part of the strategy too. However, the SIA, in seeking a bottom-up transformation, in an industry where labour turnover is so high, limits the potential success of this type of strategy. In 2007, Infologue estimated that the annual labour turnover was 28 per cent ( Infologue, 2008 ). Even a large and successful security company as Securitas experienced labour turnover of 38 per cent across its European companies during the fi rst 6 months of 2008 ( Securitas, 2008 ). There are frequent reports of much higher rates ( Michael, 2002 and Button, 2007a ). Even with a 28 per cent turnover, almost a third of the workforce is disap- pearing every year and as Schein (1992, p. 15) argues, ‘ … a group having either a great deal of turnover of members and leaders or a history without challenging events may well lack any shared assumptions. ’ The limited changes the SIA are seeking to instill are dissipated by the labour churn.
Governance Gap
Even if one is not convinced of the importance of raising the standards of security managers to improve the private security industry there is a plain accountability argument. Earlier, in this article, the confusing situation concerning non-frontline licences was highlighted. Contract (and therefore licensed) security offi cers are frequently either under de facto or de jure line management control of the ‘ security specialist ’ (who may or may not hold a non-frontline licence according to their role in management and supervision) ( Wakefi eld, 2003 and Button, 2007b ). There is, therefore – although unlikely – a theoretical possibility of a ‘ security specialist ’ with no licence having a degree of power over licensed security offi cers, who may possess a character that would not enable a licence to be granted.
The most serious concern, however, is the competence issue. Even if a ‘ contractor secu- rity manager ’ , ‘ security specialist ’ or ‘ general manager ’ possess a non-frontline licence, they could be managing and directing contract security offi cers in issues in which they have not been trained, but their contract security offi cers have. Scenarios could arise where a manager directs staff to engage in physical confrontations and exercise legal tools for which they may have less up-to-date knowledge than their staff. A hypothetical but com- mon scenario might illustrate this further.
Shopping centres and retail outlets often utilise contract security offi cers who are fre- quently managed by in-house security managers. Let us assume the retailer has employed an ex-military offi cer as a security manager, who has undergone no specialist security man- agement training and education (as is common). In the fi rst few weeks, the manager is patrolling with a group of licensed and contract offi cers when they encounter a group of drunken and rowdy men who make insulting remarks towards them. There are many poten- tial courses of action that the security team could take and the incident could have the potential to turn violent. In such a situation, the security offi cers would almost certainly look to the manager for leadership. Yet, the security offi cers will have received more training
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than the manager. If the manager decides upon a course of action that is not appropriate, or even worse and illegal, because of the power relationship, it may be diffi cult for the secu- rity offi cers not to go along with it. These scenarios also take place with ‘ general managers ’ of security where they may go on patrol with licensed staff as has been seen with research on Pleasure Southquay conducted by the author (the name given to the shopping and leisure complex researched) ( Button, 2007b ). This illustrates the importance that the three types of security managers should also have undergone minimum standards of training and preferably to a higher level than those they manage.
A Model for Change
It is clear from the evidence presented so far that mandatory minimum training and educa- tion standards for security managers are required. However, a very important question is how far should these standards go? Should they be restricted to a relatively low entry-level course or should much more ambitious standards be mandated? This article will argue for the former alongside the other measures to enhance the training and education of security managers.
The example of the NHS was discussed earlier, where regulation has began with minimum standards of training for security managers. As a mandatory requirement, this level of training should be obligatory (or equivalent through accredited prior or experiential learning) for a security manager (that is, the contractor security managers and security specialists). This should be the foundation that then provides for a ladder of higher levels of training that are voluntary for the manager to achieve. Awards already in existence, such as the SyI Certifi cate and Diploma, and ASIS ’ s Certifi ed Protection Professional (CPP) could also be used.
The ex-forces and police background of many in the private security industry make for a very status-driven sector where hierarchy is very important. Many of those working in the private security industry crave for status that distinguishes them from others. Climbing up the equivalent of military or police ranks in the security industry is something which would be considered as appropriate and attractive to many. This provides opportunities for enhanc- ing the status of security management without having to mandate compulsory standards. 3 If the SIAs were to create additional managerial licence categories built upon higher train- ing and education, voluntary licenses would begin to act as ranks in the private security in- dustry with an incentive to achieve in order to secure that status. So, for instance, the basic compulsory course might lead to a plain ‘ security manager ’ licence, but for additional ap- proved study through vocational or higher education, the SIA might create ‘ advanced secu- rity manager ’ or ‘ senior security manager ’ licences. These would soon become badges of status and would additionally enable recruiters and clients of security to further judge qual- ity by the licence held or the number of different types in an organisation.
There is also the more complicated issue of what to do about the ‘ general managers ’ of security? Where these currently require a non-frontline licence there should also be a com- petency requirement to their licence. This should cover most of the competencies of those that they manage as well as setting out their responsibilities, in particular, what they can and cannot do with their current licence status. It could also be used to provide an understanding of the challenges and best practice in procuring security as well as to provide the basis for a national network of contacts on security in different organisations. This would further aid
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partnership building in the industry if every organisation that employs security has a contact trained in certain basic procedures and protocols. It is also important for achieving lasting cultural change that this group is also properly regulated. The new structure for managers would then resemble Figure 1 .
The pyramid shows the base where ‘ general managers ’ would undergo a compulsory basic training programme (this would only be a few days). These managers would also provide a clear network for the state security services to utilise in receiving intelligence as well as disseminating best practice and intelligence. Then, there would be ‘ contractor security managers ’ and ‘ security specialists ’ who would need to undergo a more extensive training course (or demonstrate the equivalent through accreditation or experiential learn- ing), which is at least Level 3 on the NQF. Above these would be voluntary higher-level courses, which on completion would entitle the person to a higher-ranking licence. Special- ist licences could also be created for particular areas, such as retail, aviation, university and so on. Given the structural trait of large numbers of ex-military / police / intelligence in many other countries and the importance of status, this is a model that could be utilised elsewhere.
Higher Level Voluntary Licences
Contractor Security Managers and Security Specialists
Licence with Competency Element to at least Level 3 on NQF
General Managers of Security
Non-Frontline Licence with Competency Element
Figure 1 : A model licensing regime for managers of security. Note : Bold indicates compulsory.
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Conclusion
There have been substantial changes concerning the debate over regulation of private security in many countries during the last decade. Some have come in from the cold of ‘ non-intervention ’ to regulate private security, such as the United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and Greece ( Button, 2007a ). Other countries in Europe; states, territories and provinces in the United States, Australia and Canada, with longer experience of regulation, have reformed systems that had proved inadequate ( Prenzler and Sarre, 1999 ; Hemmens et al , 2001 ; Hyde, 2003 ). Much of the debate and concern tends to focus upon the ‘ ground troops ’ , the security offi c- ers, door supervisors, wheel clampers, private investigators and so on, and very little on the ‘ offi cers ’ or the managers of them. Given that most regulatory systems usually have aims that include to substantially improve the private security industry, it seems strange that the leaders and managers are so frequently neglected when they are so central to cultural chang- es, and where there is a lot of evidence, some lack the mentality and skills necessary for positive cultural changes to occur. This article identifi ed a model for closing some of these gaps and contributing to achieving some of the original aims of the UK legislation, and has largely focused on the United Kingdom, but there is evidence that it is not alone in this security management gap. Therefore, the model proposed in this article has relevance beyond the shores of the United Kingdom.
Notes
1 Under the scheme, those groups of security (that is, a shopping centre, housing estate, hospital and so on) or related staff such as wardens contributing to community safety can apply to their chief constable for accredita- tion. Those who are successful in meeting the standard set can wear a nationally recognised badge and may be given special powers, such as powers to issue fi xed penalty notices (for disorder, truancy, cycling on a foot- path, dog fouling and graffi ti, littering to name most), to require a name and address, to confi scate alcohol and tobacco, to stop a cycle, to photograph a person and to name some of the most important. For further informa- tion, see Home Offi ce (2008) .
2 NDPBs or quangos are set up by the Government as arm ’ s length bodies, with a degree of independence to carry out functions for the government, such as the delivery of services, regulation and provision of advice.
3 I have advocated similar proposals for security offi cers where different ranks of security offi cer could be created, which on completion of the training to achieve them would entitle the offi cer to wear special badges ( Button, 2008 ).
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