Literature Review
Introduction
There have been different views about the role of humanitarian action in the process of peace building and the role it plays in prolonging conflicts. Consequently, this section will examine how humanitarian action affects the regions affected by civil war negatively in terms of how it causes more harm than good and determine how affected countries become dependents of richer nations. The literature review provides for a theoretical concept using the dependency theory in addition to an empirical review. Finally, the section provides for a discussion chapter where the theoretical concept is related to the empirical data.
Hypothesis
Based on the theoretical concept below, the following three hypotheses are made.
• First, the humanitarian action provided in Sierra Leone from the beginning of the Civil War hindered the process of peace building.
• Secondly, provision of humanitarian aid became an incentive for Violence in Sierra Leone.
• Finally, humanitarian agencies did not help in solving the cause of the Civil War in Sierra Leone.

Theoretical Concept
According to Conway and Heynen (2014), dependency theory implies that rich nations grow in wealth through exploitation of poor nations. The theory suggests that industrialised countries are negative catalysts to the economic growth in poor nations. Essentially, poor nations are the main exporters of major commodities to the developed nations. Ironically, they import finished goods produced by the industrialised nations using the same commodities they exported making them raw material appendage. In this case, the humanitarian action comes from the developed countries and they stand to benefit more from developing countries if they are experiencing war or conflict because they can exploit their resources.
Therefore, the dependency theory depicts a probable way of depicting the consistent poverty of developing countries caused by the aid provided by richer countries. Conway and Heynen (2014) explain that the persistent poverty could be a result of the capitalist exploitation. Furthermore, Mahoney and Rodríguez-Franco (2016) notes that the world systems approach shares similar perceptions with the theory by implying that poverty is a direct result of how the international political economy has evolved into the somehow rigid labour division that favours the rich and undermines the poor.
Many dependency theorists assume that international capitalism is the driving force behind the reliance relationships. Instinctively, a capitalist system enforces rigid international labour division that is responsible for underdevelopment experienced in most regions worldwide (Ursing and Desai 2016). Normally, Conway and Heynen (2014) argues that dependent states provide cheap agricultural commodities, minerals and labour as well as serve as repositories of the surplus capital, manufactured goods and obsolescent technologies. Such functions make the economies of dependent states to rely on outside investments.
From a broader perspective, the dependency approach suggests that the political and economic power heavily concentrate and centralise in industrial countries that is similar to the Marxist imperialism theory (Mahoney and Rodríguez-Franco 2016). In case the assumption is true, it means that differentiation between political and economic power remains spurious. In other words, governments can take any steps necessary to safeguard their private economic interests like the ones upheld by the multinational corporations.
Third world countries like Sierra Leone are characterised by economies that are highly dependent and devotedly produce resources for developed countries. In cases of conflict or civil war, humanitarian aid from the developed countries is less likely to benefit the vulnerable civilians considering that in the past in a country such as DRC with immense minerals, humanitarian agencies have been accused of being impartial since the funding nations seek to have the conflict prolonged and illegally mine the resources (Bryer 2003). Unfortunately, Akonor (2017) notes that for many developing countries with Civil War, the likelihood of being dependent on the humanitarian aid is high normally because conflicts make it impossible for a government to supply basic resources to affected people.
Empirical Data Review
The Civil War in Sierra Leone began in 1991 and ended after a decade where thousands of civilians lost their lives devastating the country immensely (Albrecht and Jackson 2015). During the conflict in the country, humanitarian intervention was linked with the need to enforce the peace fostered conditions that were advantageous for humanitarian assistance. Forsberg, (2017) simply states that it meant accessibility within the country would be secure and funds for reconstruction and relief activities would increase. Nonetheless, the political and humanitarian interests often collided which gave way to political imperatives that hindered the peace building process.
The main aim of humanitarian intervention is to respond to conflict including civil unrest war as well as election/urban violence. In Sierra Leone, there seems to be brittle peace since there is a possibility of more fighting due to the incursions made by the rebels to neighbouring countries despite the presence of humanitarian action that shows the effect on the commitment to peacebuilding and cohesion (González and Miguel 2015). Of recent, controversy has grown over the negative influence of humanitarian actions on the peacebuilding efforts. According to Fernández y Garcia (2017), humanitarian intervention could inadvertently increase conflict. Further, Fernández y Garcia (2017) argues that international observers and aid workers in safe zones who are strategically placed to offer relief services prolong fighting by providing rebels with relief aid such as food. Similar assumptions have been made about the function of humanitarian assistance in other countries affected by conflicts with violence.
Existing literature reveals four main mechanisms that link humanitarian action to its hindrance of peace building attempts. First, De Soto and Del Castillo (2016) mentions that humanitarian assistance could prolong conflict through direct or indirect provision of resources requires funding an insurgency. Adversely, international law requires combatants to differentiate themselves from insurgents who happen to lack uniforms when frequently intermingling with the civilians. As a result, humanitarian agencies have challenges when seeking to distinguish between the combatants, insurgents and civilians. Thus, at times, Fernández y Garcia (2017) argues that humanitarian bodies can unknowingly supply the insurgents with food, medical supplies and shelter directly. For instance, after humanitarian action was attempted in Somalia, the aid organisations found that the rebels fighting from the relief camps had direct usage of the relief supplies.
Similarly, Lecomte and Consiglio (2016) notes that rebels have gained from humanitarian assistance by stealing the supplies. In the Central African Republic, for example, over half the humanitarian aid was diverted to supply and feed rebel soldiers. The problem has grown to the extent that factions have become more sophisticated whereby rebels have formed local NGOs so that they can gain control over the distribution process. The situation is similar in according to Lischer (2015) where the bandits managed to register fake villages and coerced the real villages to verify food that they do not receive.
Secondly, aid may prevent peacebuilding efforts by forming protected areas for the combatants so that they can instigate attacks with considerable immunity. For many years, Shaw (2018) states that rebel groups have utilised protected aid enclaves and camps as their safe havens so that they can recruit, recuperate and rest. For example, Ylönen (2016) notes that during the civil war in Sudan analysts held different views about how humanitarian safe zones seemed to prolong fighting as well as offered protection for the combatants. More researchers have provided broad support by revealing the systematic link between protection of refugees and the civil war continuation.
Thirdly, humanitarian action could hinder the peace building process by relieving the parties involved of political burden of the sustenance of the war. Ligawa, (2017) argues that higher aid levels may satisfy a large proportion of all civilian needs and this means that local resources may be reallocated so that it can fuel the war. For example, in Sudan, it was believed that if there was no international relief, the combatants could have redirected their resources from fighting to public goods that may have ensured that the peace building process was upheld (Akonor 2017).
Fourth, humanitarian action may affect peacebuilding if the aid organisations participate in the local war economy while showing interests that are tied towards continuation of the conflict. The arrival of humanitarian relief means that the militia leaders or government stand to gain from the import duties, visas, port and airport charges as well as other administrative fees (Caparini et al. 2017). Delivery of humanitarian aid requires hiring of guards from the local militias who operate security rackets meant to protect the resources against theft. In Sierra Leone, the delivery and distribution of the aid created local industries that were interested towards the continuance of the war so that they could gain more from the resources.
According to González and Miguel (2015), humanitarian aid negatively influences the peace building process because if a region experiencing civil war benefits from it then the war lasts longer as compared to regions that receive less or no humanitarian action. In Sierra Leone, the Civil War was prolonged because the combatants received humanitarian aid and used violent ways against the humanitarian agency workers to access more weapons. As a result, the conflict continued for a decade caused by the availability of shelter, food and medical supplies from the aid organisations (Lecomte and Consiglio, 2016). Today, the situation has only changed because of lack of violence; however, the country has a fragile peace.
According to Forsberg (2017) humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone was linked to politics which meant that the government committed atrocities which destabilised the country’s political structures. Similarly, in Somalia humanitarian intervention failed when the Somali faction undermined peace building efforts by the United Nations where thousands of American troops were deployed to the region to offer protection to the UN workers. Nonetheless, the unrest persisted and the operation was undermined. As a result, the militia fighters in Somali overpowered the US troops and the intervention eventually failed.
Humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone showed close links to the country’s political process. In other words, supporting the peace process from a political perspective created conditions that were beneficial for the humanitarian assistance. Sierra Leone experienced tensions during the civil war because more support was directed towards the government and at the time rebels (RUF) (González and Miguel 2015) controlled most of the regions that received humanitarian aid. As a result, the humanitarian action was compromised because aid agencies could be accessed by the rebels easily; this means that the war was prolonged due to easy accessibility to the necessary resources.

Discussion: Relating Theoretical/Conceptual Part to the Empirical Data
The dependency theory implies that developing countries like Sierra Leone are majorly dependent on the aid provided by developed countries and this has made them susceptible to the vulnerabilities exposed by war or conflict. In other words, Sierra Leone was too dependent on the humanitarian aid and this catalysed the continuation if the war; at the same time, their resources were exploited and utilised by militia in an attempt to gain benefits. There was a coherence of policy concerning sharing a unified political goal even before humanitarian action commenced and this triggered politicisation of the assistance. As a result, humanitarian actors were deeply mistrusted and were perceived to have taken sides with the rebels. Furthermore, the Sierra Leone government readily accepted the humanitarian intervention which stood to benefit their military and political fortunes (Labonte and Charles 2016).
Whenever the Sierra Leone government was pressured to restore peace, they defended the need to have continued humanitarian assistance by the agencies to the civilians within the government-controlled territory (González and Miguel 2015). Concerning the dependency theory, increased dependence on the rich countries only undermined the poorer countries; in this case, the Sierra Leone government depended on humanitarian aid immensely and this seemed to have hindered the efforts towards peace building. Most of the focus of the government was aimed at ensuring that the civilians within their territory had a steady supply of aid from humanitarian agencies. Instead, their focus should have been on how to restore peace so that they could supply their needs by generating them as a country using their own resources.
If the humanitarian and political objectives collided in Sierra Leone during the civil war, humanitarian concerns were the last to be considered. For instance, when a power change was experienced in 1997, humanitarian assistance was withheld in the country but it was still utilised as the tool for impacting the political objective which supported the regime change (Lecomte and Consiglio 2016). The dependency theory argues that wealthy nations dominate the poor nations because they require their raw materials and cheap labour. In this case, dependency is described as the definition of economic development within a state with regards to the external catalysts on the development policies (Mahoney and Rodríguez-Franco 2016).
Countries that have experienced civil war are underdeveloped and even before the conflict they were economically dominated by the more developed capitalist nations which continuously extract wealth from their regions (Akonor 2017). The acceptance of humanitarian aid by the developing countries shows that they are dependent on Western countries who supply it; the United Kingdom provided humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone but failed to ensure that peace was attained in the region.
The role of humanitarian action in conflict-affected regions within the developing countries is not only irrelevant but is used as a means to exploit the areas by benefiting from their instability (Brown 2017). Most importantly, the regions that have valuable resources seem to experience continuous conflict and Western countries still receive exports of resources from the regions at a cheaper cost. Humanitarian aid, therefore, has been used as a means to prevent the countries affected by civil war to benefit from their resources and use them to grow their economies significantly; this describes the dependency theory.
Instead of facilitating development in Sierra Leone, humanitarian aid legitimised a government which relied on undemocratic practices so that they could maintain power. Just like other civil war affected nations, humanitarian aid has been used as leverage so that the governments can be compelled to perform certain actions for the Western countries (De Soto and Del Castillo 2016). In relation to the dependency theory, the Western countries have exploited the developing countries like Sierra Leone through threatening to withhold supply of humanitarian aid if they fail to comply with certain conditions that they may set for the governments involved.

How Does Humanitarian Aid Prolong Wars?
In the above literature, it has been demonstrated that humanitarian organisations in Sierra Leone were responsible for the hindering the process of peace building. As mentioned through examples, humanitarian actions in Sierra Leone and other 3rd world countries in Africa have made these nations dependent on rich Western countries for the growth of their economies. As a result, many communities in these countries live under constant conflicts as they fight for the resources available. While the importance of humanitarian aid cannot be underscored, many researchers, scholars, and individuals who have worked with humanitarian organisations in regions under conflict continue to question the role relieve provided becomes a catalyst to prolonging wars or conflicts. One of the individuals adamant that humanitarian aid prolongs war is Linda Polman, a Dutch Writer. In her book titled, War Games: the Story of Aid and War in Modern Times, Polman (2010), makes an argument that humanitarianism has of recent become a large industry which together with the global media provides an opportunity for forming an unholy grouping with warmongers in different parts of the world. After the end of the Cold War, humanitarian aid business flourished. In times when the proxy wars were fought by Asian and African states, receiving backing from the USA, China, and the Soviet Union, aid organisations could not easily find access to areas under conflict or battlefields. However, Polman (2010) suggests that after the collapse of the Soviet Union areas that had been afflicted with conflicts or wars became something which can only be related to charity enterprise zones. Consequently, this led to the expansion of the humanitarian aid industry. For example, in the 1980 on the Thai border where Cambodian refugees were located, there were approximately 40 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Nonetheless, a decade later, more than 250 aid organisations were registered as working in the Yugoslavian war. By 2004 during the war in Afghanistan, these agencies had increased to nearly 2,500 (Anthony, 2010).
According to Polman (2010), the outcome in these areas with tonnes of aid agencies is different from what the charity brochures present. There are many examples around the world from Darfur to Biafra as well as the famine in Ethiopia where humanitarian actions became catalysts to prolonging wars or provided rewards to perpetrators of genocide or ethnic cleansing rather than the victims. In her book, one of the examples she provides and appears to be most striking is the post genocide in Rwanda where the killers, Hutu’s, found their war to the now Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire). Here, in a place known as Goma, large camps for the refugees were set and received service from many international agencies. Shockingly, Polman (2010) states that back in Rwanda where corpses from the Tutsi community filled lakes and rivers, little or no aid was provided. At the particular time of the genocide, the world had eyes on the refugees who happen to represent human catastrophe. Ironically, the refugees were from the Hutu community. The meaning of this is that the militias from the Hutu community that had inflicted one of the worst genocides in the world, received shelter, food, and support from international agencies while their victims who were surviving were left impecunious (Polman 2010). Worse, Polman argues that the humanitarian aid provided an opportunity for the extremists from the Hutu community to exterminate Tutsi from the security provided in Goma in the UNHCR camps. Polman writes, “Without humanitarian aid, the Hutus’ war would almost certainly have ground to a halt fairly quickly (Anthony 2010).”
The neutrality issue influenced the pervasive situations such as in Rwanda according to Polman. Since the establishment of Red Cross by Henri Dunant during the 19th century, humanitarian agencies were designed to avoid preferring a single group in a conflicts. When setting up Red Cross, the concern of Dunant was neither the wrongs nor the rights in a certain conflict. The primary aim of the organisation initially was to improve the care provided and ease the suffering of the victims during wars that happened to be mostly soldiers. In her writing, Polman holds that when humanitarian agencies fail to be discriminative during service delivery, the beneficiaries are often the powerful in the society rather than those in need. Polman states that while organisations providing aid are aware of where the problem lies, they have little willingness to address the challenges often due to competitive pressures within the industry. The humanitarianism business is worth multi-billion dollars and when a single organisation seizes operating due to strategic or moral reasons, there are hundreds willing to replace them and benefit from their funding. Polman (2010) states that globally there are approximately 37,000 international NGOs that are in competition to receive donations and contracts given by various governments and UN agencies. Polman demonstrates that inescapably, the humanitarian global industry funds wars, destroys economies, feeds soldiers, draws children and women into prostitution, and supports to keep some of the most worst regimes in government.
According to Strandow, Findley, and Young, (2014), fragile conflict countries have the least likelihood of meeting the Millenium Development Goals despite the fact that in the recent years approximately 86% of the funds from the UN agencies are directed to them. According to Narang (2015), humanitarian actions can prolong wars or conflicts in four ways that includes provision of material resources that assist the rebels indirectly, providing logistical support such as camps and shelter for bases, sustaining domestic costs for the basic services with the aim of redirecting money, and finally aid agencies distort or create economies conflicted with wars. Qiao and Nunn (2014) states that provision of food aid is largely politicised because the targeted people often known as beneficiaries are interviewed prior and deemed to be eligible for the assistance. However, the process is highly prone to corrupt behaviours and encourages rent seeking in addition to the possibility of being misappropriated. de Montclos, (2009) provides an in-depth assessment of an example of how misappropriation of aid can negatively impact on a country’s economy.
Case studies of prolonged conflicts/ wars
Biafra
Among lessons to be learned from the failure of humanitarian aid can originate from the Biafra war. In the contemporary African history, Biafra is remembered as among the worst humanitarian crises witnessed in the continent and as tragedy which created the concept of global responsibility to offering protection (de Montclos 2009). From the viewpoint of the international media, the intervention during the Biafra war was a huge success. Nevertheless, from the humanitarian viewpoint, the intervention was a logistical nightmare, operational disaster, and a political failure. According to professionals such as Polman, the elementary dilemma of organisations offering relief is providing help to the militants while ensuring war victims access the basic human needs (de Montclos 2009). Humanitarian relieve aggravates wars or conflicts of the possibility of legitimising belligerents and supporting war economies (Lischer, 2005). Essentially, Biafra got to experience all this dark side of humanitarianism. Similar to what Polman highlights in Rwanda, aid provided legitimacy to the struggle of independence by Christian Igbo who happened to be seen as the real victims of the genocide. Aid agencies were integral in providing rebels with weapons and food supplies. Nordstrom (2004) argues that the major contributing reason was because in war zones, humanitarian logistics often follow similar routes. Planes that were used in transporting supplies in Biafra were carrying both weapons and foods from Sao Tome. Thus, militants were able to access fresh supplies in plenty which made the agencies contribution to the war economy be both financial and logistical.
Financially, secessionists could not access hard currencies because after the Federal Government introduced new banknotes, the Nigerian pounds that many people in Biafra had were rendered valueless. Creating a Biafran pound was neither a solution as it lacked value externally. The pound had been printed in Portugal and hence, was only paper money considering importation and minting of coins could have been extremely expensive. Consequently, even the notes from Biafra were scarce and people resulted using plastic tokens as coins. In the enclave, individuals made it a choice to store their cash at home because the local authorities had frozen accounts and it was a risk going to the banks, as there was a high likelihood of being recruited by the militants (Uche 2002). While humanitarian agencies on one hand have a responsibility of decreasing the suffering of the war victims, they also are in denial in the political role they play in sustenance of conflicts. While the contribution of relieve agencies during conflicts has been associated to have both negative and positive effects, stakeholders need to exercise more caution during actual operations. Government and non-governmental organisations ought to exercise social responsibility when serving in war economies and avoid practices such as bribing corrupt leaders to access the victims (Ewins 2006). Building infrastructure such as roads or airstrips has been associated with providing military and militant’s access to remote areas in the rural for purposes of extending the fights. While humanitarian organisations criticise oil companies in countries such as Sudan or Nigeria because they pay taxes which support the military operations in addition to giving them transport means such as planes or cars they are faced with similar issues but rarely recognise them (de Montclos 2009). In this Nigerian- Biafra civil war during the late 1960s, humanitarian aid played a critical role in providing strength to the rebels (Barnnet 2011). Odumegwu Ojukwu who was the leader of the rebels only allowed entrance of aid to regions in Biafra that he controlled if his planes were used for shipping. Apart from charging the levy for using his airplanes, the space which remained was filled with military equipments such as firearms. Through the food, Ojukwu could feed his army and would comfortably outwit the siege that the Nigerian government had placed on Biafra. Polman (2010) notes that the primary reason the Biafra civil war lasted for years was because of the aid shipments provided by international humanitarian agencies.
Rwanda
Apart from the mismanagement of humanitarian agencies in Biafra as argued by de Montclos, in her book, Polman (2010) extensively provides a similar case in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Afghanistan. As explained above, after the global community contributed 976 million pounds for relief aid towards providing help to the victims of the Genocide, the beneficiaries were refugees from the Hutu community that had committed the atrocities. In Goma where the refugee camps were erected, there were more than 250 aid agencies with their own logos and flags. The Hutus carried with them the looting from Rwanda, a country that had been impoverished by their actions and according to Polman, hardly, no investor or relieve agency stepped in to help the real victims. Polman argues that during the crisis, the architects of the genocide from the Hutu community continued to assert their leadership. For example, in all the food rations that were provided by the aid agencies, the Hutu government living in large tourist hotels would continue to levy a ‘war tax’ that was used in payment of the army forces which consequently sustained the campaign against the Tutsi ‘enemy’ back in Rwanda.
Ethiopia
In the case of Ethiopia, the prolonged war in 1984 coincided with the civil war between the rebels present in the Northern provinces of Tigray and Eritrea and the Communist junta that was ruling Ethiopia at the particular time. Polman writes that as a strategy of winning the war, soldiers allied to the government sealed areas in the north and proceeded to cause destruction through shooting men and boys dead. Young girls and women were mutilated, raped while newborns were set on fire alive. Clinics and schools were set ablaze, grain stores were burnt, and sources of water were poisoned while thousands of livestock were slaughtered. Ironically, the same government sent invitations to international media to cover the millions who had become famine refugees. Polman (2014) quotes that journalist such as Michael Buerk concluded that the conflicts and constant wars were a form of destruction from the primary issue of humanitarian crisis through mass starvation. Through the famous BBC report by Buerk, a huge fundraising campaign happened resulting to the creation of the Band-aid. Additionally, thousands of journalists and aid workers flew to Ethiopia. Polman states that foreigners entering the country had to exchange their dollars for local currencies at rates that the ruling government determined. Using this tactic, the Ethiopian war machine was kept alive. The food aid provided was used to recruit villagers into camps where they would be later deported in state farms for forced labour. According to Polman (2010), while it remains unknown the number of Ethiopians who perished estimates shows a figure between 300,000 to one million people.
Afghanistan
Finally, in Afghanistan, Polman describes Kabul as a divided city. The division is between poverty on the part of the inhabitants and the luxury that foreign aid workers enjoy. Beyond Kabul, Polman argues that aid money never reaches the intended target as the involved subcontractors take their cut before passing to the next in the line. According to her, the process is not supervised because many of the workers in these aid agencies are targeted by the Taliban groups and fear going into provinces considered dangerous. Consequently, aid that is unsupervised invites corruption and theft (Polman, 2010). Moreover, it multiplies and strengthens the support offered to the Taliban which leads to further insecurity.
Bosnia/ Somalia
Humanitarianism actions after the Cold War have influenced war dynamics. Rather than having a war fought to finality, humanitarianism has continued to defend the decorous idea that when the stronger power is allowed to prevail then the law of the jungle is endorsed. When this is done, humanitarianism can have the war prolonged and thus more human suffering. In Bosnia for instance, due to humanitarian politics, Bosnian Muslims were provided with incentives prolonging the fighting aiming to get an intervention from the international community defending them or obtaining preferable terms of peace that would be sponsored internationally. According to many critics of the role of humanitarianism such as Saadia Touval, the work of international aid workers or mediators is made difficult by the need to respect human rights (Touval, 2002). Miller (2017), provides some insights from the Polman’s book and quotes her by saying that donors should think before reaching their pockets to provide money for children who are starving as there is a high likelihood that it could contribute to prolonging wars. In her book, Polman states that an investigation by the United Nations Security Council in Somalia concluded that humanitarian aid played a bigger role in the war that had lasted for decades. Somalia was ranked by the Forbes Magazine to be among the most corrupt societies in the world. To confirm this, the investigation showed that while about $415 million annually is spent by the World Food Program (being the largest humanitarian agency in Somalia) in providing food relieve, approximately $200 million of the cash disappeared into warlords pockets as well as local staff who have their corrupt programs ongoing simultaneously. The increase in aid agencies around the world particularly during disasters shows high levels of poor coordination and non-accountability of the provided material and financial resources. The ease to be manipulated by warlords for monetary benefits increases when the many aid agencies fail to formulate a mutual agenda that could be beneficial to the victims and the aid workers. According to Polman (2014) the solution to reducing the negative effects of humanitarianism during wars and conflicts also lies with the public. Individuals who are donating to sustain these organisations should undertake a research to understand the purpose of these agencies and how well they get to use the donor money. Accountability should be emphasised on these aid agencies to ensure that resources are not misappropriated.
According to Nunn, and Qian, (2014) promotion of conflict or wars also happens constantly when theft occurs as perpetrated by armed conflicts. Often, the transportation of food and other essential materials for victims during wars is transported in vast geographic territories and often becomes attractive for armed bandits in particular nations where the ruling government has little control in regions that are outside the capital. Through roadblocks, armed fractions can source for ‘taxes’ to guarantee safe passage. For example, in Somalia during the 1990s conflict, between 20% and 80% of the food relieve shipped were either confiscated, looted, or stolen (Barnett 2011). According to Perlez (1992), the aid that was stolen was used in trading arms in Ethiopia. In Afghanistan, aid agencies that were present in Uruzgan province were forced to give a third of their agricultural support and food aid to the Taliban. In Yugoslavia, UNHCR committed to provide the Serbian armed forces with 30 percent of the aid value arriving in the country in addition to more bribes to Croatian forces that catered for the safe roadblock passing to arrive in Bosnia (Polam, 2010). According to Polman (2010), the amount that is stolen at times exceeds the food value considering that convoy vehicles and numerous equipment are taken. An international aid agency with base in Darfur and Chad, MSF Holland, noted in 2008 that the strategic importance of the communication equipment and vehicles have value that cannot be equated in monetary terms on the part of the armed actors because they increase or improve the aptitude to finance war (Polman 2010).
According to MacFarquhar (2010), the most recent case where warlords take advantage of the available aids is in Somalia where numerous reports have shown that food aid has been channelled to the Al-Shabab a military group that controls some regions in the country. The militant group demanded that the World Food Program should remit $ 200,000 twice every year as a security fee (MacFarquhar 2010). A report by the UN Security Council in 2010 revealed that local aid agencies and contractors had formed powerful cartels that use the provided air or their profits to opposition groups that are armed. Ironically, aid is not only stolen by the militias considered as rebels but also by the military of the ruling government and supporters of the government. As a result, both sides of the divide benefit from the proceeds of the aid agencies and hence prolonged war periods. In the early 1990s, in Rwanda, government agencies were accused of stealing food aid to an extent that shipments were cancelled severally (Uvin 1998). When government receives aid from the agencies, they often redirect it to specific targets that have no association with the opposing groups. The consequence of such acts is recording increased conflicts and hostilities. In 2003, an organisation based in the United States, Human Rights Watch, released a report on Zimbabwe depicting that citizens were required to produce membership cards of the ZANU-PF party before receiving food aid from the government (Thurow and Kilman 2009). In the eastern part of Democratic Republic of Congo, the leaders from the Hema community only allowed international aid agencies if they were not to give resources to the Lendu community who they considered enemies. According to Polman (2010), such scenarios have become widespread, as humanitarianism is a permanent characteristic of strategies from the military.
Syria
While the employees of these humanitarian agencies are aware of the high threat of aid theft and have consequently put in place strategies to minimise the impact when en route, it is quite clear that aid fuels conflict even when the intended populations receive it. What this means is that the recipients of the aid can be militia groups or rebels or individuals who have to remit ‘taxes’ after accessing the aid. Importantly to understand is that there are some channels which can be used by humanitarian agencies to reduce possibility of prolonged conflicts. An example is achievement of high economic development and growth. Equally, if the source of the conflicts is resource limitation, provision of aid can loosen the constraints. As authors such as Polman have demonstrated how aid agencies played a pivotal role in prolonging the conflicts in Somalia, Ethiopia, Biafra, Afghanistan, and Rwanda, Martínez, and Eng, (2016) provide an in-depth analysis of military and political interference have impacted on the food aid in Syria.
In Syria, provision of emergency food aid has unintentionally provided assistance to the Assad regime in various ways. Through channelling assistance using organisations that are approved by the government, external donors have contributed to the regime achieving some of the responsibilities related to warfare. The Syrian government can at times reduce budget on distribution of foods and other critical duties vital to the society with an aim of directing the funds to military efforts. As a result, the regime lead by Assad contributes to the popular discontent which has the capability of translating into unrest. In the late 2014, this assertion was confirmed when violent protests emerged against food, fuel, and electricity shortages in the city of Latakia that is under the control of the regime. Martínez, and Eng, (2016) argues that the UN has shown unwillingness to leverage on the current situation in Syria considering that Assad cannot afford to seize humanitarian action offered by UN agencies particularly in Damascus. The UN has taken the responsibility of feeding thousands of people lead by Assad. Therefore, the emergency food aid provided has given the regime the support they require to exercise power over people and resources. The steady shipment of food aids in areas that are controlled by the regime has helped the Assad government portray stability and security. In a country that is war-stricken, there has been improved attractiveness of the government ruling. While internal displacement of people in the country has largely been associated with insecurity and violence, increased devastation and poverty means that migration is influenced by the needs that adults and children have. Thousands of IDPs from Syria have migrated to areas that are controlled by the regime from areas held by the rebels because they simply need to survive regardless of their political orientation or ideology. By mid 2015, the country was estimated to have an estimated 7.6 million IDPs a figure which fails to include those that the government does not recognise (Martínez, and Eng 2016). Martínez, and Eng, (2016) observes that the Syrian regime prevents international aid agencies from working in areas that are not under its control. Consequently, rebel groups that are not able to feed the people in areas which they control are forced to give up the legitimacy they had. While humanitarian organisations largely emphasize their operations in Syria are not influenced politically but the desire to help the war victims, the principle is much on paper rather than practice. During the conflict, the effect of hunger in locations led by rebels has been evident over the years. Failure to access foodstuffs has seen areas under opposition or military siege turn chaotic. The Assad regime has used this as a critical tactic of having areas that they do not control becomes disorderly. For instance, in 2014, the regime cut off food shipments into Douma through preventing any form of aid including medicines to the town (Martínez, and Eng 2016). As a result, the prices of necessities such as food items skyrocketed immediately forcing families to reduce their daily consumption. Due to the continued flagging circumstances of human life, widespread protests were witnessed from the locals who demanded the military groups controlling the town to be accountable. Amidst these protests, the authority that the militants had was discredited. As the situation in Douma became worse, neighbouring towns which were supported by humanitarian agencies experienced no food challenges (Martínez, and Eng 2016).
Globally, there exist many cases where humanitarian actions have been associated with prolonging conflicts and wars. Thus, for critics such as Polman, there is enough justification for the need to rethink on how humanitarianism functions particularly in countries that have a long history of constant conflicts between communities. According to Terry, (2013) humanitarian acts have demonstrated the ability to legitimise and recognise the authority of warmongers in four unique ways. First, negotiating with the leaders of the militias for purpose of gaining access to certain locations contributes to recognising the individuals as legitimate representatives of the population residing in these areas. Secondly, leaders at the local level can distribute food aids to their supporters and leave out others with an aim of gaining politically. Thirdly, by the presence of the aid agencies, they can help legitimate a regime that commits atrocities against its own citizens. Forth, international humanitarian agencies can sometimes replace governments in providing services and goods to the people. When this happens, it presents a window for potential dissent among the locals as some seek to question or challenge the leadership available (Terry 2013). The adverse consequences of humanitarian actions in relation to providing legitimacy to war criminals and be a catalyst to political crisis can also be illustrated using the intervention in Central Africa. Critics of humanitarianism argue that it has promoted a view that in a conflict, there are the perpetrators and the victims instead of human beings who have found themselves in relationships that are complex. The coverage by international media is often a simplification of the truth. In many conflicts and wars, the media has a good working relationship with the humanitarianism organisations. While both need each other, they ought to perform their job ethically and professionally. Acknowledgement of the weaknesses could provide critical to developing strategies that benefit the victims in terms of having an end to the conflicts and wars.

Conclusion
Among African countries, Sierra Leone is among those that have been negatively affected by the presence of humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian intervention evidently increased conflict in Sierra Leone because of thee support the rebels received through provision of resources in the regions that they controlled. Furthermore, the government gained from the aid through embezzlement and the combatants had easier access to weapons after constant the interference from the Western countries. Conclusively, Sierra Leone’s high dependency on humanitarian aid prevented them from attaining peace earlier. Hence, the dependency theory effectively describes the benefits that Western countries stand to gain if a country affected by civil war depends on their assistance. Humanitarian intervention, therefore, does not effectively implement the peace building process but instead fuels the war.
The literature review describes the dependency theory as the theoretical concept linking to the empirical data. The hypothesis drawn from the theoretical concept is that humanitarian aid has negatively influenced the peace building process in Sierra Leone. Apart from this, the reviewed literature draws from the book by Linda Polman, War Games: The Story Of Aid And War In Modern Times; to depict how humanitarian action can prolong wars. Case studies of how aid agencies have contributed to increased conflicts from Rwanda to Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Ethiopia and Biafra have been explained in-depth.

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