What challenges and opportunities exist for Middle Eastern nations making the transition to liberal democracy

Review the articles by Imai and Zeren (2017), (Links to an external site.) Gaffar (2017), (Links to an external site.) and Battaloglu and Farasin (2017), (Links to an external site.) which are required reading for Module 3. Based on the articles, respond to the following:

What challenges and opportunities exist for Middle Eastern nations making the transition to liberal democracy?
What can Middle Eastern nations do to successfully make this transition?
Should the United States and other countries work to promote liberal democracy in the Middle East? If so, how, and if not, why not?

need at least one paragraph for each question answering each of the 3 questions above based off of the articles attached

From Democratization to Securitization: Post-Arab Spring Political Order in the Middle East

Cihat Battaloglu, MA Statistical Economic and Social Research and

Training Centre for Islamic Countries Ankara, Turkey

Fadi Farasin, MSc Statistical Economic and Social Research and

Training Centre for Islamic Countries Ankara, Turkey

Abstract

This article examines the question: why and how the wave of democratization in the Middle East has receded, giving way to the prioritization of security in the post-Arab Spring by con- ducting analyses at three levels: societal, state, and international. By applying the main con- cepts and theories found in the literature on democratization and securitization and by analyzing the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Democracy Status Index, the Arab Barometers Survey, and the Arab Opinion Survey, the article concludes that: at the societal level, the tragic unfolding of events after the Arab Spring prohibits the public from pushing a reform agenda; at the state level, the post-Arab political environment raises doubts among the ruling elite about how far political reforms should be extended; and at the international level, with the rise of new security threats, international pressure on Middle East countries to democratize has been restrained, giving way to security cooperation as the top priority.

Key words: Legislative, Rationality, Elections, Public policy, Middle East, Campaign strategy, Social media

De la democratizaci�on a la bursatilizaci�on: El orden político post Primavera �Arabe en el Medio Oriente i

Resumen

Este artículo examina una pregunta; por qu�e y c�omo la ola de democratizaci�on en el Medio Oriente ha retrocedido, llevando a la priorizaci�on de la seguridad despu�es de la Primavera �Arabe al llevar a cabo an�alisis en tres niveles: sociedad, estado e internacional. Al aplicar los conceptos y teorías principales que se encuentran en la investigaci�on acerca de la democratizaci�on y bursatilizaci�on y al analizar el Bertelsmann Stiftung Democracy Status Index, la Arab Barometers Survey y la Arab

DOI: 10.1111/dome.12116 Digest of Middle East Studies—Volume 26, Number 2—Pages 299–319 VC 2017 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Opinion Survey, el artículo concluye que: a nivel social, la serie de eventos tr�agicos despu�es de la Primavera �Arabe le prohíbe al p�ublico presionar para que haya una agenda de reforma; a nivel estatal, el ambiente político post-�Arabe crea dudas entre la �elite regente sobre qu�e tanto se deben extender las reformas políticas; y a nivel internacional, con la aparici�on de nuevas amenazas de seguridad, se ha restringido la presi�on internacional para que los países del Medio Oriente se democraticen, lo que ha llevado a que la cooperaci�on en seguridad sea la prioridad principal.

Palabras Clave: Democratizaci�on, Bursatilizaci�on, Primavera �Arabe, Medio Oriente, Participaci�on política,

从民主化到安全化中东地区后阿拉伯之春的政治秩序

摘要

本文通过社会、国家和国际三个层面的分析, 检验了中东地区民主化浪潮为何会褪去, 转而优先考虑 “后阿拉伯之春” post-Arab Spring 的安全, 以及该过程是如何发生的通过应用民主化文献和安全化文献中的主要概念和理论,同时分析贝塔斯曼基金会 Bertelsmann Stiftung 的民主状况指数 Democracy Status Index 、阿拉伯民主动态调查 Arab Barometers Survey 和阿拉伯舆论调查

Arab Opinion Survey , 本文得出结论认为在社会层面上, 自阿拉伯之春后发生的悲剧事件阻止了大众推进改革议程在国家层面上, 后阿拉伯的政治环境引起了统治精英对政治改革应在多大程度上进行的疑问在国际层面, 随着新安全威胁的兴起, 中东国家遭受国际要求其实行民主的压力受到了限制, 中东国家首要考虑的是安全合作

关关键键词词后阿拉伯之春, 阿拉伯政治, 阿拉伯之春

Introduction

In the late 1990s, the democratic wave started to batter the shores of the MiddleEast, one of the last strongholds of authoritarianism. This wave gained consider- able momentum after 9/11 when the Bush Administration introduced the so-called “freedom agenda.” Governments in the Middle East bowed to internal and external pressure, acknowledging the need for: democratization, fostering political participa- tion among their citizens, and press freedom. However, the ultimate goal for govern- ments in the Middle East was to weather this wave of calls for democratization, while guaranteeing that they remain in full power.

The cosmetic and top-down approach to democratization in the Middle East failed to meet the expectations of the people; thus, a gap between governments and the people emerged, opening up space for opposition voices to register their discontent at the direction of policies. Questions of regime legitimacy arose, trig- gering a chain of events in 2011 that ultimately toppled long-standing authori- tarian leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and rocking the regimes in Syria and Bahrain to their core. At the time, it was expected that the Arab

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Spring would lead to the democratization of Middle Eastern countries — it did not! The ensuing instability, strife, civil war, and the rise of radicalism and vio- lent extremism made western powers abandon the promotion of democracy and prioritize security instead. Also, Middle East regimes, particularly monarchies, became more prudent about protecting their regimes from the snowballing effects of the Arab uprising. It seemed that the “democratic wave” has ended, yielding to a new age of securitization.

Taking into account the above state of affairs, this article examines the question: why and how the wave of democratization in the Middle East has receded, giving way to the prioritization of security in the post-Arab Spring. It applies the main concepts and theories found in the literature on democratization and securitization. This article also studies different aspects of the issue of democratization in the Mid- dle East. First, it analyzes political transition in the Middle East prior to the Arab Spring to demonstrate the emergence of democratization in the region. This is fol- lowed by analysis on political expectations and public demands, and the resulting political crisis during the Arab Spring. This article also analyzes the new political atmosphere in the post-Arab Spring period focusing on the driving forces that lead to the prioritization of security over democracy by testing three preliminary findings at three levels of analysis: 1) At the societal level, the post-Arab Spring political environment limits the public from pushing a reform agenda and leads them to securitize the idea of democratic transition when confronted with the tragic unfold- ing of events is other places in the Middle East (i.e., Syria, Yemen, and Libya); 2) At the state level, it raises doubts within the ruling elites about how fast or how far political reforms should be extended especially if it increases the risk that the reform process might get out of their control; 3) At the international level, with the rise of new security threats, particularly ISIL, pressure on Middle East countries to democ- ratize has been subdued giving way to security cooperation as the top priority.

Theoretical Approach

The reality of “democratic transition” is far more complex than discussions related to democracy. Democratic transition cannot be analyzed simply as a phenomenon. It implies more than one nominal change and period, multiple characteristics and dif- ferent variables (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007). Transition also consists of more than one stage, and each stage involves moderate and gradual changes within different characteristics. O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) are of the view that democratic transition is “the interlude between one political system to another” (19). It is generally initiated by the desire of a significant member of the ruling elite to demonstrate that “they want to substantially widen the set of respected individual and collective rights, and the population believes this announcement” (O’Donnell et al., 1986:25). Huntington (1991) also addresses the different phases of transition to democracy. He underlines five stages in a typical transition: 1) the emergence of

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reformers, 2) the coming of reformers into positions of power, 3) the failure (and replacement) of early reformers, 4) the subduing of displaced supporters of the authoritarian regime, and 5) and the inclusion of new sectors.

The drivers and actors of democratic transition are also diverse, but four main approaches can be underlined. The institutionalist approach argues that prodemocratic values can only emerge through learning by living under an existing democratic mecha- nism (Rohrschneider, 1996). This approach also highlights the importance of estab- lishing robust democratic institution in a country to fulfil a democratic transition and consolidate it. On the other hand, Rustow adopts the elite-cantered approach in its most radical version. He defines elites as the main political actors in democratization. He believes that “democratic transition comes when political elites make the conscious decision to adopt the democratic rules of the game” (Rustow, 1970:3).

For some authors in transitology, the role of nonelite actors (civil society in partic- ular) is important to consider. Particularly, Linz and Stepan (1996) insist that a vibrant and democratic society is a significant requisite of democratization. Bernhard (1993) also argues that democratization has only existed in conjunction with a civil society in which it constitutes the sphere of autonomy from which political forces representing constellations of interests in society have contested state power. In addi- tion to civil society, democratic culture is also an important subject in the societal context of democratization. As discussed by Schmitter, Karl, Diamond, and Plattner (1993), stable democracy and democratic culture are empirically correlated. The establishment of democracy is not independent from cultural determination and civic culture in particular.

Finally, the international dimension of democratization should not be ignored. As underlined by Huntington (1993), the role of external actors became more influential particularly in the third wave. During these years, western countries, the United States, in particular, were a major promoter of democratization through its diplo- matic actions, economic pressure, and material support for democratic opposition forces.

Democracy has not always been the end result of transition. Studying transitions in the late twentieth century reveals two divergent outcomes: 1) the establishment of a small number of new democracies; and 2) the emergence of a large number of reverse transitions, the majority of which have led to authoritarian regimes. Never- theless, some countries within the transition waves have been categorized neither as consolidated democracies nor as nondemocratic regimes but have remained as “hybrid regimes” (Diamond, 1999). An analysis of studies published after the mid- 1990s uncovers a number of intellectual changes occurring in the transition literature. These new views appear to have led to a more cautious (and somewhat paradoxical) understanding of hybrid regimes, that is, which are neither authoritarian nor demo- cratic and do not represent any movement along a continuum of democratization.

Recent works in transitology display a better comprehension of the current issues; nonetheless when it comes to the case of the Middle East, transition

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literature does not effectively conceptualize the political conditions that developed after the Arab Spring. The majority of existing literature fails to analyze the period of uncertainty (during the transition) and “the role of violence in shaping post uprising tangents” (Stacher, 2015:262). As a matter of fact, none of these approaches evaluate democratization or the concept of democracy within the framework of security. Yet, as argued in this article, the new political atmosphere in the post-Arab Spring period leads to the securitization of the concept of democracy. Democracy was presented as a security threat. Regimes convincingly advocated security and stability as an alternative narrative to democracy demands, societal actors accepted the restoration of autocratic rule in response to the uncer- tainty about the outcomes of the Arab Spring, and international actors aban- doned the promotion of democracy in return for security arrangements. As a result, at the societal, state, and international levels, actors (referent objects) became more prudent about protecting themselves from the negative outcomes of Arab uprisings. Thus, in addition to transitology, the securitization literature is important to conceptualize the post-Arab Spring political order and to answer the question of why the wave of democratization in the Middle East has turned into securitization in the post-Arab Spring.

The concept of securitization is built on Ole Wæver’s idea of securitization, Buzan’s conception of sectoral security, and, most recently, “the extension and devel- opment of the concept of security complexes into the regional security complex the- ory” (Wilkinson, 2007:6). In the works of the Copenhagen School, securitization is constructed on three elements: “the speech act,” “the securitizing actor,” and “the audience” (Wæver, 1999). The speech act is defined as “an inter-subjective under- standing constructed within a political community to treat something as an existen- tial threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:491). According to the Copenhagen School “Security is a self-referential practice . . . not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998:24). Also, an existential threat does not by itself create securitization. Yet, “the issue is securitized when the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al., 1998:26). To achieve successful securitization and “to prevent `everything’ from becoming a security issue” the following three steps are applied: 1) “identification of existential threats,” 2) “emergency action,” and 3) “effects on inter- unit relations by breaking free of rules” (Buzan et al., 1998).

Although the concept of securitization has its origins in Ole Wæver’s analysis of the Cold War’s ending in Europe, in recent years, the Copenhagen School securitization theory has been utilized in different spheres. As in other countries, securitization offers a useful analytical tool in understanding the Middle East. Particularly in the post-Arab Spring era, Middle East countries became the place where Wæver would expect the “securitization theory to do well by virtue of the ways in which the language of security has been utilized by elites to justify their undemocratic actions and by the social actors

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when confronted with the tragic unfolding of events in the Middle East” (Wæver, 1999). The security landscape in the post-Arab Spring Middle East is characterized by the widening of the “security concept” and by the emergence of “new threats” and “non-traditional threats.” The actors at the state, society, and international levels securi- tize the idea that “democratization demands” led to instability and chaos for the six Arab Spring countries and for the region at large. Therefore, transitiology — albeit within the securitization perspective — is utilized in this article to define the stages, actors, and drivers of the tentative transition, whereas, the outcomes of the Arab Spring are evaluated by using the framework of securitization. The recent portrayal of democ- ratization, as a threat by the actors, is analyzed to encompass the answer of why the wave of democratization in the Middle East has receded, giving way to the prioritiza- tion of security in the post-Arab Spring.

Political Transition in the Middle East and the Turmoil Years of the Arab Spring

World politics has witnessed different waves of democratization and by the mid- 1970s, democratization ceased being a Western phenomenon (Huntington, 1991). Although in the Arab region, the political reform processes have not turned into a full-fledged democratization, the history of prodemocratic reforms did start in 1970s. Egypt led the way by instituting reforms in 1973 — just three years after the arrival of Anwar al-Sadat to power — and Hosni Mubarak renewed Egypt’s commitment to reforms by holding relatively free and fair election in 1984 and 1987. In Morocco, political parties participated in the municipal and parliamentary elections, which were held in 1976 and 1977, respectively. Jordanians went to the polls on November 8, 1989, in the first general elections in 22 years and Algeria promised free munici- pal elections in 1990 (Lust, 2009).

Yet, despite these reforms, democracy did not materialize in these countries. No state made significant, unretracted “steps toward freedoms (as measured by the Free- dom House Survey) during the Third Wave”; and by the early 1990s, these Arab states had largely reversed the reform (Salam�e, 1994). It seemed that the Arab world was immune to democracy, thus giving rise to the notion of “Arab Exceptionalism.”

In the early 2000s, a new wave of transition had been started in the region. Fol- lowing the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States’ pressure on the Middle Eastern regimes increased, demanding more political liberalization. The United States started a number of ambitious plans to foster democratic transition throughout the region. The “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in 2002” and “The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) in 2004” were launched “to promote democ- racy in the region and to accelerate reforms in governance, education, the economy, technology, development and the role of women” (Khalaf & Luciani, 2006:9). Like- wise, in 2002, the White House established the Millennium Challenge Account, a funding agency charged with linking aid to 17 indicators ranging across three

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clusters: “Investing in People” (health and education), “Promoting Economic Free- dom” (free market reforms as set by the IMF and WB), and “Governing Justly” (political and civil rights as defined by Freedom House) (MacQueen, 2009:169).

In response to the external pressure to promote democracy in the Middle East, many regimes yielded, embarking on a number of political reforms, and held elec- tions (Battaloglu, 2016). The focus of democracy promotion as Macqueen (2009) argues was on the strengthening of civil society and the surface institutions of democracy. The structure and priorities of this policy fed into the ability of regimes across the Arab world to resist pressures for political liberalization. Here, it is argued that the democracy promotion policy of the George W. Bush Administration has enabled autocratic and authoritarian regimes across this region to enhance their capacity for social penetration and to exploit a lack of effort to promote the idea of democracy, facilitating direct and indirect modes of repression against opposition forces that have drawn from democracy promotion funding. This has enabled these regimes to enhance the processes of elite change — co-option and imitative institu- tion building that have been central to their resilience in the face of seemingly unavoidable challenges (MacQueen, 2009:165, 172).

The reform process in the Middle East remained cosmetic with a top-down approach designed to contain civil society, manage elections in a manner that does not pose a challenge to the existing power structure, and introducing a selective reform agenda. Some Arab states over-relied on rent and militarized in excess of their economic and political bases leading to chronic fiscal crises. Faced by the per- ceived prospect of ruin due to political reforms, authoritarian regimes resorted to “Patrimonialism” to ensure their longevity by “demobilizing the opposition and building a loyal base through selective favoritism and discretionary” (Bellin, 2004:143). This increased “the gaps between regime and public opinion (having) opened up a space for opposition voices to register their discontent at the direction of policy” (Ashton & Gibson, 2014:120). Most of the Middle Eastern states reached a dead end, triggering a chain of events that would be called the “Arab Spring.”

When the first event of the Arab Spring began in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, new hopes for democratization in the Middle East re-emerged. Optimism spread rapidly from country to country and soon affected large parts of North Africa and the Middle East. As the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya fell and other regimes appeared next in line, “analogies were quickly conjured to 1989, when another frozen political space, Eastern Europe, saw one dictatorship after another collapse” (Diamond, 2011:1). The once impossible democratic transition in the Mid- dle East now seemed possible and the “Fourth Wave of democracy” became the ter- minology of the early days of Arab Spring.

Yet this optimism was misplaced and the so-called “forth wave” proved to be no more than a mirage. Autocratic regimes have shown remarkable resilience, not only surviving under challenging conditions, but also re-establishing a more repressive ver- sion of authoritarianism. Egypt is now more authoritarian than during the years of

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Mubarak, and the Sisi regime has not found a way to revive the economy or to satisfy the grievances of the poor and unemployed. The Bahraini monarchy, aided with mili- tary support from Saudi Arabia, forcefully expelled protesters from the Pearl Round- about in central Manama. In some countries, “Arab uprisings ushered in the most violent period of state-society relations” (Stacher, 2015:262). Some transition countries such as Syria, Yemen and Libya became engulfed in civil wars and became failed states.

In Syria, when the first protest started in the southern city of Daraa in 2011, many people believed that the al-Assad regime would be quickly overthrown, as was the case in Tunisia. Yet, such an expectation turned out to be misguided. The regime did not crack under the pressure, nor sacrifice its president. State violence ensued determined to oppress the uprising and protests. More than six years have passed since the begin- ning of the Syrian revolution; it has come to be one of the greatest tragedies of the twenty-first century, and one of the most awful calamities in the history of the contem- porary world. So far, about 465,000 people have been killed, and nearly two million more have been wounded (according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights — http://www.syriahr.com/en/). More than five million Syrians are refugees and six and a half million have been internally displaced within Syria, the biggest internally displaced population in the world (according to the numbers of the United Nations High Com- missioner for Refugees — http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html). The combined number of refugees and internally displaced people presents more than half of the precivil war population of Syria. The bloody civil war consumed any hope for democratization. Haddad (2012) argues that “the Syrian tragedy is increasingly more about the fall of Syria [ans] than the fall of the Syrian regime” (p. 115).

Yemen did not fare better. The uprising, which was, in the first place, against Ali Abdullah Saleh, gave way to ethnic tensions involving the Houthi minority in the

Figure 1: Democracy status in the Middle East and six Arab Spring countries (2010 and 2016). Source: Author’s calculation based on BTI Index.

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http://www.syriahr.com/en/

http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html

north and introduced a regional proxy dimension to the internal conflict. Almost six years later, the outcome of the Yemeni uprising is the sad fact that nonstate identi- ties, which are ethnic, tribal, regional, or combinations of these, have emerged a cen- tral power lines (Heydemann, 2013). Optimism and hopes for democratization have given way to a civil war and a failed state.

Libya, at first, seemed to follow closely the pattern established by Tunisia and Egypt before the uprising quickly turned violent. Then, an internationally sponsored military intervention ended with the lynching of the long-time leader Muammer al- Qadhafi and raising new hopes following Libya’s 2012 election (Stacher, 2015). Yet, the fall of Qaddafi’s brutal regime has taken the state down with it. Six years later, Libya is struggling to ensure the national control over its borders and the fragmented state apparatus. There is no central authority in Libya, only multiplying militias, fac- tionalized violence, and political incoherence (Stacher, 2015).

Political conditions in the majority of Arab countries have worsened compared with the pre-Arab Spring years. Figure 1 shows the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s (BTI) Democracy Status Index1 scores for the Middle East as a whole and the six Arab Spring countries. The figure demonstrates how the hopes of democratic transition in the region have failed. Only Tunisia registered an improvement in its democracy sta- tus from a score of 3.8 on a scale of 10 in 2010 to a score of 6.3 in 2016. With this jump in score, Tunisia moved from the category of Hard-line autocracy in 2010 to a defective democracy in 2016, thanks to parliamentary elections in October 2014 that culminated in a peaceful turnover of power, which was cheered by many as a sign of a healthy Tunisian fledgling democracy. Although the case of Tunisia remains cau- tiously optimistic, the remaining Arab Spring countries have failed to transform their political system. As the BTI index reveals, the democracy status of the Middle East has receded, with countries scoring lower on the BTI index in 2016 compared to 2010. Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of Tunisia, are now classified as either (Hard-line or moderate) autocracies.

Taking into account the above state of affairs, it can be argued that the so-called Arab Spring has turned into the regional winter within the six years since the first incident happened. The hopes of democratization in the region have faded, giving way to the age of securitization. To analyze the reasons for such a fate, the next part of this article examines the question of why has the wave of democratization in the Middle East receded, giving way to the prioritization of security in the post-Arab Spring. Multilevel analysis (at the social, state and international level) is employed to draw a comprehensive picture covering all aspects of the transformation.

The New Political Atmosphere in the Post-Arab Spring Period

Democratic transition, as mentioned earlier, cannot be analyzed simply as phenome- non. The above discussion showed that the stages, actors and drivers of democratic transition are diverse. In the Middle East, democratization has transited through a

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number of stages due to different actors and drivers. However, in the Middle East, the terrifying results of the Arab Spring have adversely affected the drivers and actors of the democratic transition. The long-awaited democratization has turned to securi- tization. Due to the new political atmosphere in the post-Arab Spring period, all actors in societal, state, and international levels have started to prioritize security over democracy.

Changes at Societal Level

The historical experience shows that democratic transition has always been fueled by demand coming from the societal level; however, in the Middle East, public demand for political change had been relatively weak during the years when democratization waves hit other regions. Social, economic, and political life in the Arab world has been plagued by political apathy — fueled by decades of authoritarian rule — and revolving, to a remarkable degree, around the bonds of family, clan, or tribe (Haw- thorne, 2004). In the early years of state formation in the 1960s and 1970s, mass mobilizations were motivated by political nationalism rather than public demand for change. Thus, regimes, in most cases, successfully demobilized populace or con- trolled movements by using certain proregime segments of population.

Nevertheless, the advent of liberalization, marketization, and rising urban popula- tion in the 1980s unleashed important socioeconomic and sociocultural changes in the region. It not only led to new elections and legislative reforms, but also to the reorganizing of societal structures in the region. In these years, Islamic movements, particularly social Islam, became the key actors in filling the welfare gap by direct provision of services, such as health care, education, and financial aid (Bayat, 2000). The Islamization trend triggered the explosive growth of Islamic NGOs in the Mid- dle East.

When western democracy promotions were launched after the Barcelona Process in 1995, the societal structures in the Middle East started to become institutional- ized. Civil society organizations emerged and tangibly expanded, particularly after the 2000s. In this regard, the rise of the global human rights and prodemocracy movements encouraged the formation of Arab human rights and democracy organi- zations (Bayat, 2000). Middle Eastern civil society started to play an active role and provided a new avenue to mobilize middle class and opposition groups. This hap- pened despite the fact that during the first decade of the twenty-first century, inde- pendent civic activity was brought under tight state control as civil society organizations were repressed (Carothers & Ottaway, 2010).

Alongside the emerging civil society and opposition movements (based on Islamic movements), economic liberalization, urbanization, and modernization brought new challenges for Arab societies. The long-standing structural problems (such as high unemployment, rampant corruption, and social inequalities) fueled demand for change in the majority of Middle Eastern countries. Equally critical was the fact that

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political systems in the Arab world were repressive, corrupt and unstable. The absence of liberties, freedom of “saying,” political participation, political and social integration, and the rule of law were primary sources for political tribulations in the Arab world. They eroded state legitimacy and induced festering political grievances and dissatisfaction (Farasin, Battaloglu, & Bensaid, 2017:14). In this sense, the Arab world was poised for a revolution.

In the beginning, political demands were made by the existing civil society and political opposition. With time, more voices started to make their way into the pub- lic and political space by using social media to challenge state monopolies of infor- mation in the Middle East region. Civil society became integral to discussions of how to liberalize societies and democratize political regimes. Socioeconomic grievan- ces were inextricably linked with, and fueled political demands. When it came to 2010, many people who were previously silent began to speak out about social and economic injustices and to call for change. What followed was a wave of revolts that swept across the Middle East in 2011.

When the first autocrat was overthrown in Tunisia, the expectation in Arab socie- ties was that the Arab Spring would spread rapidly from one country to another, and open a new chapter in Middle East history, characterized by democratic forms of government. Nonetheless, and within a short period of time, the anticipated democracy festival turned into state violence and authoritarian backlash. People became disillusioned and societies become more polarized.

Before the Arab Spring, optimism for democracy was widespread throughout the region; however, the favorable attitude toward democracy in the Middle East has decreased in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Figure 2 compares the Arab Barome- ters Survey2 results in 2010–2011 (Wave 2) with 2012–2014 (Wave 3). The findings

Figure 2: Arab barometer on democracy perceptions in the Middle East. Source: Arab Barometer Survey.

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demonstrate that, although democracy was still viewed favorably in the region, more people in Middle East have become sceptical of the concept of democracy. The per- centage of people who agree with the statement “Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values in your country” has increased 3% during the Arab Spring years, reaching 32% in the Arab Barometer’s third wave. Likewise, more people have started to disagree with the statement “Democracy is the best system, despite its problems,” with 19% of people disagreeing in the third wave, compared to 16% in the second wave.

Alongside the increasing scepticism toward democracy, the Arab Opinion Survey3

demonstrates that Arab public opinion toward the Arab Spring has worsened over

Figure 4: The rise of political movements: fears of the Arab public. Source: Arab Opinion Index (2015).

Figure 3: Public attitude toward the Arab Spring and its outcome (2012–2015). Source: Arab Opinion Index (2015).

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time. Figure 3 shows that negative public attitudes toward the Arab Spring and its outcomes increased between 2012 and 2015. In 2012, only 22% of respondents had negative attitudes toward the Arab Spring; however, Arab people’s attitude toward the Arab Spring would soon sour, with 42% of respondents having negative atti- tudes. By 2015, the overwhelming majority of respondents (59%) regarded the Arab Spring and its consequences in a negative light. In supplementary written answers to the survey, “respondents who took a negative view of the Arab Spring explained their positions by focusing the consequences of Arab Spring, which involves the large-scale human losses; the spread of discord and chaos and lack of security; the collapse of states and state institutions; and instability more broadly.”

The Arab people also started to view political parties and political activism in a negative light. According to the results of the Arab Opinion Survey, more and more Arab respondents began to grow weary of both Islamist and non-Islamist political movements in the region (Fig. 4). An estimated 57% of respondents expressed their fears with regards to the rise of Islamist political movements in 2015, compared to just 36% in 2012–2013, and 43% in 2014. The fear of the rise of secular or non- Islamist political movements also increased from 37% in 2014, to 61% in 2015.

Six years ago, people in the Middle East were discussing a new social contract, one that granted them freedom, justice, dignity, and a voice in politics. Then events unfolded in a tragic manner. People were massacred or made refugees by autocratic regimes determined to hold onto power at all costs, or by terrorist groups commit- ting heinous crimes on a large scale. People were surrounded by senseless violence, terror, tremendous human suffering, chaos, and the emerging of failed states. Their attitudes toward democracy, the Arab Spring, and political movements — as the above analysis shows — soured. People wanted security and stability above all, and their push for a reform agenda took a back seat. Simply put: at the societal level, democratization yielded giving way to securitization.

Changes at State Level

The state elite, thorough their calculations and strategic choices, play a crucial role in determining whether democratic transition takes place. O’Donnell et al. (1986) and Rustow (1970) emphasized the role of elites as a prerequisite for democratic transition arguing that transition to democracy can only be launched when state elites become convinced that they have more to gain than loose by opening up the political system.

The Middle East is no exception when it comes to the role of the political elite in instituting predemocracy political reforms. In fact, in the Middle East, political reforms have historically been regime-led and top-down. The first set of political reforms in the Middle East were launched by political elites to consolidate their power domestically, and to establish cohesive political entities in the region. Particu- larly in the 1980s, constitutional reforms and elections became the trend among the

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regimes in the Middle East, helping them to defuse tension in society and within the power structure.

In the 1990s, the emerging civil society, new Islamic opposition, need of eco- nomic liberalization, and new social dynamics forced regimes to implement receptive reform agendas. Demand from international powers came after 9/11 and increased the pressure on political elites to launch more reforms to make themselves more accountable to their population and legitimize their power internationally. Despite the positive steps undertaken by regimes to broaden individual and collective rights and initiating new reforms including elections, expansion of women rights, educa- tional reforms, and institutionalization, the top-down changes did not bridge the gap between state and society. Political reforms remained cosmetic in most of the Middle East. As argued by Heydemann (2007) these efforts paved the way for “upgrading authoritarianism” in the region.

When the protests in Tunisia forced Ben Ali into exile in 2011, the expectations were that autocracies are coming to an end in the region. New hopes for the fourth wave of democratization in the Middle East rose. Nonetheless, no transition away from autocracy occurred. In the six Arab Spring countries, the ruling elite responded by resorting to large-scale state violence to crush the uprising (with the exception of

Figure 5: Commitment to democracy in the non-Arab-Spring Middle East countries. Source: Author’s calculation based on BTI Index (2016).

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Tunisia). In half of the six Arab Spring countries — namely, Syria, Yemen, and Libya — the situation escalated into a bloody civil war where parties are fighting for power and control of the state. The end result in these countries is statelessness or at best, failed states. Thus, to analyze the calculations and strategic choices of the ruling elite within the context of the Arab Spring, it is better to direct the analysis to the non-Arab-Spring Middle East countries (Middle East countries excluding the six Arab Spring countries).

Figure 5 assesses the state’s commitment to democracy before and after the Arab Spring. The assessment covers the areas that are considered the basic pillars of democracy: free and fair elections4; Association and assembly rights,5 freedom of expression,6 and civil rights7; separation of powers8; and independent judiciary.9 As the figure shows, in all the areas, the non-Arab-Spring Middle East countries scored lower in 2016 when compared to 2010, clearly indicating that after the Arab Spring those states stepped away from prodemocracy reforms preferring instead to reinforce their autocratic rule.

In the non-Arab-Spring Middle East countries, the tragic events observed in neighboring countries raised doubts within the ruling elites about democratization in the region. The aftermath of the Arab Spring also made the elite more cautious about the idea of change and reforms. In those countries, democratic reforms came to a halt. The tragic outcomes of the Arab Spring provided the ruling elites with the perfect pretext to justify authoritarian practices and limit civil society’s room for manoeuvre. The slogan “Amen wa Aman” which translates to “Security and Safety” is the slogan that is nowadays clearly heard in Arab capitals and streets alike.

Changes at International Level

Causes of democratization vary in world politics; however, when discussing waves of democratization, Huntington (1991) underlines the role of external actors in promot- ing democratization and the regional snowballing effects as one of the reasons of transition to democracy, especially in second and the third waves.

Upon examination, it is apparent that the processes and consequences of demo- cratic transition in the Middle East differ from previous democratization waves in the world politics. Yet, when it comes to the factors causing reforms in the region, the active role of international actors can be marked. Alongside societal and state actors and drivers, political reforms resulted from outside pressure.

In the mid-1990s, Western powers became fervent supporters of conversion through democratization among Middle Eastern countries. After 9/11, “the Bush administration became more vocal,” and announcing that “the United States had adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom” to foster democratization in the wider Middle East (Kechichian, 2004). During the first decade of twenty-first century, a number of U.S.-led initiatives (i.e., MEPI in 2002) was launched to pro- mote democracy by cooperating with political elites in the region.

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With the Arab uprising, international democracy promotions plan moved from elite/ regime level to societal level in the Middle East. In May 2011, in the thirty-seventh G8 summit, “Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition” (Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen) four priority areas were established: stabilization, job creation, participation/governance and integration. Nevertheless, in the post-Arab Spring period, a change the international paradigm on democratization occurred, thanks to the rise of new threats, particularly ISIL/DAESH and al-Qa’ida, and conflicts in the region (in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya). The outside pressure on Middle East to democratize began to give way to security cooperation and advancement of arms policies.

At the discourse level, western interest in democracy also lessened, due to the ris- ing security threats in the region. When comparing the presidential speeches in the United States before, during, and after the Arab Spring, it can clearly be argued that the U.S. policy toward Middle East has shifted from democratization to securitiza- tion, at least at the discourse level.

When analyzing the years before and during the Arab Spring, both former presi- dents, Bush and Obama were underlining the importance of democratization. On January 13, 2008, President Bush made remarks in Abu Dhabi about the importance of freedom and democracy in Middle East. He highlighted the importance of “fos- tering freedom and justice” in the Middle East (National Archives and Records Administration, 2008). Similarly, in his remarks on the Middle East in 2011, Presi- dent Obama laid out a bold vision of future American policy toward the Middle East. He marked the importance of democracy. He stated “It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region and to support transitions to democracy” (“Remarks by the President,” 2011).

Nevertheless, almost six years since the start of the Arab Spring, the discourse of the main democracy promoter, the United States of America, has changed. In U.S. presidential speeches on Middle East, particularly after 2015, security issues and the rise of terrorism in the region — instead of democracy or transition in the region — have become the main topic. The Middle Eastern interview with Obama in May

Figure 6: U.S. Military and policy aid to Middle Eastern countries. Source: Author’s calculation based on Security Assistance Monitor.

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21, 2015, the president emphasized three topics: The War against ISIS in Iraq and Syria; “The Nuclear Deal with Iran; and The President’s Relationship with Israel and the Jewish People” (The Atlantic, 2015). The promotion of democracy was obviously absent. In the same vein, when President Obama met with the Gulf Mon- archs, the declaration following the U.S.-GCC summit at Camp David in 2015 highlights the focus on security over democracy. In the Joint Statement it is stated that: “In this spirit, and building on the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, the leaders discussed a new U.S.-GCC strategic partnership to enhance their work to improve security cooperation, especially on fast-tracking arms transfers, as well as on counter-terrorism, maritime security, cyber security, and ballistic missile defence” (U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council, 2015).

The shifts in U.S. discourse from democratization to security correlates with US spending on official development aid (excluding humanitarian assistance) and on military and policy aid. Before the onset of the Arab Spring and in 2010, the United States spent US$3.96 Billion on military and policy aid for Middle Eastern countries (Fig. 6). After the Arab Spring started, this number gradually declined to US$2.57 Billion in 2013. Faced with the aftermath of the Arab Spring and with the rise of security treats stemming from terrorist organization and civil war, the United States reversed gear and increased spending on military and policy aid to reach US$4.87 Billion in 2015 (Fig. 6).

U.S. spending on official development aid (ODA) — excluding humanitarian assis- tance — tells a similar story. U.S. spending on ODA, which was hoped to facilitate democratization, dramatically increased right after 9/11 and reached its peak levels in the few years prior to the Arab Spring. With the onset of the Arab Spring, U.S. spend- ing on ODA dropped from a peak value of US$29.39 Billion in 2008 to US$21.56 Billion in 2012. Since 2012, U.S. spending on ODA has been largely flat (Fig. 7).

The rise of terrorist organization like ISIS and the emergence of weak and failed states jeopardized the interest of Western powers. Western powers started to abandon the promotion of democracy and adopted instead a security-focused approach to the

Figure 7: U.S. spending on ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance). Source: OECD Data (2017).

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Middle East. International pressure, which is vital for democratic transition, was now absent. At the international level, security was prioritized over the promotion of democracy.

Conclusion

The Arab word has proven to be an anomaly, stubbornly refusing to bow to consec- utive waves of democratization. Reform processes in response to public demand, international pressure, or as a drive-by ruling elite to defuse tension within society and gain legitimacy remained superficial. These superficial reform processes failed to meet the expectations of people and were insufficient to place these countries on the path of fully fledged democracies. Then came the Arab Spring in 2011 and the hope was that it will lead to democratization of the Middle East. It was not meant to be; instead, civil war, bloodshed, autocratic backlash and the rise of terrorist organizations ensued. Actors at different levels were dismayed abandoning democra- tization and embarrassing securitization.

At the societal level and when confronted by the unfolding tragic events after the Arab Spring and the bloodshed, destruction and the atrocities committed by terrorist organizations and by regimes determined to hold onto power at all cost, people for- sake their demands for democracy. To them, safety and stability stood above every- thing else. Today people in the Middle East have grown sceptical toward democracy, the Arab Spring, and political movements, Islamic or not.

At the state level, the ruling elite have abandoned prodemocracy political reforms. The status of democracy in the majority of countries is worse off today than it was before the Arab Spring. Free and fair elections; association and assembly rights, free- dom of expression, and civil rights; separations of powers; and independent judiciary have all receded. The ruling elite capitalized on the aftermath of the Arab Spring and reinforced their autocratic rule. Today Middle Eastern countries are classified as (hard-line or moderate) autocracy.

At the international level, western powers have shown the same reflexes that they have always shown; putting their self-interest above all other values. When western powers saw their interest jeopardized after the Arab Spring, they abandoned the pro- motion of democracy and human rights and instead prioritized security arrangements with dictators and autocrats.

As a result, democracy has yielded to securitization. This is a sad state of affairs, since there is no guarantee that securitization is the solution to the tribulations of the Middle East. The causes that gave rise to the Arab Spring remain unaddressed and unresolved, waiting to ignite again at the first opportunity.

Notes

1. The BTI Democracy Status Index goes beyond the minimalist definitions of electoral democ- racy by including the rule of law and the separation of legislative, executive and judicial

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powers with checks and balances. The index reflects the extent to which a democratic order is consolidated in terms of acceptance, interest representation, and political culture. Thus, the index seeks to assess the extent to which the ground rules of democracy are both established and accepted within society. The score on the BTI Democracy Status Index presents an assessment along five dimensions which are: staleness, political partici- pation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and political and social integration.

2. The second wave of surveys was conducted in the years 2010 and 2011 in 10 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. The third wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer was fielded from 2012 to 2014 in 12 coun- tries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. The surveys seek to measure and track over time citizen attitudes, val- ues, and behavior patterns relating to different aspects of democracy.

3. The 2015 Arab Opinion Index is the fourth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The 2015 Arab Opinion Index is based on the findings from face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,311 respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania.

4. The score on free and fair elections is based on the criterion: to what extent are political repre- sentatives determined by general, free, and fair elections.

5. The score on association and assembly rights is based on two criteria: to what extent can individ- uals form and join independent political or civic groups and to what extent can these groups operate and assemble freely.

6. The score on freedom of expression is based on the criterion: to what extent can citizens, organi- zations, and the mass media express opinions freely.

7. The score on civil rights is based on the criterion: to what extent are civil rights guaranteed and protected and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these rights.

8. The score on separation of powers is based on the criterion: to what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances).

9. The score on separation of independent judiciary is based on the criterion: to what extent does the judiciary have the ability and autonomy to interpret and review existing laws, legislation, and policies; to pursue its own reasoning, free from influence; and to develop a differentiated organization.

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Democratization and the Arab Spring: A Theoretical Perspective

Abdul Gaffar

State- society relations are articulated most succinctly by Bob Jessop, who notes that the state plays the central role in political life. Further, he contends that the role of the state in relation to society cannot be adequately under- stood without examining the social environment in which it is located. He argues that modern societies are extremely complex, characterized by many subsystems that are, in essence, autonomous to varying degrees. Therefore, conception of a clear- cut boundary between state and society is not feasible, particularly at the microlevel. Legitimacy of the state is constituted through various avenues that support the creation of conditions for a good life. The state could exercise a legitimate right to violence, but this could be employed as a last resort, when all other methods of enforcement have failed. In this context, analyzing subjective interests and capacities of the functionaries of the state such as politicians, bureaucrats, and civil society groups is vital, as state power is activated via this agency. The successful execution of actions is often made possible by unacknowledged conditions and is associated with the possibility of unanticipated consequences. State power is always conditional and relational, depending on the structural ties between state and society and their complex web of interdependencies. The more the state intervenes in the different spheres of society, the more it becomes internally complex; its power becomes more fragmented among branches and policy networks. The state depends on various social forces for the success of its projects; state power thus becomes dependent on external forces — the society. Finally, sev-

Abdul Gaffar is a doctoral student in international studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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eral factors determine the state system in a society: geopolitical location, the role of the military in developing a state, and the state’s capacity to enforce collectively binding decisions shaping the character of institutions and social forces.1

Democracy must be understood in this context. Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuss present an interesting analogy: in religion, divine blessings promise the fulfillment of human life, whereas, in its most demanding version, poli- tics treats the individual as the creator of his or her own destiny. It follows that “the sole alternative to the democratic legitimating of power is the theo- cratic one.”2 Democracy starts with replacing a government in power with one selected in a “free, open, and fair election.”3 Election, however, is the mini- mal definition. Democracy also requires limitation on power — an arrange- ment in which decision makers share power with other groups in the society.4

Whereas liberal democracy is more concerned with formal procedures, radical democracy emphasizes collective self- determination. It requires a few qualifications: members must try to accommodate others’ interests; they must agree on some underlying ethical principles; they must honor interpersonal trust; and they must work toward “stability” — members coming together repeatedly to decide on a variety of issues.5 It is relatively easy to democ- ratize state institutions formally, but in order to achieve substantial democ- racy, various aspects of society must be democratized, because state institu- tions can work democratically only if the people and values operating them are embedded in democratic consciousness. This is democratization: it is an ongoing process whereby democratic ideas, values, and practices continue to spread and evolve over time and space.

Democratization might be explained through various models. Democratic citizenship in Western Europe, for instance, has evolved both horizontally and vertically. Historically, social movements played pivotal roles in the

1. Bob Jessop, “Putting States in Their Place: State Systems and State Theory,” in New Develop- ments in Political Science, ed. Adrian Leftwich (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1990), 45. 2. Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, “Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources,” in Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 147. 3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Nor- man: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 9. 4. Ibid., 9 – 10. 5. David Miller, “Democracy’s Domain,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37, no. 3 (2009): 201 – 28.

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democratization of various states and societies. Democracy was expressed as a social demand, emerging from society, particularly in the forms of social movements. Through petitions, demonstrations, meetings, and strikes, social movements have generally accompanied the growth of democracy. The evo- lution is further deepened with electoral politics that supports rival pro- grams and mobilization and expands the rights to speak, communicate, and assemble.6

These experiences underlie this essay’s inquiry into the theoretical impli- cations of the Arab Spring. The essay sheds light on the process of democ- ratization at two levels. First, regarding the Arab Spring, the horizontal and vertical models are not still very clear, but this essay proposes new models: geographical- spatial, temporal, and sectoral. In a geographical- spatial sense, the movements for democratization have spread from Tunisia to Egypt and the region continues to be volatile. In fact, for a more comprehensive under- standing of the Arab Spring, we need to posit it into the broader Afro- Arabic contexts, particularly Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It would lead us to comprehend the temporal dimensions of democratization, which first started in the late 1980s in the region. Sectorally, democracy spreads from one sector of our social existence to the other: from the outside world, it is surprising that despite a fair amount of economic prosperity (compared with other regions such as South Asia), every section of the population partici- pated in the prodemocracy movements of the Arab Spring. Citizens’ exposure to global levels of consumption has also led to exposure to global ideas of democracy and freedom.

Second, we are well acquainted with Western concepts of democracy, but we know very little about Eastern concepts, such as African, Arabic, Indian, and Chinese contributions to democratic theory and institutions. This essay argues for the necessity of further research on the Arabic concepts of state- society relations: to comprehend the social foundations for democracy as well as the nature of authority that commanded loyalty from people over many centuries.

As noted, in Western Europe democratization started both horizontally

6. Charles Tilly, “When Do (and Don’t) Social Movements Promote Democratization?” in Social Movements and Democracy, ed. Pedro Ibarra (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 25 – 30.

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7. Raymond Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory, and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 373 – 95. 8. Steve Hess, “From the Arab Spring to the Chinese Winter: The Institutional Sources of Authori- tarian Vulnerability and Resilience in Egypt, Tunisia, and China,” International Political Science Review 34, no. 3 (2013): 254 – 72.

and vertically. Horizontally it spread through the gradual expansion of rights — civil, political, and social — and from one aspect of social life to the other, for example, from workplace to family. Vertically, democracy spread from elite levels to mass levels over a period of time: freedom of speech, for instance, has led to the growth of the printing press, which ultimately revolu- tionized the broad sociopolitical sphere. In MENA experiences, however, we find rather different methods.

Democratization and MENA: Geographical or Spatial Routes

A prime geographical aspect of the MENA region is its territorial makeup. Elections following territorial boundaries drawn by colonial rulers do not promote democratization. They intensify communal competition; the breakup of the Arab world into many small, weak states made popular movements and intellectuals emphasize pan- Arab unity rather than democratization. They also intensified an insecurity complex among the small states. As Ray- mond Hinnebusch writes, “The Middle East remains a zone of war, with all the deleterious consequences for democratization: over- sized armies, the dissent- intolerant atmosphere of national- security states, and the deterrence of investment that could generate prosperity giving people a stake in peace.”7 Thus, as an antithesis to Jessop, state and society here were not constituted by the same process; rather, the same society was divided into many states.

Still, with the Arab Spring, the idea that authorities could be confronted, despite massive state repression, has spread from one country to others in the region. It heralded a geographical- spatial course toward democratization. News of the Arab Spring, also popularly known as the Jasmine Revolution, spread with “the sudden, unpredicted collapse of seemingly durable autocra- cies in Tunisia and Egypt.”8 It started in a small way, but later shaped the contemporary history of the world.

On 17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, an unknown street vendor

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9. Hess, 254 – 5. 10. Amir Taheri, “The ‘Arab Spring’ Has Toppled Some Despots and Enriched the Arab Politi- cal Vocabulary. But What Are Its Limits and What Should Western Democracies Do to Help It Achieve Its Objectives?” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Commit- tee on American Foreign Policy 33, no. 6 (2011): 273–7. 11. Sophia Dingli, “Is the Failed State Thesis Analytically Useful? The Case of Yemen,” Politics 33, no. 2 (2013): 91 – 100.

in the small Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, triggered a chain of events that not only altered the political trajectory of his home country but also created powerful reverberations across the MENA region. Frustrated with frequent mistreatment at the hands of local officials, Bouazizi set himself on fire. This incident sparked protests across the country so powerful that they quickly destabilized the regime and drove the long- standing autocrat, Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali, from power. As Ben Ali fled to exile, the Tunisian uprising triggered protests in countries across the MENA region, including Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Within months, Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt had also collapsed. The protests in Syria turned into a bloody conflict that drew the attention and involvement of great powers.9

People from a broad section of the population participated in the revolu- tion. It is surprising that the entire regime in the region was engulfed with violence and bloodshed of such magnitude. Countries where authoritarian regimes still manage to survive offered various concessions to forestall fur- ther disruption:

• Increased salaries in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emir- ates (UAE)

• Calls for municipal elections in Saudi Arabia in support of representa- tion for women

• Increased power of the Consultative Committees in Oman and Qatar10

Chaotic internal politics, which has given Yemen a “failed state” status, helped attract massive international aid to countries of the Middle East, mostly from the United States, and it was almost usurped by the elites.

The Arab Spring, starting in February 2011, was led by the youth, who “demanded an overhaul of the current neo- patrimonial political system, and it has given rise to several grassroots organizations.”11 It is true that anti- democratic forces are again trying to establish control in this still volatile

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12. Nouzha Guessous, “Women’s Rights in Muslim Societies: Lessons from the Moroccan Experi- ence,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38, nos. 4 – 5 (2012): 525 – 33. 13. Larbi Sadiki, “Political Liberalization in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Façade Democracy,” Democratiza- tion 9, no. 4 (2002): 122 – 41. 14. Michael J. Totten, “Arab Spring or Islamist Winter?” World Affairs 174, no. 5 (2012): 23 – 42. 15. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York: United Nations, 1979), www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/.

scenario. There is a fear that women’s rights, which have made significant progress confronting patriarchy in Morocco over the past decade, well within the context of Islam, may be reversed after the Arab Spring.12 These con- cerns, however, do not nullify people’s quest for democracy, the impulse to control one’s own destiny.

Democratization and MENA: Temporal and Sectoral Routes

These temporal and sectoral routes seem to criss- cross one another. Under- standing them requires a discussion of the sociopolitical scenario and the expansion of various attributes of democracy in MENA. Tunisia was the first country in the Muslim world to have a liberal constitution, in 1861. Although the constitution was manipulated to suit the dictator ruling from 1987 until 2011 and the political space was strictly controlled by him, the country had a formal competitive party system, albeit one dubbed by critics as a “facade democracy.”13 A recent tourist- based perspective characterized Tunisia as quite liberalized and “Westernized.”14

Saudi Arabia presents a somewhat different picture: it was considered one of the world’s most repressive regimes in 2002. Subsequently, petitions demanded significant political freedom, but at the same time, memoranda from the Islamists demanded the promulgation of strong Islamic laws. The ruling elite came to understand the necessity of broadening political par- ticipation, and municipal elections were announced in 2003 – 4. Islamists condemned the elections even as Saudi Arabia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 2000.15 In 2004 women participated in elections. In this context, the basic tenets of traditional religious ideology, such as Wahhabism, were questioned.

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16. Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Saudi Arabia: Steps toward Democratization or Reconfiguration of Authoritarianism,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 41, nos. 5 – 6 (2006): 459 – 82. 17. Lisa Blaydes and James Lo, “One Man, One Vote, One Time? A Model of Democratization in the Middle East,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 24, no. 1 (2011): 110 – 46.

Tradition plays an important part in Saudi life, especially in the rule of the monarchy.16 Saudi Arabia’s liberal- minded ruler Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1982 – 2005) did not risk initiating large- scale reforms, nor did he undertake massive repressions despite terrorist attacks in the late 1990s, because the royal family has roots in the civil society dominated by tribal clans. As a result, Saudi Arabia represented a “status quo dictatorship.”17 The kingdom, it appears, has been trying to balance between two opposing forces. Thus, many prodemocratization factors are present in Saudi Arabia, in the sense that rulers, thanks to sharp intra- elite divisions and competing networks, were virtually constrained from resorting to large- scale repression.

In Egypt, Anwar Sadat, succeeding the repressive Gamal Abdel Nasser regime, undertook massive information gathering before embarking on politi- cal openings after consolidating his power. Wanting to ensure that Islamists would not dominate civil society, he took steps toward political liberalization with a multiparty system.

Algeria also feared Islamic domination over civil society. After eco- nomic prosperity, a period of hardship came and the ruling National Lib- eration Front divided into two wings: military and bureaucratic. The latter favored political and economic liberalization; civil society opened with full vigor, and within a few months 7,350 associations emerged. The country’s first multiparty election was won by the new Islamic Salvation Front, sup- ported by the petite bourgeoisie and unemployed youth. However, when the new party was on the verge of winning elections, democratic development was halted. Two factors were responsible: the leadership’s failure to protect the process of democratization and the emergence of hardliners within the new group. The public willingness to resist despite much repression was grossly underestimated.

The temporal dimensions are visible here in the sense that democratic practices take time to mature. Sectorally, they spread from one sector to another: liberals demand the expansion of rights, women demand recogni- tion of their status, and civil society groups consolidate whenever democratic

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18. Hinnebusch, 379.

space is available, despite apprehension that it would be dominated by lead- ing religious organizations. Legislation or rule making is another important aspect for the sectoral spread of democratization. Progressive legislation, such as laws or policies promoting the development of prodemocracy values, may start from the ideas of knowledgeable people (who may include those from the ruling elite) or as forms of social demands from social movements. Once codified, they may have spillover effects; prospective beneficiaries may use or demand other forms such as representation, expansion of rights, and freedom of media for realizing those promises.

This leads to an inquiry about the nature of political authority. Hin- nebusch identifies two types of authority in MENA. “Participatory Authori- tarian (PA) regimes in the Middle East were founded on a ‘social contract,’ ” he notes, and such a contract has several features:

• It guarantees social and economic rights rather than demanding acquiescence.

• It is oriented on a nationalist agenda. • It contains bureaucratic party machines with personalized leadership

and distribution patronage for co- opting various groups. • It may include repression and surveillance. • It is characterized by revolution from above that weakened social forces

like the bourgeoisie.

Another authoritarian formation in the area is “rentier monarchy.” In order to thwart military interventions, such entities recruited military leaders from family and tribal groups rather than the middle class. In these and other arrangements, government- led liberalization, which intends to vitalize the economy with private sector capital after the era of PA, encounters problems at the early stages: crony capitalism; lack of confidence by the bourgeoisie, whom the leadership attacked previously; and retreat from welfare provi- sions (leaving gaps that the Islamists fill). In addition, rapid, simultaneous economic liberalization and democratization may be disastrous, as the case of Algeria shows. Ultimately, hard- liners on both sides could outflank the moderates.18

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19. David J. Sarquis, “Democratization after the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt’s Political Transi- tion,” Politics and Policy 40, no. 5 (2012): 871 – 903. 20. Blaydes and Lo, 116.

However, liberalization without democratization did not produce any bet- ter results, as the case of Syria shows. Under a Baath regime it was social- ist in nature — it depended mainly on oil revenues for its resources and was committed to a redistribution of wealth. The oil companies, however, were never viable stand- alone industries capable of generating revenue. Bashar al- Assad’s ascendancy and retention of power was accompanied by severe repression, and massive repression meant investing disproportionately in law and order. Assad also did not promote political liberalization seriously. The transition to a liberal economy left 30 percent unemployed and between 11 and 30 percent below the poverty line.

With decolonization in the region, the previous British and French regimes were replaced by their friendly, pro- West military juntas. The West could shift its conflict of interests to the former colonies. Both Western colonialism and local authoritarianism proved too potent to sustain, however. At pres- ent, Arab demonstrators are fighting against both. After the Second World War, two tendencies emerged in the MENA region: liberal, Western- oriented Arabs and pan- Islamic Arabs aspiring for a caliphate. People were caught between the lure of Western, modern living and its associated threat to iden- tity. Much bloodshed resulted from the struggle of the religious wing and sec- ular but dictatorial authorities. From a distance, Western powers intervened to fish in these troubled waters of their national interests. After the Arab Spring, Egypt inherited a very fragmented society. Although the military did not repress the revolutionaries, it maintained its role in contemporary Egyp- tian politics.19 In the Middle East, civil society did not necessarily repre- sent a force for democratization. Many times, new rulers coming to power by election had tendencies to thwart the ongoing democratic process, rep- resenting the “one man, one vote, one time” syndrome.20 While examining the economic dimension of the Arab Spring, we need to take notice of these features.

The real economic hardships faced by people were apparently the imme- diate cause of the revolt. In this context, we should note that even during this tumultuous period, most of these countries have performed impressively

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21. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, 2015 (New York: UNDP, 2015), hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf. 22. A. Testas, “Political Repression, Democratization, and Civil Conflict in Post- Independence Algeria,” Democratization 9, no. 4 (2002): 106 – 21.

on the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI). Although detailed reports on Iraq and Oman are not available, the data in table 1 reveal that three countries have scored “very high,” seven “high,” three “medium,” and only two “low.”

As seen in table 2, Arab states are among the best human development performers in the developing world. However, countries such Yemen and Sudan performed miserably in this regard.21 Two distinct economic factors are the key to understanding the Arab Spring. First, economic crises inten- sified in this region in quick succession. Lower economic growth prevents many people from earning taxable income; government revenue and thus ser- vices decrease; and young citizens (including many in Algeria) become easy recruits for religious militancy. Algeria’s decline came after comfortable eco- nomic growth.22 Although Ben Ali had regulated democracy in Tunisia with very little space for opposition and massive human rights violations, the coun- try achieved comfortable economic progress for quite some time and at one

Table 1. Human Development Index (HDI), MENA Region

Country Rank Country Rank

Qatar 32 Algeria 83 Saudi Arabia 39 Libya 95 UAE 41 Tunisia 96 Bahrain 45 Egypt 108 Kuwait 48 Palestine 113 Oman 52 Iraq 121 Lebanon 67 Syria 134 Iran 69 Yemen 160 Turkey 72 Sudan 167 Jordan 80

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, 2015 (New York: UNDP, 2015), hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf.

Note: HDI ranking: very high = 1 – 49; high = 50 – 105; medium = 106 – 43; low = 145 – 88.

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23. Sadiki, 130. 24. Sarquis, 874. 25. Sami Zubaida, “Civil Society, Community, and Democracy in the Middle East,” in Civil Soci- ety: History and Possibilities, ed. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (New Delhi: Foundation, 2002), 232.

point was tipped to be the “Mediterranean’s Singapore.”23 The crisis started in the regime with the decrease of oil prices. Egypt was also facing severe economic crises during 2007 – 8, following the global economic crisis. The fraudulent referendum of 2011, in which it approved constitutional changes that resulted in rapid elections dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and the undermining of the liberals, made matters worse.24 Rapid violence in Syria in the aftermath of the Tunis and Cairo revolts, with their accompa- nying blood feud, angered social forces. The quest for democracy thus has spread from asserting social and economic rights to promoting civil and polit- ical rights, from one sector to the other.

Almost every state in the region — monarchical or socialist — had main- tained firm control over various segments of their respective societies. It worked well where the governments were capable of dispersing welfare provi- sions among the mostly impoverished population. Sami Zubaida notes, “The decline of these resources and the ever- expanding commitments with grow- ing populations, rising expectations at all levels, arms expenditure, and mili- tary adventures (such as the two gulf wars) brought to an end this short- lived equilibrium.”25 These factors lead us to concentrate on a second economic

Table 2. Human Development Index, World Regions

Life expectancy Schooling Schooling Region at birth (mean years) (expected years)

OECD (D1) 80.2 11.5 15.8 Non- OECD (D1) 75.1 8.2 13.6 East Asia and the Pacific (D2) 74.0 7.5 12.7 Arab States (D2) 70.6 6.4 12.0 Europe and Central Asia (D2) 72.3 10.0 13.6 Latin America and the Caribbean (D2) 75.0 8.2 14.0 South Asia (D2) 68.4 5.5 11.2 Sub- Saharan Africa (D2) 58.5 5.2 9.6

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2015.

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aspect, massive corruption, which intensified the hardship of people and eroded the authority of undemocratic regimes further. Particularly in Egypt, such anger had been accumulating over quite some time:

Poverty and political impotence have been around for quite some time, yet seldom do they generate the resentment and anger that are provoked when individuals believe these were begotten in illegal or immoral ways. Accu- sations of corruption are not merely economic or financial indictments; they are first and foremost moral criticisms. Allegations of arrogance are not simply political grievances; they are also principled arguments against the misuse of political power.26

The entire MENA region reflects this scenario. Corruption defies the basic norms of civility. Where money circulates well, people have opportunities to augment their income; the mobility of lifestyle may ameliorate the humili- ation arising from asymmetric power relations, where one party must sub- mit to another through no fault of his or her own. As Samuel Huntington pointed out, authoritarian rulers must show economic performance in order to survive.27

Concomitant to this corruption, elaborate security and surveillance mech- anisms were installed.28 They required a disproportionately large slice of public investments, displacing funding for such issues as growing inequality and unemployment and generally accentuating the economic crisis. Democ- racy could have been a much more cost- effective measure for the ruling class; much discontent would have been evaporated by peaceful political expres- sion. Again, if a crisis deepens in democracies representing various social forces, a de facto understanding (consensus) emerges among elites. For example, the liberalization program initiated in India in 1991 in the con- text of severe economic crises was supported virtually by all parties. The more democratic ideas and institutions mature, the better the chances are for such consensus to emerge. However, a new democracy may also achieve

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26. James Toth, “Local Islam Gone Global: The Roots of Religious Militancy in Egypt and Its Transnational Transformation,” in Social Movements: An Anthropological Reader, ed. June Nash (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2004), 118. 27. See Huntington. 28. Mariz Tadros, “Backstage Governance,” IDS Bulletin 43, no. 1 (2012): 62 – 70.

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29. Sadiki, 133. 30. Christian Fuchs, “Behind the News: Social Media, Riots, and Revolutions,” Capital and Class 36, no. 3 (2012): 383 – 91. 31. Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World (New York: Henry Holt and Times Books, 2008), 273.

such outcomes if democratizing forces accommodate various social forces in power- sharing arrangements. At this point, the role of leadership becomes crucial. India, for instance, inherited a highly diverse, fragmented, populous, and poor society at the time of independence, but was also fortunate to have leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, ably supported by Jawaharlal Nehru, B. R. Ambedkar, and Vallabhbhai Patel, to hold the nation together and consoli- date democracy. Soon after independence, MENA countries prioritized social and economic rights at the expense of civil and political rights, although they do not contradict each other in the long run. In Tunisia for instance, govern- ment expenditure on welfare had trebled between 1986 and 1999, based on revenues mostly from exports.29 It might have averted the crisis had civil and political rights been given an equal chance. Democracy, thus, spreads naturally. Such movement might be monitored, and efforts may be made to channelize them along the desired pathways, but they should not be thwarted or impeded — that could become counterproductive for the regime.

In fact, economic prosperity generates consumerism — the impulse to con- sume more and more, in a verity of directions. Access to the Internet also facilitated social networking in the region and played a vital role in its quest for democratization. However, Christian Fuchs correctly cautions us that the role of social media should not be exaggerated. The root causes of the revolts were realities such as authoritarianism, increasing gaps between the rich and poor, increasing poverty and decreasing wages, repression of the political left and trade union activities, high illiteracy, and the contradiction between the values of Islam and that of modernization.30 Still, we cannot altogether dis- miss the supportive role of Internet. In 2006, democracy activists from the Shiite community in Bahrain used Google Earth to document the country’s extreme inequality in land and wealth — mapping where elites controlled huge tracts of land and poor Shiites had to live in “small, dense areas,” a revelation disturbing “for even an avowedly reformist monarchy.”31 During the Arab Spring, popular social media such as Facebook and Twitter were extensively used to organize the movement. When the government suspended

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32. Yusery A. Ezbawy, “The Role of the Youth’s New Protest Movements in the January 25th Revo- lution,” IDS Bulletin 43, no. 1 (2012): 26 – 36. 33. Taheri, 274. 34. Jeffrey Haynes, “Islam and Democracy in East Africa,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 490 – 507. 35. Miller, 225.

Internet and mobile phone services, “Egyptian youth abroad established a group on Facebook that monitored developments inside Egypt and reported them to the world.”32 Much of the international and Arab media depended on these kinds of sites. Social media, to an extent, supplements the role of corporate media in the sense that many seemingly unimportant, informal items are posted, although there are possibilities that it spreads rumors and half- truths as well. The important point here is that there is a spread of ideas through the Internet. Ideas are not only concerned with some normative or ideological positions such a rights and freedom; democratizing ideas are also embedded in daily practices and realities and they expand through the appli- cation of the concepts.

Islamists did not start the Arab Spring, but the continuing violence and near anarchy in MENA does not bode well for the prospects of democracy, and apprehension persists that the Islamic Brotherhood could appropriate the social space created by the democratic movements, launched by people from all sections of the population.33 There are also other varieties of Islam just bordering the MENA regions, such as Sufism.34 And in addition to Arabs, there are other ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, in the region; in addition to Muslims, there are other religious groups, such as Christians and others. The domination of a religious force in this fairly multiethnic region, there- fore, may jeopardize the chances for future democratization, and the warn- ing signals are quite apparent. The experiences of the Arab Spring shed interesting light on state- society relations in MENA. Various state projects, such as welfare and economic and political liberalization, failed to spread across the society convincingly. The rulers generally failed to take the people into their confidence. The establishment of democracy, particularly politi- cal inclusion, during times of prosperity might have averted crises of such magnitude. As a principle of inclusion, “people who live in a country and are routinely subject to its legal system are entitled to be admitted to democratic citizenship.”35

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36. Hinnebusch, 390. 37. Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 90. 38. Ibid., 91.

When prodemocratization forces were at work, antidemocracy forces were still present with equal strength, which happens even in mature democracies. Overall, regional peace protests, economic and political liberalization, and internationalist- minded elites may eventually bring democratization. Options are open for democratization from both above and below.36 We may need to search further for the indigenous routes of democracy as a form of sociopoliti- cal organization in the MENA region to identify the prospects.

Democratization and MENA: Toward Indigenous Roots?

A powerful thesis by Elie Kedourie strongly argues that Islam is an antith- esis to democracy: no representation, no self- government. Obedience must be shown to whomever becomes the king and order is preferred over flexibility. Military coups were part of the history in this region. Surveying the politics of Libya, Sudan, Egypt, and Syria, Kedourie observes the following:

It is obvious that parliamentary government, judicial independence and freedom of speech and assembly are not compatible with a revolutionary struggle designed to turn Arab society, all its institutions, customs, and modes of thought, upside down.37

Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria are countries with heterogeneous populations. One- third of Sudan’s population is Christian or pagan. Civil war is part of the country’s history. After seventeen years of civil war, a peace was negoti- ated between the Christian south and Muslim north, but the dictator, Omar Hassan al- Bashir, fearing for his position, resorted to sharia law in 1983. Civil war ensued and continues to this day. Islam is a potent factor in Sudan, propagating the ideology of togetherness.38

The Christian versus Muslim thesis, however, is too simplistic for the MENA region, as it does not take the democratizing elements of Islam into consideration. As an antithesis, we need to note several, albeit sporadic, indicators:

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39. Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 277. 40. Zubaida, 234. 41. Sarquis, 875. 42. Bryan S. Turner, Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism (London: Allen Unwin, 1986), 16.

• Tunisia had a constitution in 1861, as noted earlier (and was certainly among the first few in the developing world as well).

• Muslim countries like Bangladesh have been practicing democracy over the past two decades.

• Several surveys conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine between 2000 and 2006 found between 84 and 90 percent of respondents to be in favor of democracy. About two- thirds of the total respondents in Jordan and Palestine disagreed that Islam is incompat- ible with democracy. About half the respondents favored secular author- ity; another half favored the influence of religion in government.39

• Invoking the “example of the Prophet in Medina,” it was decided that in the relationship between new Muslims and existing non- Islamic commu- nities, tribes, and religions of Medina each community would follow its own laws and customs; matters of common interest would be specified.40 Thus, the basic idea of multiculturalism was ingrained here.

• In Islamic political philosophy, concepts like shura (consultation) and ijma (consensus) have been present since the days when the Prophet ruled the city of the Medina.41

• While examining the origins of citizenship, Bryan S. Turner finds ele- ments of egalitarianism existing in Islam; religion was seen to “bind” people with “God” and community.42

Traditional Western scholarship is comfortable looking at the East in terms of literature, music, architecture, and history. But these are not the only compo- nents of human civilization. Human relations with power is an integral part. We need to understand how ancient Arabic thought conceptualized power relations among state, society, and individuals.

We know much about the Western notions of democracy, but very little about the contribution of Eastern societies to democratic theory, although they are much older civilizations than those of the West. In Eastern civili-

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zations we do not find documentary evidence. This leads us to two types of hypotheses.

First, perhaps democracy never existed in the Eastern civilizations, even though power struggles and oppression are features of any society. It seems logical that when tyranny reaches a crescendo, protest occurs and leads to adjustment in existing power relations. Hobbesian order is, at most, a tem- porary phase in the history of any society. It cannot be sustained for long, and at the same time, religion alone cannot command loyalty if it offers no incentives.

With the expansion of umma or community in MENA, the political orga- nization became much more complex, and undemocratic features devel- oped. Western- style democracy, again, cannot simply be transposed onto the Middle East. Its concepts attack institutions like family as inimical to democracy, thus interfering with the core of their existence. It can encour- age the emergence of ethnoreligious cleavages, which make the “national” ideal somewhat elusive. Such concepts are often associated with a neoliberal, globalized economy that has painful consequences for people in these coun- tries, particularly poverty and unemployment.43 Such limitations of Western notions are found in Yemen as well. Tribalism is a word used indiscrimi- nately by Western bureaucracies, but it does not capture the full complexi- ties and flexibilities of the system. Tribes, in the community, perform many locally relevant development functions. The leadership is also heavily armed, and thus definitely controls the agenda in local politics.44 Community plays an important part in the life of MENA people, as in many parts of Eastern civilizations. These nuances of state- society relations need to be taken into consideration, because various threads of democratic ideas, values, and prac- tices are embedded in such relations.

This leads us to the second hypothesis: the experiences of these civiliza- tions are not well documented, as in Europe, where adjustments to power relations vis- à- vis conflict are recorded in documents like Magna Carta in premodern England. We need to study the Arabian version of democracy: its ideas on justice, authority, and political obligation — the ways authority

43. Ibid., 880. 44. Dingli, 93.

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has been able to command loyalty from the subject population since ancient times. The task is twofold: refering to existing literature like the One Thou- sand and One Arabian Nights and then evolving appropriate methodologies to establish their credibility, so that they can meet the standard of rationality convincingly.

Finally, as an agenda for democratization in the MENA region, two recom- mendations are pertinent. First, taxation should be made obligatory, regard- less of how resourceful a particular state is. Taxation defines an individual as a citizen member of a sociopolitical community. Taxation also strengthens their normative claims of being the rights- bearing member of the state.

Second, any new regime requires time to settle down, even while the pressure of popular aspirations is tremendous. At this time, it is a great challenge for the new leadership to strike the fine balance between democracy and gover- nance. Democracy is required to convince people that they are included in shaping the destiny of the country. Governance, or efficient administration, is also necessary simultaneously — in order to implement the decisions and policies that are required to keep the old entrenched social forces and vested interests that may jeopardize the transition in check.

Conclusion

This essay is concerned with the spillover effects of democratization. It began by categorizing the experiences of democratization in the Western world as spreading horizontally and vertically. In light of the Arab Spring, one finds that democratization has similarly spread through geographical and sectoral routes in MENA countries.

Overall, democracy does not spread smoothly. It mostly spreads incremen- tally — it might occur in one sector and take time to spread to others. And the spreading effects may not always be instantly visible. It continuously encoun- ters antidemocratic forces, values, ideas, and maneuvers. Deepening democ- racy is generally a cumulative effect: diverse stakeholders address their own issues simultaneously. Having a minimal base is also necessary: there are many instances across the developing world where particular attributes of democracy, such as rights or empowerment, have been concretely shaped

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under unforeseen, new social circumstances. Access to the Internet and other media — the attributes of consumerism — often draws our attention to various instances of prevailing oppression and deprivation. It even stirs the passion of change among communities that may be conservative, but it is certainly neither inhuman nor dehumanized.

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DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ARAB SPRING AND ITS AFTERMATH

Kunihiko Imai and Associate Professor o f Political Science Elmira College

Aysegul Keskin Zeren Adjunct Professor Mendoza College o f Business

University of Notre Dame

Kunihiko Imai is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Elmira College, Elmira, New York. Building upon his experiences in Russia, Poland, and Japan, he writes on issues in both comparative politics and international relations. His articles have appeared in scholarly books, as well as professional journals such as Comparative Strategy: An InternationalJournal, InternationalJournal on World Peace, International Interactions, International Relations and Diplomacy, and The Journal of Politics.

Aysegul Keskin Zeren is an adjunct faculty at the Mendoza College of Business, the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana. She has taught at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame and at the Center for Applied Conflict Management at Kent State University. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from Kent State University and an M.A. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from Sabanci University. She has published articles in Mediterranean Politics, Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace and Peace Policy.

This article seeks to uncover the idiosyncrasies of democracy and democratization in the Middle East. Based on the existing literature, it utilizes variables such as internationalization o f national economies, Islam, Arab culture, subordination o f women, economic development, education, elites’ efforts at maintaining control, oil, and political institutions in its empirical investigation. This article also analyzes the new trends of democracy in the region that began with the Arab Spring in December 2010 and questions how this recent wave o f popular uprisings in the Middle East and its aftermath can contribute to the understanding of democracy and democratization in the region.

INTRODUCTION

Why does the Middle East lag behind the global trend of democratization? This has been the central question that scholars and policy analysts working on the Middle East have had to tackle for decades. The so-called third wave of democratization that began in 1970s doubled the number of democracies in the world by the 1990s. It spread all around Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, as well as Southern, Eastern, and Central Europe. However, the Middle East was left out of this trend.

Because authoritarianism has per sisted in the region, scholars have

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DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

spilled considerable ink on the question of why the Middle East has remained stubbornly resistant to democracy. Despite the lack of satisfactory explanations, a huge body of scholarship has developed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney (2005, 3) outlines how the literature on democratization can be evaluated under two main categories: “ …the ‘prerequisites’ school, whose arguments posit economic, cultural, or institutional necessities for transitions from authoritarianism to begin; and the ‘transitions’ paradigm, which sees democratization as a contingent choice of regime and opposi tion actors that can occur under a variety of socioeconomic and cultural

B ecause a u th o r ita r ia n is m

has p e rs is te d in th e M id d le E ast, sch o la rs h a ve sp illed c o n s id e ra b le in k on th e q u e s tio n o f w h y it has re m a in e d s tu b b o rn ly re s is ta n t to d e m o c ra c y .

conditions.” Since 2011 the Arab World has experienced various changes. On

December 17,2010, the young fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set him self on fire to protest police harassment in the town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. As the fire of protest swept through the Middle East and North Africa, some of the authoritarian regimes in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen were ousted. The uprisings generated some forms of repression and/or civil war in Syria and Bahrain; they also led to limited reforms in

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Jordan. It is still too early to predict whether or not these transitions will lead to democratization in the region, but it is a critical time to understand the impact of the 2011 uprisings on the democracies of the Middle Eastern states.

We start this inquiry to understand the idiosyncrasies of the region and the changes in the region’s democracy after the 2011 Arab upris ings. Since the effects of these uprisings were divergent across the Middle Eastern countries, this study does not propose specific conclusions for the individual countries. This paper begins with the review of the litera ture on the authoritarian persistence in the region, and then, outlines the conceptualization of democracy and explains the methodological details. Finally, it presents the empirical findings and their analysis in the last two sections.

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LITERATURE ON THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

There have been various efforts to explain the reasons behind the democracy deficit and authoritarian persistence in the Middle East, but the current scholarship has not yet provided a simple, satisfactory explanation. This section provides a review of the existing literature on the democracy deficit in the Middle East, and questions the validity of the arguments found in the existing literature, in light of the 2011 uprisings.

In the late 1950s, the study of democracy was dominated by moderniza tion theory and its socio-economic explanations. Lipset’s (1959) seminal piece on “requisites” of democracy was the first empirical work that cor related socio-economic development and democracy. In 1960, Rostow built on Lipset’s economic development variable and theorized the necessary steps that a country must follow in order to reach to the “preconditions” that allowed economic “take-off’ and therefore, political development. As Hinnebusch (2006, 374) summarized, “ …high-income countries were most likely to be democratic and that rising literacy, urbanization and non-agricultural employment.. .were associated with an increased propen sity to political participation…” Following Rostow, other scholars such as Almond and Coleman (1960), Apter (1965), and Huntington (2006) continued to support the main assumption that the socio-economic indi cators were the key preconditions of political and economic modernity. Modernization theory, however, has been criticized for simplifying a very complex phenomenon, and being methodologically flawed. The existence of democratic regimes with low levels of modernization, such as India, as well as authoritarian regimes with high levels of modernity, such as European fascist and communist regimes, led scholars to question the threshold of modernization required for democracy, and for the end of authoritarian ism (Hinnebusch 2006). Modernization theory also failed to explain the democracy deficit of high-income, oil-rich Middle Eastern countries (Ibid, 375; Bolme 2015).

Modernization theory failed to explain the democracy deficit of high-income, oil-rich Middle Eastern countries.

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A new vein of scholarship emerged to explain the region’s democracy deficit by rentier-state theory (Luciani 1987). According to this theory, rentier states rely on revenue from external sources, rather than domestic sources such as production, and taxation (Brynen et al. 2012; Tilly 1992). As the states depend on oil exports or other sources of rent instead of taxes, the state bureaucracy strengthens (Huntington 1991). States begin to dis tribute rentier revenues in the form of jobs and welfare benefits. Citizens who are not being required to pay taxes become highly dependent on the state for their livelihoods; they neither get mobilized to demand representa tion nor place pressure on the government for their demands (Hinnebusch 2006). States remain immune from accountability (Ibid; Anderson 1995).

In a nutshell, the main assumption is that rents both promote and protect authoritarianism (Anderson 1995; Hinnebusch 2006; Bolme 2015). However, this theory did not explain the endurance of authoritarianism in resource-poor countries of the region such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and Jordan (Perlini 2015).

As Brynen et al. (2012) reviewed, by the new century, the rentier-state theory lost its popularity among most of the Middle East scholars; after sur veying the literature on the Middle East, they outlined three critical counter-arguments to rentier-state

theory. First, the limits of liberalism and the resistance of authoritarianism in oil exporter Middle Eastern countries were not uniform; the nature of authoritarianism and the levels of political opposition varied in rent-depen dent countries of the region such as Libya, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The 2011 uprising and the increasing political opposition fortified this criticism. Second, the link between taxation and representation may not have been as clear as the rentier-state theory predicted because, during the bust years, private sector actors did gain political voice in some Middle Eastern countries. Third, the so-called unique characteristics of rentier

R e n tie r th e o ry says th a t as s ta te s d e p e n d on oil e x p o rts or o th e r so urces o f re n t in s te a d o f ta x e s , th e s ta te b u re a u c ra c y s tre n g th e n s an d c itize n s b e c o m e h ig h ly d e p e n d e n t. H o w e v e r , th is d id n o t e x p la in th e e n d u ra n c e of a u th o r ita r ia n is m in reso u rce p o o r c o u n trie s o f th e reg io n such as E g y p t, M o ro c c o , T u n is ia , S y r ia , an d J o rd a n .

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states, “such as having [a] bloated state sector and weak state capacities,” may apply to all developing countries.

The lack of modernity and the reliance on rents were not the only attempted explanations for the democracy deficit. In the 1980s and the 1990s, it was common among scholars to put blame on Islam and Arab cul tures. The transitions following the collapse of the Soviet Union bolstered the democratization literature and reinstituted Islam as the main roadblock of democratization in the Middle East. The most prominent work of this kind was Huntington’s The Third Wave of Democratization. While reaf firming the importance of socio-economic indicators, Huntington (1993b, 307-308) argued that “whatever the compatibility of Islam and democracy in theory, in practice they have not gone together.” Raphael Patai’s The Arab Mind, first published in 1973, and Elie Kedourie’s Democracy and Arab Political Culture, published ____________________________ in 1992, were the first examples of this essentialist approach that simply concluded, “The idea of democracy is alien to the mindset of Islam.”1 Several qualitative and quantitative studies (Fish 2002; Donno & Russett 2004) also concluded that Islam is not com patible with democracy, despite their studies’ limitations, including logical and epistemological flaws. (Anderson 1995)

Several qualitative and quantitative studies concluded that Islam is not compatible with democracy, despite their studies’ limitations, including logical and epistemological flaws.

Other scholars, however, provided sophisticated critiques to these essentialist claims, arguing that culture is changeable, and overgeneraliza tions are misinformed; they tended to focus on understanding the political context in an attempt to explain political culture (Ajami 1992; Fickelman & Piscatori 2004; Hudson 1977 & 1995). Many critiques asserted that relat ing authoritarianism to Islam stems from orientalist bias and that Western study of the Middle East has been characterized by the romanticization and radicalization of “the other” (Said 1994; Bolme 2015). Beilin (2004, 141) pointed out “Catholicism and Confucianism have…been accused of incompatibility with democracy, yet these cultural endowments have not prevented countries in Latin America, southern Europe, and East Asia

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from democratizing.” Further, the culturalists’ view cannot explain the persistence of democracy in Muslim-majority countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.

Some scholars shifted their attention from Islam to Arab culture. Stepan and Robertson’s (2003, 33) empirical study on political performance of Muslim countries concluded, “A non-Arab Muslim-majority country was almost 20 times more likely to be ‘electorally competitive’ than an Arab Muslim-majority country.” Hirsham Sharabi’s (1988) neo-patrimonialism has been vital to understand the Arab culture and democracy deficit con nection; he argued when the modernization process makes the country dependent on the West, an inherited patriarchal culture that blends the state and the family gets encouraged. Many have used neo-patrimonialism

tarianism in the region have treated culture and religion as prerequisites to democracy, and have tried to prove that there is something wrong with the Arab culture (Bolme 2015). The most vocal critic of this approach, Lisa Anderson (1995, 90) warned, “Political culture analysis can be very seductive, particularly to policy-makers looking for short, neat explanations of the complexities they face… If we are not careful to specify its context and limits, we not only risk analytical confusion, we set the stage for sloppy, self-indulgent, or even damaging prescription.”

The permeability of authoritarianism in the Middle East has further been explained through the role of external powers and domestic conflicts. Analysis of U.S. policies has been very instrumental in explaining the lack of democracy. The U.S. has initiated several policies to promote and sup port democratization in the Middle East to foster free and fair elections, reform state institutions, and support civil society (Bolme 2015, 22). However, these efforts did not end authoritarianism in the region for several

The permeability of authoritarianism in the Middle East has further been explained through the role of external powers and domestic conflicts.

to explain the lack of necessary skills and requirements that lead to associa- tional and institutional group forma tions (Bill & Springborg 1990), and ultimately, the lack of an active civil society in the Middle East (Barakat 1993). Studies that put political culture on the center stage when explaining the endurance of authori-

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interconnected reasons. First, as Heydemann (2002,104) elucidated, U.S. policy favored stability and economic reform over political reform. Second, the U.S. concentrated on so-called democratization only when its security was at stake.2 Beilin (2004, 149) described that the authoritarian regimes maintained their relationship with the West, and continued to remain in power through protecting the US interests in the region, namely access to oil, containment of Islamic threat, and the security of Israel. Since the energy sources and security issues were critical for the U.S., this inter national patron-client relationship did not make authoritarian regimes vulnerable to external pressure (Levitsky & Way 2010, 361). However, the Arab uprisings complicated this relationship. On the one hand, the U.S. put pressure on some friendly regimes and a few of them achieved some degree of improvement in civil rights and allowed political participa tion (Dalacoura 2005) On the other hand, the U.S. did not decrease its support for the second largest recipient of U.S. bilateral aid, the Mubarak regime of Egypt (Brynen et al. 2012). Lastly, the democrati zation process, under the control of the West, prioritized elections over the other dimensions of democracy such as civil liberties (Bolme 2015). Elections have been used as a vital tool to uphold the system in the Middle East. They were not fair or free; opposition groups were allowed to compete in elections, as long as they did not risk the safety of authoritarian governments. Despite the inability of elections in promoting democracy in the region, they were very informa tive in terms of understanding the political trends, rulers, and opposition dynamics (Brownlee 2007).

Other than the external pressures and elections, the robust and politi cally tenacious coercive apparatus of Arab authoritarian regimes has been utilized to explain the democracy deficit. Beilin (2004, 143) explained, “Democratic transition can be carried out successfully only when the state’s coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it. Where that coer cive apparatus remains intact and opposed to political reform, democratic

Other than the external pressures and elections, the robust and politically tenacious coercive apparatus of Arab authoritarian regimes has been utilized to explain the democracy deficit.

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transition will not occur.” Hence, the ruling elites of the authoritarian regimes tried their best to keep their security apparatus strong and loyal. Ruling elites used their resources and rents to distribute patronage; they also used both internal and external conflicts as excuses to increase their military capabilities (Ibid, 157). While the 2011 uprisings complicated the capacity of military feature of Beilin’s analysis, they strengthened the will of military argument. For instance, the militaries of Tunisia and Egypt lacked the will to crush democratic uprisings (Brynen et al. 2012). Although “Bahrain’s and Egypt’s defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP are similar,” during the 2011 uprisings, Bahrain’s armed forces chose to suppress protestors, whereas the Egyptian army did not (Ibid, 264).

Even though democratization still seems distant in the Middle East context, the 2011 uprisings complicated the existing explanations of the democracy deficit in the Middle East. As Bryen et al. (2012,290) summa rized, “institutional and cultural strategies failed to protect many regimes

from the popular uprisings that swept across the Arab world, start ing in December, 2010.” Managed elections, rents, political culture variables, neo-patrimonial strategies of co-optation, and the power of coercive agencies could not prevent the collective action against state. The academic com m unity and

experts missed this upsurge, but cannot afford to miss the opportunity to provide sophisticated, “multi-causal,” and “multilevel” explanations of the endurance of Arab authoritarianism, and of the consequences of the 2011 uprisings for democratization in the region (Ibid, 288).

As the 2011 uprisings obscure the existing literature, the need for a paradigm shift in the studies of authoritarian persistence is more pressing than ever. Thus, this study aims to not only explain the idiosyncrasies of democracy in the Middle East, but also to empirically test the role of the Arab uprisings in understanding the predicaments of democracy. The next sections answer how democracy is operationalized in this study, along with its determinants, and provides insights with regard to methodology and econometric measurements.

As the 2011 uprisings obscure the existing literature, the need for a paradigm shift in the studies of authoritarian persistence is more pressing than ever.

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CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

One of the challenges in the empirical study of democracy and democra tization is the operationalization of “democracy.” Despite various efforts made by scholars to measure the concept, a universally-accepted index of democracy has not emerged. The most fundamental problem with measuring democracy is the lack of consensus on what democracy means. Democracy is generally understood as rule by the people. Although this notion of the concept seems to be universally accepted, it does not render itself to any exact measurement because what constitutes rule by the people is debatable. Thus, further specifications are required. Beyond this basic, common notion, however, there is no consensus.

Most scholars rely on either a “thin” or “thick” conception of democ racy.3 On the thin side, democracy is defined as a system “for arriving at political decisions in which individ- uals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”4 At the minimal level, if a people can choose and replace their leaders in regular, free, and fair elections, there is an elec toral democracy. Electoral democ racies, however, vary enormously in their quality. The existence of regular and competitive elections does not ensure high levels of freedom, equality, transparency, social justice, or other values that are generally considered to be essential in a democracy

Although the notion that democracy is rule by people seems to be universally accepted, it does not render itself to any exact measurement because what constitutes rule by the people is debatable.

(Diamond 1999). Only when these substantial measures exist can we call a system a liberal democracy. Thus, on the thick side, a system is not a democracy unless it also ensures a range of attributes such as substantial individual freedoms. “When a democracy meets all the institutional attri butes of liberal democracy, it also satisfies ‘thick’ conceptions of what a democracy should be” (Ibid, 10-13). These two conceptions—electoral, as opposed to liberal, democracy—are distinct, and thus, require separate indices. Furthermore, in order to have a deeper understanding of democ racy, it is crucially important to utilize both conceptions of democracy.

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Most empirical studies of democracy use either the Polity IV or Freedom House scores to measure democracy. The strength of Polity is the clarity of its measurement criteria. Although it has strengths such as clear and detailed coding rules, it is limited as an index because of its minimalist definition of the concept of democracy, omission of participation, and an inappropriate aggregation procedure. These shortcomings make it unfit to capture the concept of liberal democracy (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Particularly problematic is its exclusive focus on the aspects of electoral democracy, with no attention to the liberal aspects of democracy. With the possible exception of freedom of organization, it pays no heed to political freedom (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). Therefore, Polity’s primary weakness is at the concep tual level. If measuring the electoral aspect of democracy is the primary interest, Polity IV would be the choice. As Plattner (2002, 9) emphasized however, democracies often refer to “genuinely liberal democracies that protect the rights of their citizens and adhere to the rule of law, and not merely electoral democracies that are deficient in these aspects [even though they may choose their leaders through competitive elections].” Polity IV, therefore, could hardly cover all aspects of democracy.

The strength of the Freedom House data set, on the other hand, is its construct validity. It covers essentially the entire range of basic democratic criteria. Particularly important is the fact that it is the closest measure of the concept of liberal democracy, whereas hardly any of the other extant indices cover that aspect of democracy. Based on their definition of liberal democracy, which is focused on the degree to which a political system allows democratic rule and political liberties, Bollen and Paxton (2000) argued that, of all the subjective measures, the Freedom House ratings are the most conceptually similar to the definition of democracy, adding that other recent subjective indices do not meet the necessary criteria for accurately measuring the concept. Despite its strength, however, Freedom House has a methodological weakness due to the inadequate transparency of its coding system. Outsiders cannot replicate the process. As a result, it is hard to conclude with confidence that Freedom House is necessarily a better all-around index of democracy than Polity; only that it is a better index for liberal democracy.5

Based on these previous findings, this study adopts Polity as the best measure of the “electoral” democracy, and the Freedom House data set

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as the best indicator for analyzing the impacts of variables on the “liberal” democracy.6

DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY

Internationalization of national economies

Many scholars believe that increased internationalization of national econo mies has weakened the individual states’ control over their societies; thus, this economic globalization promotes civil liberties and, eventually, democ racy through socioeconomic development (Bhagwati 1994; Bollen 1979 & 1983; Bollen & Jackman 1985; Cutright 1963; Cutright & Wiley 1969; Hannan & Carroll 1981; Jackman ^ 1973; Lipset 1959; Schwartzman 1998; Thomas et al. 1997). Some scholars argue that increasing eco nomic integration among nations has dramatically reduced the bar riers between national economies, underm ining the autonomy of national governments and their political control over their societ ies (Bryant 1994; Ohmae 1993; Rodrick 1997; Slaughter 1997; Thomas & Wiley 1997). As the flows of capital and information become too great and sudden for any state to control, and as various transnational and international actors such as multinational corporations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supersede die states’ autonomy, globalization erodes their authority.

This, of course, may not mean that economic globalization automati cally weakens all states’ ability to control their own society. Some “national economies retain a considerable degree of isolation from each other, and [their] national policymakers enjoy more autonomy than is assumed by most recent writings on the erosion of national sovereignty” (Rodrik 1997,21). Moreover, the same degree of integration into the global economic system

As the flows of capital and information become too great for any state to control, and as various transnational and international actors such as multinational corporations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supersede the states’ autonomy, globalization erodes their authority.

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may have a different effect on industrialized countries than on developing countries. The governments of developed countries may possess greater control over their capital than those of less developed countries (LDCs), and hence are better able to deal with the impact of global economic changes than their counterparts in LDCs. Thus, the different levels of national income among countries need to be taken into considerations.

It is also true that “a gain in power by non-state actors does not neces sarily translate into a loss of power for the state” (Slaughter 1997, 184). The extent of the impact of globalization may vary greatly between states, depending on their economic capabilities as well as the extent of the inter nationalization of their national economies.

The concept of the internationalization of national economies as one of the determinants of democracy is captured by using several economic indi cators: Net Trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).7 In addition, the KOF Index of Globalization, published by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, is included in this study. It is an indicator tiiat measures the three main dimensions of globalization; 1) economic, 2) social, and 3) political. It represents an overall level of globalization by aggregating the scores on the three dimensions, and is one of the most comprehensive indicators of globalization available today. It is an excellent representation of states’ overall levels of globalization and, therefore, serves as an ideal complement to the other indicators that represent more specific aspects of the internationalization of national economies.

As explained above, the different levels of national income need to be taken into considerations as well. They are captured by Level of National Income,8 Further, depending on the extent to which the wealth generated by the increased internationalization of particular national economies is shared by the general public, levels of national income may have either a positive or negative impact on the levels of democracy. Therefore, GINI Index is used to control for the income inequality among the population.9

Islam

Some scholars reject the claim regarding the universal effect of economic globalization on politics. They contend that the unique political culture of some nations attenuates the effects of globalization, thus leaving the states’

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control over their citizenry strong (Brown & Jones 1995; Huntington 1991 & 1993a; Jones 1995; Kausikan 1993; Tarnney 1991; Zakaria 1994). Others, however, reject such claims (Dupont 1996; Fukuyama 1989 & 1995; Haggard 1990; Imai 2006 & 2010; Scalapino 1989; Tai 1993). As Fukuyama (1995,25) points out, for instance, empirical evidence of a causal link between the lack of democratization and Confucian political culture is missing. Various economic and political indices show that many of the Islamic states are less modernized and less democratized than the rest of the world (Hunter & Malik 2005). They do not, however, provide any proof that Islam per se negatively affects democracy. In fact, as explained before, the existing literature provides various alternative explanations to such an account based solely on cultural uniqueness. Moreover, many observers of Islam see no inherent or essential aspect of Islam that would make it incompatible with democracy (Ahmad 2003; Ayoob 2005; Diamond 2008; Esposito 1998; Hunter & Malik 2005; Voll 2005).

An all-encompassing, cultur ally deterministic view is therefore faced with the contradictory evidence of empirical studies. To this date, no research has found any evidence of a systematic association between culture and democracy.10 Diamond (2008, 315) concluded that “there is no intrinsic economic, cultural, or religious obstacle to democracy.” Thus, based on such overwhelming evidence, this study excludes culture from its list of possible determinants of democracy.

One exception to this decision is Islam. It has been argued to have the largest (among all the religious categories) influence on a state’s regime type (Barro 1999). Although the causal link between democracy and Islam has been disputed, there is an important reason to include ‘Islam’ in this empirical analysis. “Many states with great mineral wealth also have large Muslim populations, not only in the Middle East but also in parts of Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei) and Africa (Nigeria)” (Ross 2001, 339). Therefore, to separate the impact of historical—including religious—factors from that of resource/oil wealth, for instance, it is important to use Islam as a control variable.11

Many observers of Islam see no inherent or essential aspect of Islam that would make it incompatible with democracy.

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Arab Culture

In order to test the afore-mentioned “Arab culture” hypothesis, we use a dummy variable, Arab State. If the hypothesis is correct, Arab State should prove statistically significant even after it is controlled for the effects of all the other independent variables included in this study.

Economic Development

Among the developing countries, their level of economic development is generally believed to be one of the, if not the most, important explana tory variables of democracy and democratic transition (Diamond 1992; Foweraker & Landman 2004; Gasirowski 1995; Inglehart 1997; Lipset 1959 & 1994). Many scholars have examined the causal relationship between economic development and democracy and have found a consis tently strong, positive relationship between them (Bhagwati 1994; Boix & Stokes 2003; Bollen 1979 & 1983; Bollen & Jackman 1985; Cutright 1963; Cutright & Wiley 1969; Hannan &carroll 1981; Imai2010; Jackman 1973; Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Schwartzman 1998; Thomas et al. 1997). Although some scholars (Booth & Seligson 1993; Evans 1979; Huntington & Nelson 1976; Milner & Kubota 2001; O ’Donnell 1973) have questioned some of the arguments over this causal link, the basic premise that economic development generates a greater likelihood of democracy, and that “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1960, 31) has never been refuted. As Fukuyama (1989, 11) argued, “political liberalism has been following economic liberalism . . . with seeming inevitability.”

Lipset (1959, 85) argued that “economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in overall wealth of the society” is a requisite for democracy. Lerner (1968) argued that political liberalization results from urbanization because urbanization stimulates education, which in turn promotes media liberal ization and thus, democratic development. Vanhanen (1997) argued that advanced literacy and education rates ultimately lead to enhanced resource distribution, paving the way for democratic reforms. Thus, in this study, economic development is captured by using several indicators: a) GDP Per Capita,12 representing the overall wealth of the society, b) Urbanization,13

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and c) Education, 14 Education is measured by using the literacy rate among the adult population, ages 15 and above.15

Elites’ efforts at maintaining control

When democracy fails to develop in a state or a new democracy fails, it is often because of bad governance. Ruling elites do not naturally seek to restrain their own power and submit to the discipline of transparent laws and institutions. Rather, they seek to corner and monopolize power. Once their rule is established, elites use their power “to restrict economic competition so as to generate “rents” that benefit the small minority of ruling elites over the broad bulk of the society,” (Diamond 2008, 296) thus maintaining the existing political order. This manipulation of resources for social control is called “rent-seeking,” which has the rentier effect to “relieve social pressures that might otherwise lead to demands for greater accountability” (Ross 2001, 332).

The rentier effect can be measured by two indicators o f Gov’t Consumption Exp. (government consumption expenditure) and Gov’t Activities (government activities as a proportion of GDP). Ruling elites attempt to maintain their control over society by keeping some of their powerful clients—especially big businesses, as well as the general public— content with the status quo. They try to achieve this goal by providing all sorts of social programs to improve, or at least maintain, the quality of life for the target population. When the businesses and the citizens are generally content with the status quo, they put less pressure on the regime to make changes in the political and economic life of the country, and the democratization of the society may be delayed. This provision of Gov’t Consumption Exp. (measured as a percentage of GDP) on all social programs, including wages and salaries for state employees, is used to account for the countervailing effect of ruling elites’ effort to minimize the liberalizing effect of the internationalization of national economies and economic development.

The other component of the rentier effect might be called the “preven tion of social group formation.” The government can use its resources and activities to “prevent the formation of social groups that are independent from the state and hence may be inclined to demand political rights” (Ibid,

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334). As governments increase in size (relative to the overall domestic economy), they become more capable of preventing the formation of civil institutions and social groups that are independent from the government, and the absence of these groups will hinder a transition to democracy (Ross 2001). This component of the rentier effect is captured by the share of the GDP accounted for by Gov’t Activities.16

Furthermore, as mentioned above in our literature review, some scholars emphasize the importance of the state’s coercive apparatus, namely the mili tary, to explain the democracy deficit in the Middle East. Therefore, Military Expenditure, as percentage of GDP, is also used as a control variable.

Oil/Resource Wealth

The success of the ruling elites’ effort to control the masses and impede democracy depends on the availability of resources with which they can co-opt the important segments of the population. The findings of some studies suggest that “a state’s reliance on either oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic” and this reliance on oil/resource wealth is not limited to any particular geographical area of the world (Ibid, 236). In order to account for this “oil-impedes-democracy” claim (Ross 2001), therefore, an additional variable, Oil, is included in this study. “It measures the export value of mineral-based fuels (petroleum, natural gas, and coal), as fractions of GDP.”17

Quality o f Political Institutions

Our hypothesis is that the quality of political institutions is one of the important ingredients of democracy. It will be tested by using two indices of Rule of Law and Corruption. Rule of Law is measured by using one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), “Rule of Law,” which is published annually by the World Bank. This index reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents, such as the elites, have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Corruption is measured by using the “Corruption Perception Index” (CPI) published annually by the Transparency International. WGI also contains the “Control of Corruption”

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scores, but, since it is based on the CPI data, this study goes straight to the source, CPI, to measure the concept.

Middle Eastern States

Although it is not a determinant of democracy in the strictest sense, Middle Eastern States is included in this study as one of the explanatory variables to capture the difference between the Middle Eastern states and the rest of the world in terms of their levels of democracy. It is measured by using a dummy variable, representing the Middle Eastern states.18

The Arab Spring

We are also seeking to detect any change in terms of the levels of democracy among the Middle Eastern countries since the 2011 Arab uprisings. For this purpose, we use a dummy variable, Arab Spring, giving the value of 1 for all the years after 2011.

ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS

Because the data on the KOFIndex is available only from 2000, the period of this study is limited to 2000 through 2014. All independent and control variables are lagged by four years. The lag renders more confidence that the causal link between the independent and dependent variables flows in the right direction. The four-year lag also helps with analyzing factors that have an enduring impact on democracy.19 The Generalized Least-Squares method is used, with pooled time-series, and cross-national data on 116 countries.20 The choice of countries is based on the size of their population (greater than 100,000) and the availability of data.

The two measures of “political freedom” and “civil liberties” of the Freedom House data set are combined and the resulting scale is converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Following Londregan and Poole, the two 0-10 interval scale variables, “DEMOC” and “AUTOC,” of Polity IV data set are com bined into a single indicator by subtracting the autocracy measure from the democracy measure and by re-scaling the resulting -10-10 scale as a 0-10 scale (Londregan & Poole 1996). The original values for Freedom House scores are inverted so that both Freedom House and Polity vary between 0 (“least democratic”) and 10 (“most democratic”).

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Statistical controls

Pooled time-series models require special statistical considerations. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, for example, is not automatically applicable to pooled time-series analyses because it ignores the pooled structure of the data. OLS treats each case/observation as independent of all others, not as part of a set of related observations. However, when systematic relationships among cases exist, regression analysis’ applicability remains questionable unless statistical controls are introduced.

Two particular violations are likely to accompany pooled data. First, the cases may not be independent along the time dimension within units, in which case autocorrelation would bias the statistical findings. Second, a form of heteroscedasticity is likely to be present in pooled data. For a variety of reasons, some units (i.e., states) are more variable than others at all times. For example, some states may show a wider range of variations in the value of some of the variables than other states.

Many of the independent variables included in the model— Trade, EDI, Gov’t Consumption Exp., Gov’t Activities, and Oil—are divided by GDP. Thus, their values are standardized across countries and time, mini mizing autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems. Any variations in these independent variables would be independent of systemic, time-serial biases. The heteroscedasticity bias for the other variables is minimized by conducting their log-transformation. Their possible autocorrelational bias is minimized by introducing a set of 14 dummy variables for years (2000 through 2014, less one) and a lagged dependent variable in the model. Moreover, to deal with these potential problems effectively, the Generalized Least Square regression is used.

Including the lagged dependent variable, Democracy(t 4), in the model serves several purposes. First, it helps capture any (historical, cultural, or otherwise) country-specific factors that may be missed by the explanatory and control variables. In other words, it works as a proxy control for other potential determinants of democracy not included in the model. Second, it “helps turn the equation into a change model, transforming the dependent variable from regime type [democracy] to the change in a country’s regime type [degree of democracy] over a given five-year period” (Ross 2001, 339). Third, it helps address the problem of serial correlation, which often

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plagues pooled time-series, cross-sectional data such as the ones used in this study (Stimson 1985). Fourth, it helps to control for the possibility of “endogeneity bias; that is, causality running in the direction from democ racy to the explanatory variables instead ofvice versa” (Teorell 2010, 171).

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Since the Middle Eastern states examined in this study are developing countries, we need to examine the impacts of the explanatory variables upon LDCs in general first.21 The findings will help highlight some of the unique characteristics of democracy among the Middle Eastern countries.

LDCs

Internationalization of national economies clearly helps developing coun tries improve their levels of democracy. KOF Index is consistently significant for both electoral (Table la) and liberal (Table lb) democracies, indicating a positive influence of the internationalization of national economies upon the levels of democracy among LDCs. Interestingly, Net Trade shows a negative impact on the levels of electoral democracy under models (1) and (2) in Table la, while it shows no effect on liberal democracy. These findings may reflect the fact that the initial changes toward greater basic freedoms, such as the initiation of public elections of legislators, may be more easily manipulated by the elites because, at the earlier stages of economic growth, only the elites are able to reap the benefits of increased financial resources via international trade, thus monopolizing the ability to control the outcome.

Such abilities of the elites to stymie democracy, however, maybe lim ited. In fact, when controlled for Level of National Income (models (3) and (4) in Table la), Net Trade exhibits no effect on the levels of electoral democracy. Further, Level of National Income shows a positive impact in Table lb , which indicates that the overall level of wealth among the public is a key to liberal democracy and that the wealth among the public is at least as important as the internationalization of national economies. GINI Index, however, does not show any impact: the income inequality among the population per se does not directly affect the levels of either electoral or liberal democracy in developing countries.

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Table la:Generalized Least Squares Regression on (Electoral) Democracy among LDCs. (1) (2 ) (3) (4)

Net Trade – .0 0 0 * -.0 0 0 * – .0 0 0 -.0 0 0 FDI -.092 -.090 -.094 .091 GDP .000 .000 .000 .000 KOF Index 033 *** .035 *** .033 *** .036 ***

Level of National Income -.073 -.060 GINI Index .002 .001 .002 .001

Islam -.0 0 2 -.0 0 2 -.0 0 2 -.0 0 2 Arab State -.347 -.329 -.358 -.338

GDP Per Capita -.227 -.243 -.134 -.166 Urbanization .001 -.001 .001 -.001 Education -.004 -.003 -.004 -.003

Gov’t Consumption Exp. -.024 * -.024 * -.024 * -.024 * Gov’t Activities -.017* -.017 * -.017 -.017 Military Exp. .071 * .071 * .071 * .072 *

Oil .005 .006 .006 .006

Rule of Law .203 * .2 1 2 * Corruption .2 1 0 * .216*

Middle Eastern States -.980 *** _ 9 4 4 *** – 985 *** – 946 ***

Constant 34.087 35.629 * 33.570 35.326 * Democracy,,^ 793 *** 79 5 *** 793 ***t 795 ***

Observations 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 States 116 116 116 116 Log Likelihood -1,718 -1,717 -1,717 -1,717

*significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level. All independent and control variables are lagged by 4 years. Generalized Least Squares regressions were run; corrected for first-order autocorrelation using a panel-specific process. For the sake of parsimony of presentation, the dummy variables for years are not listed

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Table lb: Generalized Least Squares Regression on (Liberal! Democracy among LDCs. ( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)

Net Trade – . 0 0 0 – . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 FD1 -.040 -.033 -.034 -.027 GDP . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 KOF Index .018 *** Q2 2 *** q| y *** Q2 1 ***

Level of National Income .231 * .256 * GINI Index – . 0 0 0 – . 0 0 1 – . 0 0 0 – . 0 0 1

Islam – . 0 0 1 – . 0 0 1 – . 0 0 1 – . 0 0 1 Arab State – . 1 0 1 -.079 -.071 – . 0 2 1

GDP Per Capita – . 0 1 2 -.038 -.308 -.367 Urbanization – . 0 0 2 -.005 – . 0 0 2 -.005 Education . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 2

Gov’t Consumption Exp. O (X) * -.019 * . 0 2 0 ** . 0 2 1 ** Gov’t Activities -.007 -.007 .008 .008 Military Exp. -.017 – . 0 1 2 -.018 -.014

Oil . 015 *** – 015 *** -.016 *** – 015 ***

Rule of Law 422 *** 415 *** Corruption 41 j *** 39Q ***

Middle Eastern States -.381 -.293 -.364 -.283

Constant 84.461 *** 87.924 *** 86.124 *** 89.252 *** Democracy^, .780 *** .810 *** 7 9 9 *** .809 ***

Observations 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 States 116 116 116 116 Log Likelihood -1,515 -1,517 -1.513 -1,514

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Unlike the findings and arguments fotmd in the literature, neither Islam nor Arab State exhibits any statistically significant effect on democracy: the empirical results shown here clearly illustrate that, when controlled for the effects of the other explanatory variables included in this study, neither the religion of Islam22 nor the “Arab culture” affects the levels of either electoral or liberal democracy. The deterministic argument of some scholars about the negative influence of the religion of Islam on democracy and the so-called “neo-patrimonialism” explanation of the democracy deficit in the Middle East are clearly contradicted by the empirical evidence.

None of the indicators of economic development (GDP Per Capita, Urbanization, or Education) shows any effect on electoral, or liberal, democracy. This is interesting because many published works conclude that GDP per capita is one of the most important determinants of democracy. Given the fact that those works did not include Rule of Law or Corruption in their analyses, and that, as explained below, both these indicators turned out statistically significant for electoral and liberal democracies, it seems that the quality of political institutions matters more than economic factors such as economic development.

Elites’ efforts at maintaining control over the society show mixed results. Their efforts through Gov’t Consumption expenditure are effec tive in slowing the development of democracy. It shows a statistically significant, negative effect on both electoral and liberal democracies. Although Gov’t Activities shows no effect on the levels of democracy, these results indicate that the elites in developing countries are clearly capable of impeding democracy by utilizing such tools of manipulation. The statistically significant, positive effect of Military Expenditure, shown in Table la , may suggest that, when they feel more secure about their control over the society due to the increased military, the elites become more comfortable with allowing greater levels of electoral freedom. As its null findings on liberal democracy in Table lb show, however, Military Expenditure does not make the elites comfortable enough to allow true political liberalization.

As expected, Oil proves to be a negative factor for liberal democracy. All ofits coefficients in Tables lb are significant at the .001 level. For elec toral democracy, however, Oil does not make any difference. None of its coefficients in Table la is significant. For most developing countries, elites’

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ability to control the finances seems to make a critical difference only in the advancement of liberal democracy.

As the statistically significant, negative coefficients of Middle Eastern States in Tables la and lb illustrate, the Middle Eastern countries are clearly behind other developing countries in terms of their levels of both electoral and liberal democracies. Also noticeable is the difference in the size ofits coefficients between Table la (-.980***, -.944***, -.985***, and -.946***) and Table lb (-.381*, -.293, -.364*, and -.283). This difference signifies that the Middle Eastern states are behind the rest of the world in terms of their levels of electoral democracy but not as much in liberal democracy. Given the commonly-shared perception that the Middle Eastern countries are behind the rest of the world at all levels of democracy, this finding is noteworthy: when all the major explanatory variables are held constant, the Middle Eastern states are not as much behind the rest of the world in their levels of liberal democracy as in electoral democracy.

This last finding seems to have much to do with the quality of political institutions. The importance of providing effective Rule of Law and reducing Corruption for improving the levels of both electoral and liberal democracies is clearly demonstrated in these Tables. In addition, what is equally noteworthy is the fact that the quality of political institutions brings a stronger impact to bear upon liberal democracy than it does upon electoral democracy. Ride of Law exhibits stronger impacts in Table lb (.422*** and .391***) than in Table la (.203* and .212*). Similarly, Corruption shows stronger impacts on liberal democracy than upon electoral democracy.

Middle Eastern States

The main question of this study is whether there is anything unique to the Middle Eastern states in terms of democracy. The empirical findings shown in Table 2 delineate some important characteristics.

M id d le E a s te r n s t a t e s a r e

b e h in d t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r ld

in t e r m s o f t h e i r le v e ls

o f e le c t o r a l d e m o c r a c y

b u t n o t a s m u c h in l ib e r a l

d e m o c r a c y .

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Table 2: Generalized Least Squares Regression on (Electoral and Liberal) Democracy among Middle Eastern States. Variable (Electoral) (Liberal)

Net Trade .0 0 0 ** .0 0 0 ** .0 0 0 – .0 0 0 FDI .389 .397 -.131 -.146 GDP – ooo *** . ooo *** .0 0 0 ** .0 0 0 ** KOF Index .067 .104* .083 * .086 **

Level ofNational Income -.375 -.422 -.527 -.582 GINI Index .315 ** .329 ** .014 .032

Islam 4 7 3 *** 4 3 4 *** .092 .066

GDP Per Capita 3.148 4.195 .803 1.446 Urbanization JQJ *** – 182 *** -.042 -.049 Education .044 ** .039 * -.008 -.007

Gov’t Consumption Exp .027 -.031 .138 .148 Gov’t Activities -.051 – .1 0 2 .093 .077 Military Exp -.091 -.239 .071 .045

Oil -.096 *** -.116*** .014 .0 1 1

Rule of Law 1.557 * .474 Corruption -.196 .272

Arab Spring .906 .901 -.579 -.597

Constant 503.337 ** 628.946 *** 143.142 169.471 Democracy,tJl) -.281 ** -.270 ** .030 .046

Observations 48 48 48 48 States 8 8 8 8 Log Likelihood -26 -29 -14 -14

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As above, internationalization of national economies shows a sign of positively influencing the levels of democracy. KOF Index is significant for both electoral (.104*) and liberal (.083* and .086**) democracies. This time, however, Net Trade shows a positive effect on the levels of electoral democracy: the greater the volume of Net Trade, the greater the levels of electoral democracy among the Middle Eastern states. In addition, GDP exhibits a negative effect on electoral democracy (-.000*** and -.000***) while showing a positive effect on liberal democracy (.000** and .000**). This may appear to suggest that, the greater the size of the economy (GDP), the less electoral freedoms the Middle Eastern states allow, while, at the same time, promoting liberal democracy. A more accurate interpretation, however, is that, these results signify the ability, as well as the limitation, of the elites to impede democracy. It seems the elites in the Middle East are less able to stymie liberal democracy than electoral democracy when the country’s economy starts expanding.

Also noticeable is the “positive” coefficients for G INI Index (.315** and . 329 * *, for electoral democracy). They appear to imply that the greater the income inequality among the public, the greater the level of electoral democracy in the Middle Eastern societies. As counter-intuitive as these findings may be, they actually underscore the above explanation on the elites’ ability to impede the progress of electoral democracy. In fact, the findings on Urbanization (-.191*** and -.182***) and Oil (-.096*** and – .116***) support this assertion as well. They indicate that the greater extent of urbanization and dependence on oil help the elites in the Middle East impede electoral democracy. While Urbanization may eventually help promote electoral democracy when it leads to improved education among the public, it seems to give the Middle Eastern elites more opportunities to maintain political control due to the public’s increased dependence on the state for various services.

One interesting twist is that the findings on Oil appear to be the exact opposite of Tables la & lb. Oil shows a negative effect on electoral, but not liberal, democracy. It was argued before that Oil does not make a dif ference in the levels of electoral democracy while it makes a statistically significant, negative impact on the progress of liberal democracy. The seemingly contradictory results found here seem to provide yet additional evidence of the limitation of the elites, rather than their ability, to impede

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democracy. The elites in the Middle East seem to be capable of hindering the progress of electoral democracy by utilizing Oil, but they seem to be less capable of thwarting liberal democracy.

These findings on GDP, GINIIndex, Urbanization, and Ot7all demon strate the elites ability to stymie the progress of electoral democracy, while they show no impact on the levels of liberal democracy, except for GDP. In fact, the statistically significant, positive coefficients of GDP actually further support the argument. Although the three indicators of the elites efforts at maintaining their control—Gov’t Consumption Expenditure, Gov’t Activities, and Military Expenditure—show no effect on either electoral or liberal democracy, the findings on these four indicators clearly demon strate the Middle Eastern elites’ ability to take advantage of the growing economy to maintain control over the society and frustrate the progress of electoral democracy.

Further, these findings show that the elites in the Middle Eastern states have a greater ability to do so than those in other LDCs. Conversely, they seem to be quite limited in their ability to thwart the progress of liberal democracy. None of the tools of manipulation the elites use exhibits any impact on liberal democracy. In fact, only GDP and KOF Index show a statistically significant effect on liberal democ

racy. This indicates that, in order to hamper the growth of democracy, the elites in die Middle Eastern countries have to rely more heavily on economic resources than their counterparts in other developing countries.

The positive effect of Islam(A73*** and .434*** on electoral democ racy) indicates that the demographic homogeneity, based on the religion of Islam, helps improve the levels of electoral democracy in the Middle East, though it shows no effect on liberal democracy. It also provides evidence that the religion of Islam perse does not impede the progress of democracy. These findings are consistent with those demonstrated in Tables la and lb.

Education’s positive influence on democracy is also demonstrated

T h e fin d in g s on th e s e fo u r in d ic a to rs c le a rly d e m o n s tra te th e M id d le E as te rn e lite s ‘ a b ility to ta k e a d v a n ta g e o f th e g ro w in g e c o n o m y to m a in ta in c o n tro l o v e r th e s o c ie ty and fru s tra te th e p ro g ress o f e le c to ra l d e m o c ra c y .

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(.044** and .039*). Although it fails to show any statistical significance for liberal democracy, improved education among the public clearly helps improve the levels of electoral democracy, which unveils another idiosyn- cracy of the Middle Eastern countries. Previously, we found that Education had no direct impact on either electoral or liberal democracy among developing countries in general. Among the Middle Eastern countries, however, Education proved to be an important contributing factor for electoral democracy.

One of the indicators of the quality of political institutions, Rule of Law, does make a difference in the levels of electoral democracy (1.557*) among the Middle Eastern states. When the elites abide by the rules of law, electoral democracy is more likely to make headway. Rule of Law, however, does not show any effect on liberal democracy, demonstrating that it does not help explain the variations in the levels of liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern states.’ This may be because there is little difference among these countries in the extent to which they provide well-established, functioning rules of law. After all, hardly any of the Middle Eastern states can be classi fied as a secular state—at least not based on the way Rule of Law is defined and operationalized. So, the extent of their law enforcement may not be enough to secure a tangible improvement of liberal democracy.

Corruption, further, proves to have no effect on either electoral or liberal democracy either. This, by itself, does not make sense. Corruption and democracy do not go together. A greater degree of Corruption means a lesser degree of guarantee for the tenets of democracy. However, if you take into considerations the fact that many of these autocratic leaders have recendy learned how to manipulate the “coordination goods,” such as media and other means of communication, to stay in power, this phenomenon becomes more explicable.

One of the lessons that many successful autocratic rulers have learned in recent years is that, as long as they control the “coordination goods,” they

O n e o f th e in d ic a to rs o f th e q u a lity o f p o litic a l in s titu tio n s , R u le o f L a w , d o es m a k e a d iffe re n c e in th e leve ls o f e le c to ra l d e m o c ra c y a m o n g th e M id d le E as tern s ta te s .

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can safely provide various public goods and allow certain degrees of political freedom, without jeopardizing their political survival.23 This phenomenon, together with the fact that Rule of Law does not show any effect on the levels of liberal democracy in the Middle Eastern states signify the extent to which the Middle Eastern elites rely on the control of the coordination goods in their efforts to prevent the advancement of liberal democracy. For the advancement of their electoral form of democracy, the quality of political institutions seems to make a difference. For the growth of their liberal democracy, however, the questionable enforcement of Rule of Law and the tight control of the coordination goods appear to be the critical impediments. The null-findings on Arab Spring seem to provide support to this assertion. The so-called Arab Spring seems to have jump-started some movements toward democracy but it has not led to a true political liberalization of the Middle Eastern societies.

DISCUSSION The internationalization of national economies proved to be an important determinant for democracy in developing countries. KOFIndex turned out statistically significant for both electoral and liberal democracies in LDCs. As for the Middle East, the authoritarian regimes seem to have to rely more heavily on economic resources to stay in power than their counterparts in other developing countries. That is especially true for preventing the spread of liberal democracy. As the above findings show, the indicators of the internationalization of national economies—GDP and KOF Index—are the only ones that demonstrate a statistically significant impact. In other words, the elites in the Middle East are quite limited in their ability to hin der liberal democracy. They are more successful in impeding the progress of electoral democracy through the use of rent-seeking activities, but the empirical evidence indicates that such tools of manipulation are not useful for thwarting liberal democracy.

At the same time, however, our findings also suggest that the Middle Eastern elites have quickly learned to manipulate “coordination goods” to impede democracy and stay in power. Despite the general impression that there has been some improvements of the levels of democracy since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the null-findings on Arab Spring make evident

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that there has been no detectable improvement of either electoral or liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern societies.

Various scholars have sought to explain the democracy deficit and the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. None of them, however, has fully succeeded in providing a satisfactory explanation. One of the reasons for this lies in the difficulty with defining and operationalizing the concept of democracy in a universally acceptable manner. By utilizing the POLITY and Freedom House data sets to represent the electoral and liberal democracies respectively, this study has shown a more sensible way to operationalize democracy than the traditional approach taken by most scholars, which relies on one indicator to measure the entire concept of democracy. The resultant empirical findings have allowed us to conduct deeper analyses of the impacts of the presumed determinants of democracy. Consequently, we are now able to make more nuanced critiques of the explanations on the Middle Eastern democracy deficit.

Take the “rentier-state” theory, for example. It was criticized for its failure to account for the endurance of authoritarianism in the resource- poor countries of the region. The findings of this study have helped us realize that, if we focus on the electoral aspects of democracy, the “rentier-state” theory is remarkably accurate. We have also realized that some of the critiques of the theory make more sense if we focus our atten tion on liberal democracy. In other words, we have discovered that the “rentier-state” theory is not without merit: thus, dismissing its arguments would be a mistake.

This study has also rendered credence to the critiques of the essential- ists’ arguments that Islam and democracy are not compatible, and that the idea of democracy is alien to the mindset of Muslims. The empirical evidence has clearly refuted these claims. It shows that the greater the Muslim population among the Middle Eastern states, the greater their levels of electoral democracy.

The focus on Arab culture to explain the democracy deficit in the

The null-findings on Arab Spring make evident that there has been no detectable improvement of either electoral or liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern societies.

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Middle East—particularly the “neo-patrimonialism” argument by Sharabi and others—seems to miss the mark as well. After all, the same line of argument was used by some other scholars to try to explain the democracy deficit among the Confucian states, and it has already been refuted by many scholars, including the findings of some empirical studies. This study has shown that, when it is controlled for the effects of all the other variables, Arab State shows no direct effect on either electoral or liberal democracy. This demonstrates a serious under-specification of the model by past stud ies, and refutes their conclusion on the influence of Arab culture upon democracy.24 The “neo-patrimonialism” argument not only lacks the vigor of logical soundness but it is also contradicted by the empirical evidence as well. Further, it fails to explain the variations in the levels of democracy among the Middle Eastern states that are all Arab states.25

The argument that focused on the coercive apparatus of the authori tarian regimes of the Middle East boils down to the debate between the “will” and the “capacity” explanations. This study has shown that the “capacity” per se does not help explain the variations in the levels of either electoral or liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern states. While the argument focused on the “will” of the elites to use the coercive apparatus to prevent democracy requires further research, this study has allowed us to fine tune the focus of inquiry, specifically upon the “will,” much more than past studies.

Finally, the “modernization” theory has also been criticized by many scholars for failing to account for the democracy deficit among the high- income, oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. Our findings have shown that, in looking at the levels of liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern states, the theory’s explanation is actually accurate. As we have discovered, the only variable that helps explain the variations in the levels of liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern countries is the internationalization of their national economies. Given the fact that its two indicators— GDP and KOF Index—are the only indicators that proved statistically significant for liberal democracy, it seems that the “modernization” theory is quite valid after all for the Middle Eastern states.

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Notes

1. For more information about the literature on political culture please see Brynen et al., Beyond Arab Spring, pp. 96-104.

2. Democratization efforts began in the mid-1980s with the rise of radical Islamic movements and gained impetus after 9 /11 . Bolrne (2015, 22); Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (2000, 3).

3. See Diamond (2008). 4. See Schumpeter (1947, 269). 5. Another problem is that the checklist of civil liberties was partly changed

in 1989. To maintain a constant measure of democracy, therefore, one may have to choose to limit the date to either before 1989 or after 1990. We chose the latter.

6. Inglehart and Welzel (2009) argued that the essence of democracy lies in its empowerment of ordinary citizens and that, whether a democracy is effective or not depends not only on the extent to which civil and political rights exist on paper, but also the degree to which elected officials actually respect these rights. The existence of such rights on paper is measured by Freedom House’s annual country ratings. As the “effectiveness” of a country’s democratic institutions is not measured by Freedom House, they suggested the use of the World Bank’s gov ernance scores, in conjunction with the Freedom House scores, so that a “rough index of effective democracy can be obtained by multiplying these two scores.” (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 44) Teorell and Hadenius (2006), however, had explained their three lines of criticism of this alternative index proposed by Welzel and Inglehart in 2006, pointing out a serious problem with its construct validity. Hadenius and Teorell (2005) also found a systematic tendency of the Freedom House scores to underestimate the level of democracy, whereas the Polity scores have a systematic tendency to overestimate the level of democracy. Consequently, they recommended an alternative index of democracy by taking the average of the Freedom House and the Polity scores to minimize measurement bias. This last approach, however, represents yet another effort to produce a global index that would cover all aspects of democracy. As we have explained, such an approach is misguided, if not misleading. Hence, such an index is not appropriate either.

7. The concept of the internationalization of national economies requires multiple measures to capture it adequately. Several economic indicators – trade, finance, and production, – allow us to capture the totality of the concept (Sachs 1998). Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (Global Transformations) also used these three areas of international economic activities to measure the extent and depth of global economic interconnectedness. Net Trade is used as one of the measures to gauge the extent of the internationalization of national economies. It is indexed by the state’s net trade, measured as percentage of its GDP to standardize

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data for the cross-national variations. FDI measures the net inflows of investment acquiring a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, and it is another ideal measure of a country’s degree of economic internationalization. The data on FDI is based on balance of payments data reported by the IMF, supple mented by data on net FDI reported by the OECD and official national sources. The production aspect of a country’s economic internationalization is captured by using the GDP(Gross Domestic Product). (Sachs, “International Economics,” Held, et al., Global Transformations)

8. This variable is measured by the per capita GNI (Gross National Income). The data are obtained from the World Development Indicators, 2016.

9. The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2016, supplemented by the CIA World Factbook (1990 – 2015).

10. Ross (2001) found a statistically significant, negative impact of “Islam” on democracy. Unlike this study, however, his model failed to control Islam for Economic Development and Internationalization of national Economies-, thus, fall ing short of the statistical specifications oflater studies by Imai (2006 and 2010).

11. Islam is measured as the percentage of Muslims within the total popula tion in each state. The data are from the CL4 World Factbook (1990 ~ 2015).

12. It is measured by GDP per capita, log transformed. The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2016.

13. An increase in the urban population may not necessarily represent an increase in the overall wealth for the society unless if is controlled for the quality of life among the urban residents. Urbanization is therefore calculated by multi plying the “proportion of urban, as percentage of the total, population” and the “percentage of urban population with access to improved water source.” The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2016.

14. Democracy is stable in affluent countries. One possible explanation for this may be found in education. More highly educated people are more likely to embrace democratic values. Przeworski et al. argued that education increases the probability of survival of democracy at each level of income. Feng and Zak argued that democratic transitions are more likely to take place in nations where, ceteris paribus, the citizens are better educated.

15. The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2016 (World Bank), supplemented by the CIA World Factbook (1990 -2015).

16. The data are from the Penn World Tables. 17. Ross (2001, 338). The data are from the World Development Indicators,

2016. 18. The Middle Eastern states included in this study are: Egypt, Iran, Jordan,

Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. The choice of the countries were

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dictated by the availability of a sufficient amount of data. 19. Imai (2006) found that such an enduring impact is detected by lagging

independent variables by three to five years, beyond which the statistical significance of the variables begins to diminish rapidly.

20. The 116 countries included in this study are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botsuwana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

21. Although Kuwait and United Arab Emirate are categorized by the world bank as high income countries based on their per capita income, their societal characteristics are unmistakably those of developing countries.

22. We ran separate regression analyses by measuring Islam as a) the percent age of Muslims within the total population in each state and b) a dummy variable for Muslim-majority states. The results were exactly the same between the two in terms of their statistical significance, or lack thereof.

23. See “Development and Democracy” by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs (2005) for details.

24. For the detailed discussion on the under-specifications of a statistical model, see Cranmer and Desmarais; Diehl & Wright; and Poast.

25. Due to the lack of data on some of the variables and the country’s high- income status, Israel is not included in this analysis.

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